740.00119 E.W./10–1344: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 14—4:11 a.m.]
4170. Scheynius has been visited again by Zuechner of German Legation on October 2, 5 and 6. During these visits, Zuechner communicated following statements concerning alleged interest of German Government on peace feelers, reported in Legation’s 3841, September 23, 7 p.m.
He referred to drastic conditions in Germany and observed that “Germany is now ripe for peace”. With regard to Scheynius’s previous stipulations, Zuechner said reply had been received from Berlin to effect that German Government desired Scheynius to approach American Legation Stockholm, and without expressly mentioning German Government’s interest in matter, endeavor to ascertain sentiments (“Staemningen”, in Swedish) in “Western Allied” circles concerning peace with Germany. Zuechner said on prestige grounds Germany could not openly admit defeat and German leaders could not address themselves directly to “Western Allies”. They wished to use private channels lest rejection of direct advances would undermine German Government’s authority.
[Page 558]Scheynius asked if it would not be better for Germany to make its inquiry in more concrete form, such as asking for “Italian conditions”, or terms based on Atlantic Charter.24 One could then better ascertain whether Allies would be disposed to initiate discussions on definite basis. Zuechner said he personally considered Atlantic Charter most acceptable basis but it would be necessary to refer this question to Berlin. He agreed to propose to Berlin that Scheynius’s alternatives be considered. Zuechner went on to express opinion that Germans had now learned that it was dangerous to follow extremists and to have illusions about ruling Europe. He believed German people would rise up in anger against Nazis. He feared, however, that if “Western Allies” followed too harsh policy, German peoples emotions would be exploited by extremist elements.
On last visit, Zuechner stated telegram to Berlin had been prepared as promised but German Legation felt it unwise to send it as it would only cause lengthy delay. He indicated in response to question, that Hitler would have to approve any decision. Zuechner therefore appealed to Scheynius again to approach American Legation at earliest possible time (to use approximately his own words) to learn conditions which “Western Allies” would propose for an armistice and for basis for peace negotiations between Germany and “Western Allies”. He added that in circles he represented there were no illusions about possible nature of conditions which might be forthcoming. American and British views on the subject were only too well known but subjection to “Western Allies” was considered lesser evil than alliance with Soviet Union. He expressed fear that if “Western Allies” demanded unconditional surrender, Hitler would accept such conditions as Soviets would give Germany.
Scheynius asked why German Government did not address itself to all Allies at same time and Zuechner replied that although German Government realized three great Allies were cooperating to such extent that it would be difficult to separate them, it thought it should, in interest of German people and as last attempt to prevent possible permanent occupation and annexation by Soviets of parts of Germany, make last attempt to explore possibilities for separate agreement with “Western Allies”.
At a fourth meeting on October 7, Zuechner, who had previously stressed fact that his proposals were made with knowledge of German Legation, stated that he was specially asked to stress that everything was being presented in spirit of complete honesty and sincerity with no reservations or evasions. He further expressed desire that no publicity be given to the matter and that it not be brought to knowledge of third parties.
[Page 559]This report from Scheynius was accepted by a Legation officer without comment.25
Simultaneously the Legation has been told the following story by Carl Buchberger, former Austrian Minister to Turkey, who received it from a Swedish source. Von Kleist,26 a Berlin lawyer who comes to Stockholm as Red Cross delegate from time to time, attempted to establish contact with Soviet Legation in June or July. (This is apparently same Von Kleist as has been involved in suggestion to get Baltic Jews out to Sweden, as reported in Legation’s 2362, dated June 28, 10 p.m., 2419, dated July 3, noon, and 2621, dated July 15, 10 a.m.27) Attempted contact was apparently to see whether Russians would be receptive to idea of separate peace with Germany. Whatever directions he had were reportedly set forth in meeting with Dankwort,28 German Legation Counselor, and a Swedish subject named Rasch. Rasch subsequently obtained interview with Semenov,29 Soviet Legation Counselor, who, when he learned object of Rasch’s call, reportedly said he would have nothing whatever to do with matter and would not have granted interview had he known what object was. Buchberger reports further that Von Kleist has just been in Stockholm and departed for Berlin four days ago. On this visit he is said to have stated unequivocally that he had full powers to propose peace to Soviets on whatever terms they might exact. He was, however, unable to make any contact with Soviet representatives, according to Buchberger’s informant.
Foregoing facts and reports may fit in with information available to Department from other sources. Viewed from here, these appear to be transparent and rather clumsy attempts to implant seeds of suspicion between Anglo-Americans and Soviets in another desperate effort to exploit any dissensions among Allies and possibly mitigate eventual fate of Germany. Legation would not be surprised to know that Zuechner’s advances have been brought to the attention of Soviet Legation as Kleist’s efforts were brought to the attention of this Legation.
- Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- On November 2, 1944, the Department of State transmitted aide-mémoire (not printed) to the British and Soviet Embassies, informing them of this indirect approach by Franz Zuechner. The Department stated that the Minister in Sweden declined to consider the approach further and doubted the truth of Zuechner’s claim to represent the German Government. It further indicated that it attached no importance to the approach. (740.00119 EW/11–244)↩
- Reference here is to Peter Kleist.↩
- None printed, but see telegrams 2322 and 2340, June 27, from Stockholm, pp. 525 and 526, respectively.↩
- Werner von Dankwort.↩
- Vladimir Semenovich Semenov.↩