Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt

[Translation]

I have received your message on the Polish question. It goes without saying that a correct solution of this question is of great importance for us as well as for our common cause.

There are two principal points: first—the Soviet-Polish border, second—the composition of the Polish Government. The point of view of the Soviet Government is known to you from the recently issued statements and from Mr. Molotov’s letter⁸⁴ sent in reply to Mr. Hull’s note received in Moscow on January 22 through Soviet Ambassador Gromyko.⁸⁵

First of all about the Soviet-Polish border. As it is known, the Soviet Government officially stated that it did not consider the border line of 1939 inalterable and has agreed to the Curzon line, thus having made considerable concessions to the Poles in the border question. We had the right to expect an appropriate statement from the Polish Government. The Polish Government should have made an official statement that the border line established by the Riga Treaty was subject to change and that the Curzon line was being accepted by it as the new border line between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Such a statement of recognition of the Curzon line should have been made by the Polish Government in the same official manner as it was done by the Soviet Government. None the less the Polish Government in London did not make any move, stating, as before, in its official declarations that the border line, which was forced upon us at a difficult moment by the Riga Treaty, should remain inalterable. Hence there is no ground for an agreement, as the point of view of the present Polish Government, as it appears, excludes the possibility of an agreement.

In connection with the above-mentioned circumstances the question regarding the composition of the Polish Government became more acute. Besides, it is clear that the Polish Government, in which the principal role is played by hostile to the Soviet Union pro-fascist imperialist elements, such as Sosnkovsky, and in which there are almost no democratic elements, can find no ground in Poland itself, and cannot, as experience has shown, establish friendly relations with Soviet democratic states. Naturally, such a Polish government is not in a condition to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and it is impossible to expect from it that it will not introduce dissensions into the midst of the democratic countries, which, on the contrary, are interested in the strengthening of unity among themselves. It follows from the above that the basic improvement of the Polish government appears to be an urgent task.

I was late with the reply in view of tasks at the front.

February 16, 1944.

84. Not printed; Ambassador Gromyko transmitted this letter on January 24. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union had already reported on his interview with Molotov in telegram 183, January 18, p. 1230.
85. Not printed; the contents of this note had been sent to Ambassador Harriman with instructions to “take up the matter with the Soviet Government”, in telegram 88, January 15, p. 1228.