Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President

Washington, November 9, 1943.

Memorandum for the President

In accordance with your request¹ I attach a memorandum on the question of trusteeship for the disputed islands in the Central Pacific and certain other groups of islands, a memorandum on the geographic factors involved and a chart.²

These memoranda have been very hastily compiled. As you know, comprehensive studies of the problems of international trusteeship are well under way in the Department but not completed. Before discussing this question with the Prime Minister you may wish to obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly with respect to the inclusion in the trusteeship of nearby American islands such as Howland, Baker, Palmyra and others which the British would no doubt suggest be included.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Department of State³

[Washington, undated.]

Memorandum

1. … If pressed to a settlement, we could expect little except on political grounds. Nevertheless Australia and New Zealand wish the United States to remain permanently interested in the Southeast Pacific for security reasons and Great Britain’s attitude is not unfavorable.

2. It is believed that the best disposition is international trusteeship since the United States, assumably, is less interested in the question of sovereignty over these contested islands than in their adequate administration within a security system, and their usefulness on the basis of equal access in the development of common pacific interests, particularly transportation and communication. Responsibility for trusteeship should be assumed by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and China. Administration of the individual islands should be allocated through friendly negotiation. The administrator should be accountable for the progressive attainment of the well-understood objectives of trusteeship.

3. Responsibility for administration of defense should be vested singly in the United States, or jointly in the United States and Great Britain (and/or Australia and New Zealand) on terms to be proposed to the heads of the two Governments by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The inclusion of China as a trustee should not be of a kind devolving far-flung naval commitments upon her.

4. This arrangement while assuring immediate advantages to this country should not in any way prejudice United States claims or future freedom of action with respect to them.

5. Inclusion of the French possessions in the area of trusteeship would involve including France among the trustees. French sovereignty need not be disturbed, but France would be obligated to give to the United States and other participating states rights not heretofore granted. She would receive in return protection and equal access to the other islands under trusteeship.

6. This zone of trusteeship might well be extended to include neighboring islands, such as the French Austral and Society Islands, and the British Henderson, Ducie, Pitcairn, and Oeno Islands.

7. It might be desirable that this trusteeship should be integrated with a broader trusteeship encompassing similar islands in the entire South Pacific and possibly including the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Chile among the trustees. It should in any event be integrated with whatever general international trusteeship system may be established.

8. In any consideration of Pacific islands the vital importance to the United States of Clipperton Island (French) should never be overlooked. The same might be said of the Galapagos Islands (Ecuador).

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Geographer of the Department of State (Boggs)

confidential

[Washington,] November 9, 1943.

Certain Pacific Islands

Information has been requested concerning the following Pacific islands, especially in connection with possible trusteeship over them:

a) Islands claimed by the United States, in a note to Great Britain dated August 16, 1939:⁴ (The population is added, as given in H.O. Pub. 166, 1940 edition.)

1)	Claimed also by Great Britain:
	Vostok	0	(no date given)
	Malden	0	(1936)
	Starbuck	0	(1940)
	Caroline Island	2	laborers and families (1936)
	Flint	0	(no date given)
	Christmas	23	native, 3 French (1936)
	Ellice Islands (the southern 4 of them—administered as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony[)]
	Nukufetau (De Peyster)	361	(1929)
	Funafuti	392	(1929) including 5 Europeans
	Nurakita (Sophia)	39	(1929)
	Nukulailai (Mitchell)	202	(1929)
2)	Claimed also by New Zealand:
	Penrhyn (Tongareva)	462	(1936)
	Manahiki (Humphreys)	486	(1937)
	Rakahanga (Rierson)	290	(1936)
	Danger Islands	651	(1936)
	Union Group (all 3 islands)
	Atafu	380	(1932)
	Nukunono	250	(1936)
	Fakaofu	431	(1925)

b) Two of the French groups in the South Pacific:

The Marquesas

The Tuamotu Archipelago

The relative geographic positions of these and other islands have been marked and studied on a globe (a globe-mounted “printers’ proof” of a special air route globe which has been prepared in this office, 1,000 copies of which have been ordered by the War Department) . From the globe, the more important lines have been transferred, approximately, to the accompanying H. O. Chart No. 1500.⁵

The problems relating to the islands listed above can not be adequately assessed, it is submitted, without taking the following steps:

(1) Evaluating all islands in the Pacific which are pertinent, in view of their geographic position, at least approximately, regarding their use for:

(a) Land planes

(b) Sea planes

(c) Surface ships;

(2) Studying the geographic relationships of all islands which are important for the possible use of one or more of the above—initially without any reference to sovereignty, but only with reference to the range of airplanes and to desirable routes of both airplanes and surface ships;

(3) Studying the limitations imposed by political sovereignty and claims, with reference only to significant islands and their geographic relationships with each other and with the continental mainlands.

The present memorandum is restricted in scope by a 24–hour deadline. Further data and maps will be submitted later, if desired.

The assumed range of commercial airplanes is 2,500 statute miles, as represented on accompanying chart by circles and arcs of 1,250 mile radius. The portions of the Pacific are ruled which are, on that hypothesis, outside those limits; commercial operation across those zones seems improbable, at least in the near future.

Separated by vast spaces of free air and high sea, there are in the Pacific several thousand islands, many of them mere pinpoints. Very few of them are adapted, by virtue of size, surface structure, and geographic position, to transportation uses, either for landplanes, seaplanes, or surface ships, and then only at great expense. To be useful for airplanes they must also accommodate surface ships to bring supplies. Except for the airway corridor to the Pacific coast of the United States by way of the Hawaiian Islands there is an extensive zone near the American continents which can scarcely be traversed by airplanes with pay loads.

The Pacific is preeminently the area which seems to call for master-planning of air routes. On the basis of natural geographic factors (adaptability to use, and geographic position) excellent trans-Pacific routes are feasible, including alternate routes for varying weather conditions, emergency landings, and adequate aids to navigation.

The imposition of the limitations of political geography greatly reduces the utility of many of the islands, and renders some desirable routes almost impossible. No nation possesses the stepping-stones for a trans-Pacific route under its own flag.

The political problems, however, are relatively simple, involving only colonial possessions of a very few countries, with small populations, and historical background which is brief in comparison with problems in Europe and Asia.

At the request of the Department of State, initiated by Judge R. Walton Moore, the Navy Department in 1938 made a careful, detailed evaluation of 27 islands possessed or claimed by Great Britain (including the more valuable of those claimed by the United States, listed on page 1 of this memorandum) and more than 25 French islands, including the best in the Marquesas and Society groups. The islands were rated on a score of 1,000. A map showing the ratings of these individual islands, with sovereignty of all Pacific islands, is on file in the Office of the Geographer.⁶ Much better information regarding adaptability to both landplane and seaplane use is now available. No attempt is made, therefore, on such brief notice, to discuss the islands individually.

International action on some principle of “trusteeship” seems essential in planning trans-Pacific air services. The details require much study.

S. W. Boggs

1. The request may have been made at the White House meeting of November 5, 1943, referred to ante, p. 155.
2. Chart not reproduced herein.
3. Prepared by the Divisions of Political Studies, of European Affairs, and of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Office of the Geographer. See Notter, p. 200.
4. Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. ii, p. 317.
5. Not reproduced herein.
6. Not reproduced herein.