837.61351/3653
The Ambassador in Cuba (Braden) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 15.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum81 prepared by the Counsellor82 relative to the sugar negotiations conducted by our Government between September 1942 and the present, particularly with respect to the various obstacles which retarded the reaching of an agreement. These obstacles may be summarized as follows:
- 1.
- Failure of the Cuban sugar industry to face the realities of 1943. This was influenced in considerable measure by the large profits made in 1942, and by the resistance of many producers to accepting the inevitability of smaller profits in 1943.
- 2.
- Efforts by a substantial group of hacendados, especially those with a large speculative investment in cane, to torpedo the negotiations. These efforts were seconded by the Opposition, which sought throughout the negotiations to embarrass the Government and to make political capital out of the delays and the fact that the terms inevitably would be less attractive than in 1942.
- 3.
- Timidity, vacillation and lack of vigor on the part of the Cuban Government contributed greatly to the difficulties of the situation.
The primary obstacle in my opinion was the attitude of the Cuban producers, who fought tooth and nail to retain in the 1943 agreement provisions which our Government accepted last year but which in the light of war developments, especially transportation difficulties, we did not feel in a position to assume in 1943. In some ways it is difficult to find excuses for the attitude of the Cuban sugar industry in general, while the activities of certain hacendados were extraordinarily short-sighted and dangerous, particularly with respect to their influence on fundamental Cuban-American relations.
On the other hand the Cuban disposition to live from day to day, the psychology inherent in a one-crop country and the still prevailing—despite continuous educational efforts by the Embassy—lack of war consciousness have made it more difficult for the Cubans to recognize the cold facts of the existing situation. Also we must regretfully admit that they have been misinformed and misdirected by some of the Americans interested in sugar and who should have known better. It is pertinent to observe that these American interests never called at the Embassy to inquire as to the facts surrounding the negotiations nor much less to proffer their cooperation in a self-evidently difficult situation which might adversely affect our relations. [Page 162] On the contrary, some of the most acrid denunciation of the United States Government policy emanated from these people (see my despatch no. 2055 of January 2683). Similarly statements issued by the press and by bulletins in the United States were harmful.
On the basis of the present outlook, the negotiations relative to the 1944 crop should be by no means so difficult as those for the 1943 crop, since the anticipated carryover should exert a sobering influence on producers, who should become increasingly alive to need for accepting sacrifices, and moreover the procedure and conditions to be incorporated in the 1943 contract should, by reason of their inclusion this year, with far less difficulty be accepted by the Cubans next year. Finally, the exaggerated optimism which resulted in so much planting during the latter months of 1941 and the early part of 1942, is notably absent at the present time, and we should therefore not have to contend a year hence with the allegations so interminably reiterated in connection with the 1943 negotiations that we had “encouraged” Cuba to plant as much cane as possible.
I realize that the extent of our future requirements depends to an important degree on the production of sugar in continental United States, and that the difficulty of obtaining labor, particularly in the beet fields, may result in a considerably smaller continental crop than was envisaged a few months ago. I assume that this possibility has been discounted in connection with estimates on which our present purchases are being made, since few things would cause us to be ridiculed more, with a resultant adverse general effect on our sugar relations with Cuba (and hence on our general relations) than a reversal similar to that which occurred in the progressive scaling-down of our requirements estimates from March to September, 1942.
With respect to the 1944 crop negotiations themselves, it is suggested that if they be held in Washington they be undertaken by a smaller American Government group, and that they be pushed more intensively than was possible during November and December of last year. I believe the complaint of the Cuban Government against being faced by a “regiment of American negotiators” has some justification and that should a Cuban commission proceed to the United States in the latter part of this year, it would be better to have the American negotiators number not more than three or four persons, under the chairmanship of an official of the Department of State.
Respectfully yours,