841D.01/326: Telegram
The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State
74. Acknowledging your number 56, April 4 and accompanying draft for proposed note to Eire. The situation following recent exchange of notes appears to be substantially as follows. There is a growing realization that our note was not a hostile ultimation [ultimatum] to be followed by reprisals but a request which responsibility for American lives and our military effort compelled us to make. It came as a shock to Irish complacency and angered and alarmed those who counted on a free and prosperous ride without prejudice to the riders. This shock brought immediate and general support to De Valera for his refusal. It is now realized that his intimations of impending invasion were unfounded and probably disingenuous and thoughtful people are beginning to worry over the position in which he has placed Eire on the record. There are signs that the opposition parties while upholding neutrality are preparing to attack the Government for the manner in which it has shown needless unfriendliness to us and made political capital by willfully misinterpreting our request.
The imponderables are working for us and gradually weakening belief in De Valera’s thesis that acquiescence in our request meant violation of Irish sovereignty, betrayal of neutrality and immediate and inevitable entry into war. Letting the truth work itself out within the Irish mind is the only practical course for us to take. Although we failed in our efforts to increase the security factor for our military effort we are in a stronger position than we were, even in this respect. Eire is now on formal notice as to the responsibility which she has elected to assume.
Churchill’s speech in the Commons made that clear and it is in our written record through the memorandum of my conversation with [Page 255] De Valera on the occasion of giving him assurances pursuant to your instructions and prepared and sent to him at his request.
We have also the record of his formal refusal to cooperate even in a small way in this world emergency as protection against future demands of his which we may deem unreasonable. From a practical point of view our note has not diminished cooperation in security measures or in releasing aircraft. It is also operating to make Eire accept the serious reduction of coal supplies necessitated by the British shortage without politically-inspired resentment. It is probable that it will have a similar effect on other reductions if and when they occur. This is of great value in minimizing the danger that would attend a martyred Ireland propaganda.
The proposed new note is excellently conceived and drafted but we see little or nothing that its delivery and publication here would gain for us. We cannot put Eire more on record than she now is and it is a certainty that De Valera will not reconsider his reply. The disadvantages that we should experience are several. First we give De Valera important help for his political campaign by giving him the opportunity for rousing the country with more emotional and disingenuous appeals. Second we enhance his prestige by dignifying his answer to us with a reply that will not further our interest there. No argument or citation of fact will change the lunatic group. Truth seeking people do not need our assistance. Of the situation in America you of course are a far better judge than we.
As well as we can reconstruct it would seem desirable to point out the falsity of De Valera’s premises to the American public. Cannot this be done by issuing the substance of the draft note in the form of a statement which you could father, though from our point of view it would be preferable to have it issued by an Assistant Secretary. That touch would not escape Irish scrutiny. In other words treat this disingenuous reply as it deserves to be treated.
On April 6 I had a long conference with British representative. He strongly holds views similar to the above as regards situation in Eire but withholds comment as to best policy in America, He feels that from the British viewpoint the note though excellent would gain us nothing of practical value and would probably cause deterioration of Anglo-Irish working relations at a time when reduction of coal may produce serious dislocation of Irish economy. For the present at least he feels the least said here the better.
Whether the note is delivered or used as a statement I would suggest cutting out reference to bombing Eire territory. Our unfortunate mishap in Switzerland47 was prominently publicized by Government newspaper. I would suggest also in presenting case of [Page 256] parachutists that “the published record shows et cetera.” be the reading instead of “the American Government is informed”.
Repeated to Winant.