851.01/12–2243
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)
I telephoned Admiral Leahy with regard to the message which the President desires to have transmitted to “Mr. Murphy”. I explained that Murphy was now concerned only with Italian problems33 and Admiral Leahy concurred that the message should go to Mr. Wilson instead.34
I also referred to the reference to Flandin in the message to General Eisenhower and said that as I recalled it Flandin had not been of assistance to our people at the time of the landings or subsequently; that on the contrary his efforts to get into the picture had been somewhat embarrassing to Bob Murphy and me at the time. The Admiral said that he had a similar impression but that Flandin had been included because he had been mentioned specifically in the message received from Prime Minister Churchill. He then read me a paraphrase of the pertinent portion of Mr. Churchill’s telegram to the President. It ran about as follows:
“I am shocked about the arrest of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin. There are rumors even that the first two may be shot. I feel that I have an obligation toward them for what they did for us. I did encourage these men to hold firm at the time of our struggle in Tunisia. It seems to me that the American obligation is even stronger since [Page 196] it was primarily an American operation under General Eisenhower. I hope that you will take what steps you can to protect them and even give them asylum if necessary.”
Admiral Leahy said that it was in the light of the foregoing that the message was sent to General Eisenhower. The text was repeated to Prime Minister Churchill and the President added that he hoped the Prime Minister was in full agreement and would so inform General Eisenhower and Macmillan. The President added that he thought the time had come to eliminate de Gaulle and to give the Committee a sense of the realities of the situation. The Admiral said he hoped General Eisenhower would take strong action since he felt that the General as Allied Commander-in-Chief had both the power and the authority to act. I remarked as regards the latter that the French would presumably take the viewpoint that while the General’s authority unquestionably extended to all matters connected with the prosecution of the war they would consider other questions internal ones to be handled by them. The Admiral remarked that he was not sure himself of just what the legal situation was but he felt the time for action was overdue.