862.01/354: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

2553. In a private conversation yesterday with Boheman I endeavored again to draw out any knowledge he might have regarding Russo-German contacts (see my 2422, August 4, 8 p.m., 2473, August 7, 7 p.m.31 and 2501, August 10, 7 p.m.). Boheman said he did not have any precise knowledge and could only give opinions based on analysis of information available and what seemed to him probable in light of common sense. He does not believe in any possibility of a separate peace between present regimes in Germany and Russia but thinks it highly probable contacts have been made between anonymous emissaries representing military and that German military has sounded Stalin as to whether Germany could have peace if Poland and Russia were evacuated. He thinks it possible that such feelers may not have had from Stalin same answer of “unconditional surrender” given by Anglo-Saxon powers. He said that if I didn’t object he [Page 687] would like to expand a little on his personal ideas. He asked me to look at situation from Stalin’s point of view—how could he in light of Russia’s interests be pleased or easy with an indefinite Anglo Saxon military occupation of Germany? With reference to question as to whether Hitler or generals wield final effective power at present in Germany he suggested that generals are in ultimate control but that they keep Hitler in power because if Germany must go to bottom they want him to be on top to bear blame. If they could be assured of saving Germany he would be sacked at once but as long as they keep him they cannot maintain him entirely as a puppet; he must have power to make decisions so that blame will fall on his head for failure. Dilemma of generals is that there is no point of hope to which they can look under formula of unconditional surrender. Boheman remarked that war is now in an acutely critical stage and that in his personal view it is vitally important for future of Europe that Anglo-Saxon powers make some clear cut declaration of their planned policy for Germany which will say something more than to propose unconditional surrender. Alternative may be that generals can come to terms with Stalin which may not involve total abasement of Germany. Boheman is of personal opinion which I have reported previously that Stalin does not desire a long occupation of Germany nor necessarily a Communist Germany but that what he wants is a weak democratic Germany not controlled by Anglo-Saxon powers.

I learned yesterday from a reliable source that about 3 weeks ago two Germans arrived by plane from Berlin, one a bona fide wine salesman who had made many previous visits to Sweden to sell wine to Swedish monopoly and other a commercial traveler. They stayed at a Stockholm hotel where they were joined in evening by two men with whom they remained for several hours. These men were trailed by Swedish Secret Police back to Soviet Legation which they entered in early hours of morning. Two Germans returned to Berlin next day and came back within a week. They stayed at same hotel, were seen by two Russians who were again trailed by Secret Police back to Soviet Legation, Germans returning to Berlin next day. When I was talking to Boheman I mentioned this information and his reaction was such that I have no doubt it is true and that he knew of it. I have no reason to believe that Swedish Secret Police have any knowledge of what was discussed between four men and it is highly improbable that they do know. Police were not able to establish identity of two men who returned to Russian Legation.

Johnson
  1. Neither printed; but see footnote 24, p. 683.