The Ambassador then inquired about the nature of the Russian
reply53 to this Government in response to its
tender of good offices to aid in bringing the Soviet and Polish
Governments together in order that they might consider matters of
difference between them. I said that it was not an outright
rejection but that it stated hi effect that conditions had not
sufficiently ripened thus far so as to make the offer of the United
States of desirable utility.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Polish Government in Exile
for President Roosevelt
A conversation took place between Prime Minister Churchill and
Premier Mikolajczyk in the presence of Foreign Secretary Eden,
Under Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan, Minister Romer and
Ambassador Raczynski,54 in the course of which the situation between
the Polish and Soviet Governments was discussed. Mr. Churchill
suggested that:
- 1)
- The Polish Government should agree to accept the
so-called Curzon Line (prolonged through Eastern
Galicia) as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet
Government.
- 2)
- The final settlement of the Eastern frontier to be
linked with the grant to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig
and Upper Silesia to the River Oder.
- 3)
- All Poles left on the Soviet side would be given the
right to return to Poland.
- 4)
- All the German population within Poland’s new
boundaries to be removed from Poland.
- 5)
- The solution as enumerated above would receive the
approval and guarantee of the three principal United
Nations.
Mr. Churchill intends personally to telegraph to Premier Stalin
suggesting such a solution on his own behalf and demanding that
the Soviet Government engage itself to refrain from any further
calling in doubt of the Polish Government and any interference
or ingérence in the internal affairs of
Poland. He would likewise indicate to Premier Stalin the
indispensable necessity of bringing about an understanding
between the Polish and Soviet Governments regarding the
coordination of action and of the safeguarding of forces
fighting in Poland against the German forces of occupation.
In view of the fear of accomplished facts being created in
Poland, Prime Minister Churchill urged that the Polish
Government authorize him to express in his telegram to Premier
Stalin the consent of the Polish Government to negotiate on the
basis of the Curzon Line.
Premier Mikolajczyk explained to Prime Minister Churchill that
his suggestions raise a series of grave doubts and requested
their thorough elucidation. For instance,—an a priori acceptance
by the Polish Government of the Soviet demands would render
further negotiations futile and would create, in the form of a
surrender to a Russian dictate, a legal and de
facto situation highly dangerous to the national unity
of the Polish people and untenable for the Polish
Government,—without at the same time giving to Poland the
effective guarantee that the Soviets would respect her
sovereignty, or that the program of her territorial adjustment
in the West would be carried out.
Premier Mikolajczyk informed Prime Minister Churchill that,
before deciding on their final reply to his suggestions, the
Polish Government intend to consult the Polish underground
authorities in Poland and the United States Government.
The Polish Ambassador is personally authorized by Prime Minister
Mikolajczyk most urgently and personally to submit to the
President the views express[ed] by Mr. Churchill to the Polish
Government and to ask the President very kindly, confidentially
to inform Prime Minister Mikolajczyk through the Ambassador:
- 1)
- Whether the U. S. Government considers it advisable to
enter already now upon the final settlement of
territorial problems of Europe.
- 2)
- Would the U. S. Government be prepared in principle to
participate in bringing about such settlements and to
guarantee them.
- 3)
- Does the U. S. Government regard it possible to lend
its support to Prime Minister Churchill’s plan and to
its realization.
Washington,
January 26,
1944.
