760C.61/2173: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 19—5:21 p.m.]
183. Supplementing my 146 January 17, 11 a.m.,41 there was evidently something unusual going on at the Kremlin yesterday because I could not reach Molotov or either of his secretaries with whom we usually freely deal until it was too late for him to receive me last night. Today at 4 p.m. I handed him the aide-mémoire containing your views on the Polish question and offer of good offices as expressed in your No. 88, January 15, 7 p.m.
Molotov expressed to you thanks for your willingness to assist in the Polish matter but pointed out that Marshal Stalin had stated clearly at Tehran that the Soviet Government could not deal with the present Polish Government in London and that this attitude had been publicly stated since. He repeated that no permanent friendly neighborly relationship could be established with this group because it contained Fascist elements.
In reply to my request for clarification of this error of his statement to me of January 16 that they were willing to deal with a Polish Government in London if reconstructed,42 he explained that the Soviet Government envisioned an entirely new Polish Government including perhaps some of the present members of the London Government, prominent Poles in the United States and Poles now in the Soviet Union.43 He said that, although he did not have sufficient information [Page 1231] to come to a final conclusion, he believed Prime Minister Mikolajczyk would be acceptable in a reconstituted government but he had some doubts about Mr. Romer. He did not mention any individuals now in Russia but on his own initiative mentioned the following names of individuals in the United States as possibilities: Krzewicki,44 Professor Lange,45 Olemanski.46
I made it plain that I had no idea whether my Government would want to involve itself in any way in discussions concerning possible changes in the Polish Government and that my [instruction?] was only to develop the Soviet Government’s attitude. I told him I was sure that in extending good offices you had in mind that the Polish Government in London had now indicated its willingness to reestablish permanent friendly relations and that you had hoped your offer would be helpful in bringing about discussions between the Soviet and Polish Governments.
Molotov again stated that the Soviet position on this question had been made clear, that the Soviet Government was unwilling to deal with the present Polish Government in London, and that the time had often [now?] come for the formation of a new government of “honest” men, untainted by Fascism and well-disposed toward the Soviet Union.
He stated that the Soviet Government had proposed the Curzon line for settlement of the boundary question as the basis for the resumption of relations.
I emphasized the distinction between the Soviet Government unilaterally fixing the Curzon line as the boundary, as against its-proposing the Curzon line as a basis for negotiation. He replied that the Curzon line should be the basis for negotiations subject to some adjustments and stated the Soviet Government would support the extension of the Polish boundaries to the west.
In reply to my inquiry, Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government appreciated the importance of finding a solution and would welcome the continued efforts of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden in that direction, but hoped that Mr. Hull understood the Soviet Government’s position.
During the conversation I took the opportunity to explain to Molotov the public reaction in the United States to the Pravda reply to the Willkie article and other Soviet statements on the Polish question as you described them in the next to the last paragraph of your cable.
[Page 1232]In his conversations with the British Minister47 and me on the 16th Molotov gave each of us the impression that the reconstruction of the Polish Government desired by the Soviet Government was the elimination of the irreconcilably anti-Soviet members and nothing he said then could be interpreted to indicate such a sweeping proposal as he described to me today. I still feel that the Soviet Government might be satisfied with the more moderate changes. Unless something of this kind is accomplished soon, however, I believe the Soviet Government intends to stand pat in the expectation that with their encouragement a new Polish Government friendly disposed toward the Soviet Union can be developed.
- Not printed.↩
- In his telegram 142, January 16, 1944, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that Molotov had stated that “the Soviet Government was not unwilling to deal with a Polish Government in London but that it would not deal with the present Government as now constituted”, and that the persons opposed to friendly relations with the Soviet Union “must be eliminated” from the Polish Government (7600.61/2162).↩
- With regard to the concern of the United States over Soviet support of Polish groups within the Soviet Union in connection with the formation of a new Polish government, see pp. 1398 ff.↩
- Leo Krzycki, Vice President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (CIO), and National Chairman of the American Slav Congress.↩
- Oscar Lange, professor of economics at the University of Chicago.↩
- Father Stanislaus Orlemanski, pastor of a Roman Catholic church in Springfield, Mass.↩
- John Balfour, British Minister in the Soviet Union.↩