837.61351/4100

The Chargé in Cuba (Briggs) to the Secretary of State

No. 3848

Sir: With reference to my telephone conversations with Mr. Scherer1 on July 15 and 16, 1943 relative to the forthcoming sugar negotiations, I have the honor to enclose for the confidential information of the Department a copy of a memorandum99 of my conversation with Prime Minister Zaydín and Sr. López Castro on July 15, 1943. In this connection I also enclose a copy of my note99 to the Minister of State2 informing him that our Government is agreeable to beginning negotiations in Washington on July 26 next.

The Department will note that during my conversation with the Ministers they expressed themselves as optimistic that an agreement can be reached at an early date (which the Cuban Government obviously much desires), and that I raised as a possible obstacle to the speedy conclusion of an agreement the difficulties encountered this year with the loading of vessels at Cuban ports.

The Cuban argument against the sale of sugar on a delivered-aboard-vessel basis I do not find in the least convincing, and I wish to recommend that serious consideration be given to the desirability of making our purchase on that basis.

There is no single item in the 1943 operations which has caused anything approaching the difficulty experienced in endeavoring to expedite the efficient handling of ships at Cuban ports. This subject [Page 169] has been an almost daily matter of discussion and argument between Ambassador Braden and me on the one hand, and the Prime Minister, the Minister of Labor3 and Sr. López Castro on the other. It has no less occupied the attention of our War Shipping Administration representatives in Habana, with Cuban Labor Department officials, the Cuban Maritime Commission, labor leaders, terminal operators, et cetera. The favorable results obtained with respect to movement of sugar have in my opinion been due largely to these constant efforts on the part of the Embassy, of ten against very tenacious opposition from the Cubans. Furthermore, Cuban shipping charges are exceedingly high, and in my opinion Cuban port workers are by no means ill paid. While admittedly they went through a difficult period in the latter part of 1942 and early 1943, and while at certain ports (notably Cienfuegos) the laborers have shown a thoroughly patriotic attitude, it should not be forgotten that Cuban port workers received a subsidy during their idle period, and that the picture of abnegation and patriotic self-sacrifice painted by the two Cabinet Ministers appears to me to be somewhat overdrawn.

I am not unmindful of the fact that the Embassy’s present suggestion was considered during the last negotiations, and opposed by War Shipping Administration on the grounds that it might interfere with agency arrangements for the handling of vessels, an argument the validity of which I consider at least debatable.

As to the Ministers’ assertions concerning the difficulties between maritime labor and the sugar interests, terminal operators, the Government, et cetera, which they argue would follow adoption of my suggestion, I do not believe these statements are indicative of anything more than reluctance to modify the business-as-usual arrangements under which the Cuban sugar industry is trying to operate. Furthermore, if the maritime labor situation is as explosive as Zaydín maintains, that should in my opinion be all the more reason for our Government to avoid becoming involved (as we have had to become involved incessantly during the past six months) in that situation.

To my mind there is no valid reason why the Cuban Government should not itself (if it does not desire to have the matter handled by the Institute) establish a fund into which would be paid the amount paid by us, representing the cost of handling and placing aboard ship, and I perceive no valid reason why, at a time when we are apparently pre-pared to commit ourselves to purchase many millions of dollars worth of Cuban sugar, thereby supporting the economy of the entire country, we should not do so on terms which should greatly minimize our operational problem.

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I hope therefore that the Department will give renewed consideration to this suggestion, which I may add is endorsed by the Habana representatives of War Shipping Administration.

Respectfully yours,

Ellis O. Briggs
  1. George F. Scherer of the Division of the American Republics.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Emeterio Santovenia, who succeeded José Martínez-Viademonte on March 6, 1943.
  5. José Suárez Rivas.