800.00 Summaries/39n: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic Officers 74

Discussions have recently taken place between the President and Churchill and between the Department and the British Embassy in Washington in regard to a British approach apparently designed to bring about the establishment in the Balkans of spheres of influence.75 On May 31 Prime Minister Churchill sent a message to the President76 pointing out that conflicts in policy had arisen between the British and the Russians in certain Balkan countries. The Prime Minister stated that as a result of this development the suggestion had been made to the Russian Ambassador in London77 that as a practical matter it should be agreed that the Russian Government would take the lead in Rumanian affairs while the British would take the lead in Greek affairs. Churchill stated that the Soviet Government agreed to this proposal but requested the views of the United States before giving final assurances. Churchill went on to argue at length that this arrangement was merely an extension of the interests of the two countries as reflected by the military situation and maintained that it would be useful in preventing divergences in policy between Great Britain and Russia in the Balkan States. In a subsequent message Churchill re-emphasized that he had no idea of establishing spheres of influence and argued that the British followed the American lead as far as possible in South America. A similar approach was made to the Secretary by Lord Halifax on May 30.78 The Department’s [Page 611] views on this matter were contained in a memorandum submitted to the British Embassy.79 After noting the British thesis regarding the necessity for such an agreement and the intention that the agreement would apply only to war conditions without affecting the rights and responsibilities of the principal Allied governments, the Department stated its reasons for not agreeing to the proposal. It was acknowledged that a government whose military forces are operating in a given territory will ordinarily take the principal initiative in making decisions affecting the territory and made necessary by military operations therein. The Department stated its belief that the natural tendency for the extension of such initiatives to other than the military field would be strengthened by the conclusion of an agreement of this nature. Consequently the Department believes that the proposed arrangements would result in the persistence rather than the elimination of differences in the views of the British and Soviet Governments regarding the Balkan Area and despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to war conditions, would lead to the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence. The memorandum stated the Department’s firm conviction that the practical and military advantages sought in plans of this nature would not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system. The memorandum stated the Department’s opinion that the preferable course of action would be to devote attention to proposals designed to establish adequate machinery for frank consultation regarding the Balkan region. In this manner the policies of the Allied Governments would be directed along the lines of collaboration rather than independent action. The United States Government attaches special importance to this latter policy because of the efforts now being made for concerted action in laying the foundations of a broad system of general security in which all countries, great or small, will have their part. The establishment and effective functioning of such a broad system of general security would inevitably be adversely affected by any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence. The President’s reply to the Prime Minister80 was couched in similar terms. It is the Department’s belief that the British proposal contained serious political implications pertinent to the whole question of joint participation and joint responsibility of all the Allied Governments in the conduct of the war. Despite the military basis upon which this proposal was presented it apparently amounts to an attempt to secure American approval of the establishment of spheres of influence.

Hull
  1. At Algiers, Cairo, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Moscow, and Stockholm.
  2. See vol. v, pp. 84 ff., passim.
  3. Telegram 687, May 31, ibid., p. 114.
  4. Fedor Tarasovich Gusev.
  5. Vol. v, p. 113.
  6. Dated June 12, vol. v, p. 119.
  7. Telegram 557, June 11, ibid., p. 117.