Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The American Republics, Volume VI

837.61351/3559: Telegram

The Ambassador in Cuba (Braden) to the Secretary of State

Habana, January 20, 1943—4 p.m.
[Received 8:58 p.m.]

40. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Department’s telegram number 88, January 19, 9 p.m.⁵⁶ As heretofore reported my conversations pursuant to Department’s telegram number 4, January 2, 7 p.m.,⁵⁷ disclosed that our proposals made in Washington would be summarily rejected as they stood and that such a development would greatly weaken Batista and his Government, cause his trip to the United States to be considered an utter failure and increasingly affect our relations with Cuba and create a serious or even potentially dangerous political situation here.

However, the Prime Minister by constructive suggestions (the first made by any Cuban since negotiations began last November) indicated his Government’s desire to work out a definitive counter-proposal within the general framework of our offers. To this end he requested my good offices before the Department in order to give him cards to play vis-à-vis the industry and my assistance in bringing the hacendados⁵⁸ and colonos⁵⁹ into line.

After consultation with the Department and Duggan’s agreement by telephone that I “was proceeding on the right track” we have arrived at a concrete counterproposal as described to Walmsley⁶⁰ yesterday (see my telegram number 37, January 19, 9 p.m.⁶¹) and in previous communications which should apply to the situation mentioned in first paragraph above and elicit enthusiastic acceptance and gratitude of Batista and his Government. In this way while realizing that some of the Cuban exactions for modification of our Washington proposals may prove unacceptable to the Department and other agencies of our Government, I have with the termination yesterday of our talks here—and pending my receipt of what will be our final offer—obtained for the first time a clear definition of exactly what are the Cuban maximum aspirations. Moreover I have protected our position by:

1. Repeatedly declaring to the Cubans that my conversations were informal and that I had no instructions from Washington other than to request the Cuban Government’s reply to our only official proposals which were those brought back by the Cuban delegates.

2. Keeping all suggested modifications within the financial limitations of our Washington proposals so that any additional expenditures which might be undertaken by us as a result of my talks here not only remain well within the 12,000,000-dollar saving effected through the proposed elimination of the stockpile but mean a saving for us of probably $12,300,000 or more.

I understand from Walmsley that within a few days I may expect instructions to present to the Cuban Government a last “take it or leave it” proposal. In view of tense atmosphere existing throughout the island and of our desire to assist Batista Government to maintain a tranquil, stable situation socially and politically I respectfully suggest that I be afforded an opportunity to comment on this proposal before it is presented. Also it would probably be useful for me to receive rush by courier the intercepts⁶² referred to in the third paragraph of your message.

For the convenience of the Department I am summarizing by separate telegram the position reached as a result of discussions here and I, of course, appreciate that acceptance thereof (following the procedure outlined in my telegram no. 28, January 14, 2 p.m.,⁶³ sections 1 and 2) is a matter of policy having in mind all the aspects of the situation.

Braden

56. Not printed.
57. Not printed; this telegram outlined the two modifications which purported to improve for Cuba the terms of the molasses purchase and of the subsidy of inland transportation of sugar to unnatural ports (837.50/154).
58. Sugar mill owners.
59. Cane producers.
60. Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of the American Republics.
61. Not printed.
62. Intercepts of telephone and other communications between Habana and New York.
63. Not printed; in this telegram the Ambassador suggested that outstanding points of contention be resolved through informal negotiation between himself, the Prime Minister, and the sugar producers, and that the resulting compromise be submitted first, informally, to the Department for approval and then, if acceptable, embodied in a formal Cuban counterproposal to the Department’s proposals of December 1942 (837.61351/3555).