Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁹⁹

London, 18 October, 1944.

799. I send you in my immediately following text of document to which Mikolajczyk’s delegation agreed together with two amendments on which Stalin insisted. Mikolajczyk said that if he accepted the first of these amendments he would be repudiated by his own people. Stalin’s position is that in this case it is not worth while proceeding to the difficult discussions arising out of the second amendment. These could probably have been surmounted had the first been accepted.

2. Both the London and the Lublin Poles will now return home to consult their colleagues on outstanding points and our communiqué from here will explain that progress has been made and differences narrowed.¹ Meanwhile, only the London Poles and Russians know of this document and every endeavour will be made to prevent it leaking out, though London Poles will have to consult some of their people.

3. You will see I have not gone at all beyond the position adopted by His Majesty’s Government in your presence at Tehran, though possibly the regions to be ceded by Germany have been more precisely stated. I have made it clear throughout that you are not committed in any way by what I have said and done. It only amounts to a promise on the part of His Majesty’s Government to support the Curzon Line and its compensations at the armistice or peace conference, which alone can give a final and legal validity to all territorial changes. I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east, and our 20–year treaty with Russia makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Averell² will have reported, that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles that you had expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Tehran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles. I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasised his earnest desire for your return at the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

5. Meanwhile, in other directions, considerable advantages have been gained. You have already been informed about the obvious resolve of the Soviet Government to attack Japan on the overthrow of Hitler, of their detailed study of the problem and of their readiness to begin inter-Allied preparations on a large scale. When we are vexed with other matters, we must remember the supreme value of this in shortening the whole struggle.

6. Arrangements made about the Balkans are, I am sure, the best that are possible. Coupled with our successful military action recently we should now be able to save Greece³ and, I have no doubt that agreement to pursue a 50–50 joint policy in Yugoslavia will be the best solution for our difficulties in view of Tito’s⁴ behaviour and changes in the local situation, resulting from the arrival of Russian and Bulgarian forces under Russian command to help Tito’s eastern flank. The Russians are insistent on their ascendency in Roumania and Bulgaria as the Black Sea countries.

7. Although I hear most encouraging accounts from various quarters about United States politics, I feel the suspense probably far more than you do or more than I should if my own affairs were concerned in this zone. My kindest regards and warmest good wishes.

99. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
1. In telegram 801, October 22, 1944, Churchill informed President Roosevelt of the compromises proposed by both sides and the reasons for feeling “hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement.” The text of this telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 206.
2. W. Averell Harriman.
3. For correspondence concerning the policy of the United States toward political developments in Greece after liberation from German occupation, see vol. v, pp. 84 ff.
4. Josip Broz (Tito), leader of the guerrilla Partisan forces in Yugoslavia. In regard to the concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia, see vol. iv , section on Yugoslavia.