740.0011 European War 1939/31617a
The Adviser on Political Relations (Duggan) to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)
Dear Mr. Caffery: Phil Bonsal58 and I today had a long talk with Colonel Hertford with regard to the idea that Brazil might send troops to the European combat zones.
Your telegram that this proposition is agreeable in principle, plus what General Dutra stated when he was here, seem a pretty clear indication that Brazil would like to send troops. The question is when and under what conditions. General Dutra told General Marshall59 that he would like to send over three divisions next summer, all in one expeditionary force. From the Brazilian point of view one can see many reasons why this would be the best procedure. From the War Department point of view there are a number of difficulties, one of which seems controlling. The principal difficulty is the impossibility [Page 643] of making available sufficient shipping to transport in one expedition three divisions with all of their equipment. This would be a major operation that would require diversion of too much shipping. The War Department, which has a general shipping schedule planned out for a year in advance, could probably transport one division in December or early next year and another division during the spring. These divisions would be given three months’ intensive training in North Africa, so that they would arrive in the combat zones as well prepared and trained as our own troops.
In addition to this shipping problem, which the War Department insists is controlling, there is another consideration that suggests strongly the desirability of Brazil’s following the War Department indication if it is really interested in sending troops into combat areas: that is, the present willingness of our Army leaders to employ Brazilian troops. Colonel Hertford says that General Eisenhower60 and General Clark61 say they would be glad to have them and could use them. General Marshall is in favor of it. There therefore exists at this time a good atmosphere in the War Department, but this atmosphere may change, depending upon the progress of the war. For one or another reason General Marshall and General Eisenhower may lose interest.
It is therefore my belief that if Brazil is really interested it should make known its interest now and in general accept the pattern of the operation suggested by the War Department.
Our telegrams have made clear that the utilization of Brazilian troops must have the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If the proposal is strongly supported by General Marshall and General Eisenhower this approval should, of course, be forthcoming. The War Department is unwilling to put the proposition before the Chiefs of Staff, however, until it knows that Brazil actually does want to send troops into combat areas and finds acceptable the pattern of operation suggested.
In giving you this background my idea is not to convey to you any impression that we think Brazil should be persuaded that it should send troops but rather that if this is the Brazilian decision it would be well for them to accept the outline suggested by the War Department and proceed accordingly, since otherwise no assurance can be given when a Brazilian expeditionary force might be transported.
Yours very sincerely,