740.0011 EW/10–1744: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:48 p.m.]
8842. From Murphy. The Chief,30 Psychological Warfare Division SHAEF, recommended in a recent staff meeting that a SHAEF directive be issued redefining the objects of Allied occupation of Germany with special reference to the pre-surrender period. A priority list was suggested as follows: (1) to induce in German civilians in occupied territories non-resistance and obedience to our orders thus reducing the number of garrison troops necessary; (2) to maintain the output of key industries and essential services; (3) to obtain from the purged German administration at least that degree of collaboration which will prevent administrative sabotage; (4) to obtain from the civilian population at least that degree of acceptance of our rule which will make them unwilling to harbor Nazi guerrillas and saboteurs and (5) by the example of life under military government to counter the effect of Nazi propaganda in the German army and to weaken its spirit of resistance.
The foregoing is in the discussion stage and no decisions were taken on any of the foregoing points in respect of Allied propaganda to the German public but a committee has been set up to study the matter and to formulate local directives.
SHAEF points out that military operations require that railroads continue to operate for the Allies where possible, certain public services—light, water, etc.—are necessary, coal from the mines is required, etc. The workers and other personnel needed for these services will be predominantly German, and of course, to work will need to be fed. Some of the German territory which will be occupied is not self-sustaining and it will be necessary to import food for this purpose. PWD pointed out that the present directive31 permits such imports of food and measures of economic rehabilitation as are demanded by military considerations and that this could be interpreted narrowly to the effect that unless and until starvation has been proved or industrial unrest already caused no food will be imported; broadly looking to an economic policy designed to maintain tolerable living conditions throughout the occupied area thus reducing the garrison troops necessary [Page 561] and maintaining essential production. PWD made the point that if the first is adopted the population will find life under military government infinitely worse than life under the Nazis. Considerable bodies of troops to maintain work in essential industries to guard our lines of communication and to track down the guerrillas harbored by a desperate population would be required. It concludes that after the use of force and threats and after the population has been driven into an attitude of resistance the Allies would probably be compelled to introduce wide-spread relief measures.
It had been proposed among other things to reassure the German population generally that the latter would not starve under Allied rule and it was suggested that military considerations will compel the Allies to maintain employment at as high a level as possible. I urged that no broadcasts or announcements should be made which could even remotely be construed as a general commitment or long term obligation but that use be made of examples in captured areas to demonstrate that German workmen are fed and that there is no starvation or brutality under Allied rule. It is my opinion that it might be most effective at the present stage if Germany were now faced by a wall of complete silence on the Allied propaganda front as distinct from straight news.
The Dept’s comment on the foregoing would be helpful.
In connection also with American information effort [in] Germany during the post defeat period it is now planned to place supervision of this activity in the political section of the Control Council. I have been asked whether the personnel for this work in the Control Council in Berlin as well as under the Commanding General in the American One [Zone] would include OWI civilians and what responsibility OWI would have for operations. PWD is faced with the responsibility of recruiting qualified [personnel?] for this purpose now. I should be grateful for the Dept’s advice in that connection. [Murphy.]
- Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure.↩
- Reference is to the directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in respect of military government in Germany for the pre-surrender period, April 28, 1944, text of which is printed on p. 218. The Economic and Relief Guide for Germany, which constituted Appendix D to the Directive, is printed in Hajo Holborn, American Military Government (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 143.↩