Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

851g.01/9–844

The Secretary of State to the President

top secret

Washington, September 8, 1944.¹

Memorandum for the President

[Subject:] Indochina and Southeast Asia

The French seek restoration of Indochina and have promised some reforms to offset the independence sentiment which exists among the Indochinese and to enlist American support which they presently consider vital. They are fearful of Chinese ambitions. The French and British believe that French participation in the liberation of Indochina will stimulate Free French resistance within the country and thus aid military operations, but the extent and value of such aid is open to question. It is thought that the Japanese may shortly disarm all French troops and take over the country, possibly establishing an independent puppet regime. It seems doubtful if outside assistance could prevent such Japanese action. . . . There is much mutual distrust among the French with whom our people have come in contact. The French divisions in Indochina are considered ineffective.

Despite Mr. Eden’s apparent approval in March 1943 of placing Indochina under trusteeship,² British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority. It is believed that an important factor in the British position is a desire to strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong. In May the French, it is thought at British instigation, requested the British, with Lord [Louis] Mountbatten’s approval, for permission to send a military mission to SEAC, a light intervention force to India for subsequent use in Indochina, and, later on, an expeditionary force to Indochina. They have also asked to participate in planning political warfare in the east and in planning military operations against Japan. The British have indicated they approve of all but the last.³

Although Indochina is not at present in the SEAC theater, it is to be noted the British desire that the details of the proposed French political warfare be worked out between SEAC and the proposed French military mission. Even prior to May the British SOE was training a large number of French officers for officering the light intervention force. Recently, using American facilities and misleading Chennault as to the purpose, the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina and agreed on two such further operations (one agent carrying a letter of credentials from de Gaulle) despite insistence by American officers attached to SEAC that the purpose was primarily political and not military and must be approved in Washington.

Reports indicate a British hope to extend the SEAC theater so as to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Hong Kong.

The Chinese are actively backing the Annamite Revolutionary party which seeks Indochinese independence. There are persistent reports that the Chinese hope for political ascendancy in northern Indochina, or at least creation of a free port and release from the economic stranglehold on southeast China which the French formerly exercised through the Yunnan railroad. They are particularly concerned over the danger to Chinese security inherent in French control of the railroad and their inability to defend it. The Chinese have indicated interest regarding the military government to be established in Indochina.

It would seem of substantial military importance to secure for the United Nations the good will of the native peoples of southeast Asia among whom, for some years, there has been increasing nationalistic sentiment, and who, for the past three years, have been subjected to intense Japanese propaganda exploiting the old slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics”. In this objective Indochina cannot be considered apart from other countries of southeast Asia.

It is suggested that early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of southeast Asia would save many American and Allied lives and facilitate military operations. It would be especially helpful if such concerted announcements could include (1) specific dates when independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be accorded, (2) specified steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment towards other nations. Such announcements might well be accompanied by a reaffirmation of American determination to grant Philippine independence, a joint commitment to restore the independence of Thailand, and a pledge to establish a regional commission for consultation on social and economic problems in the region, on which all countries and peoples concerned would be invited to have membership. The value of such concerted announcements would be still further enhanced if each of the colonial powers concerned would pledge a formal declaration of trusteeship under an international organization for the period of tutelage, but it might be unwise for the United States to attempt to insist upon such a declaration of trusteeship by one country if similar declarations could not be secured from the others.

In addition to their great value as psychological warfare, such announcements would appear to be directly in line with American postwar interests. These areas are sources of products essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. They are potentially important markets for American exports. They lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacific Ocean and have important bearing on our security and the security of the Philippines. Their economic and political stability will be an important factor in the maintenance of peace in Asia. Emergence of these regions as self-governing countries would appear desirable as soon as they are capable of self-rule, either as independent nations or in close voluntary association with western powers, for example as dominions. Such association might indeed lend them political and economic strength (the weakness of Asiatic powers has long been a cause of war) and help prevent future cleavage along regional or racial lines.

Failure of the western powers to recognize the new conditions and forces in southeast Asia and an attempt to reestablish pre-war conditions will almost surely lead to serious social and political conflict, and may lead to ultimate unifying of oriental opposition to the west.

A memorandum on British attitudes towards southeast Asia, generally, is attached.

Will you advise me if you wish the Department to develop details of policy along the lines indicated in the above suggestions.

C[ordell] H[ull]

[Attachment]

The Secretary of State to the President

top secret

[Washington,] September 8, 1944.

Memorandum for the President

Southeast Asia: British Attitudes. There are persistent reports of a British desire to create a Southeast Asia federation of Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indochina under British aegis, if not direct control. This apparently develops from a report prepared last year by five officers of the Burma government. It is strongly denied in London which points to the expectation of eventual dominion status for Burma and British support of French restoration in Indochina. However, the British anticipate a fairly extended military occupation of Thailand and anticipate the need of strong economic control of all these regions to assure revival of sound industrial and agricultural practices. It seems clear that the British envisage economic ascendancy in these areas.

It is significant that the British government has refused to make a public statement in line with yours and the Generalissimo’s on the restoration of the independence of Thailand.⁴ They have suggested that security questions may be involved in the Kra Peninsula (rich rubber area of Thailand) and have raised the question of boundary adjustments. Winant has been instructed to secure, if possible, at least a confidential statement of the position of the British government. There is strong evidence that the British hope to gain predominant influence over the post-war government of Thailand.

Desire for dominion status for Burma has received public British affirmations but is apparently distant. Military government is believed planned for a considerable period and various liberal reforms reportedly urged by the Burmese government-in-exile are believed to have been rejected by London.

In Malaya also it is understood that military government is planned for a period of at least two years. Reform in administration has been urged by business interests and elimination of special treatment and “protection” of racial groups.

Despite rumors of British desire to secure Sumatra, it is believed that the British are in favor of restoring Dutch authority in the Netherlands Indies. A desire to strengthen the restoration of British prestige and controls in Southeast Asia is believed to be an important factor in this position.

All reports indicate that the military operations of SEAC are aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in Southeastern Asia and the restoration of British prestige. To minimize American association in the public eye with restoration of British imperialism which is admittedly highly unpopular in Asia, no American civil affairs officer is to serve in any area in the SEAC theater unless under independent American command, and no American officer may collaborate in SEAC political warfare.

C[ordell] H[ull]

1. The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Coordination and Review: “Actually delivered to White House Sept 9. S[arah] D M[oore.]”
2. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 37, 39; ibid., 1944, vol. iii, pp. 777–778.
3. See ante, p. 248.
4. The reference is to a broadcast made by Chiang on February 26, 1943, and to a subsequent comment thereon by Roosevelt at his press conference of March 12, 1943. See Foreign Relations, 1943, China, pp. 13, 24n, 36–37.