Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

741.671/11–943

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), and the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)¹

secret

[Washington,] November 9, 1943.

PA/M	—Mr. Murray:
A–B	—Mr. Berle:
U	—Mr. Stettinius:

Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy, came in yesterday to furnish an account of Mr. Eden’s talks with Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, in Cairo. The first of these talks was held on November 5, and Mr. Eden reported to the Prime Minister that he had had a long tough day. Mr. Eden first requested Numan to furnish air bases for the use of Allied forces. He also brought up the question of Turkey’s full entrance into the war. Numan refused to agree that there would be any difference between these two courses of action, contending that to furnish air bases to the Allies would be tantamount to entering the war. In this connection he said that Germany would not dare not to react if Turkey furnished bases. Mr. Eden argued that Germany was in such a position that it could attack only by air and apparently argued that the Allied air forces could handle any such attacks.

Mr. Eden reported that although Numan did not refuse to discuss the question of air bases or formal entry into the war, it was obvious that he was deeply suspicious of the Russians and greatly concerned about their possible penetration into the Balkans. Mr. Eden argued that Turkey would be in a much stronger position in the post-war world if it furnished bases now or entered fully into the war. Mr. Eden made it clear, however, that what was really wanted was air bases and that there was no intention to press the Turks to go into the war on an all-out basis. Numan asked what good it would do the Allies if at the end of the war Turkey was militarily exhausted. Mr. Eden contended that it was extravagant to talk of exhaustion.

Mr. Eden said it was interesting to note that the Turks made no request for fulfillment of requests made at the Adana Conference² for supplies. Numan had inquired as to whether the Allies would continue to furnish supplies if Turkey refused to supply bases, and the British Foreign Minister replied that he could give no assurance as to that.

On the following day, the discussions were continued and Mr. Eden strongly restated the case for furnishing air bases and stressed the urgency of the need. He expressed the view that the Germans would not dare to declare war on the Turks if bases were furnished and added that if the bases were refused, the British would have to consider the question of furnishing supplies to the Turks.

Numan said he could give an immediate answer to the question of air bases. The Turks could not accept such a demand and they would be unable to grant the facilities requested. Mr. Eden continued with the same arguments he had used on the previous day, but without success.

The discussions then turned to the broad issue of Turkey’s formal entrance into the war. Numan pointed out that at Adana Mr. Churchill had given the Turks the impression that they would be free to make an independent decision as to whether and when they should enter the war. Did the British now feel that the Turks now had enough equipment with which to put up a fight? In any case, if Turkey was to be involved in the war, it would wish to be in active collaboration with its allies and was not content to play a passive role by merely furnishing air bases. If the Turks were to go into the war and take an active part, where would the Allies want them to fight? In the Balkans? If the British really felt the Turks were ready, the Turks would want to know the precise part they were to play. Again and again Numan repeated that Turkey would never agree to play a passive part. He said that if the British Foreign Minister had brought from Moscow such decisions as the future treatment of Persia, Iraq, and the Balkans, it would be much easier for him to meet the British views.

Mr. Eden replied that so far as Persia was concerned, the Russians and the British had a treaty under which they undertook to withdraw from Persia after the war.³ So far as Iraq was concerned, the British had a bilateral treaty which made things perfectly clear.⁴ So far as the Balkans were concerned, it would be obvious to the Turks that they would gain more by cooperating with the Allies than by standing aloof. Numan asked if it were not true that the Russians had withdrawn their demand for a second front in Europe in return for a free hand in Eastern Europe. Mr. Eden denied this and pointed out that the Americans, in particular, both in public and in private, had made it clear that they could not discuss frontiers until the end of the war.

Numan then inquired why the British had not accepted Rumania’s peace offer.⁵ What more could the Rumanians do than offer to discuss peace? Mr. Eden retorted that the Allies would discuss peace with the Rumanians only on the basis of unconditional surrender. Numan replied that the Turks would never suggest to the Rumanians that they surrender unconditionally to the Russians.

Summing up, Mr. Eden said that the negative reply that he had received from the Turkish Foreign Minister was bound to have a deplorable effect among the Allies. Numan replied that to the first request for air bases he was bound to give a negative reply, for the reasons he had mentioned. As to the second request for formal Turkish entry into the war, he would have to report to his Government. Mr. Eden reported that he had given Numan a severe warning as to the possible consequences of the Turkish refusal to meet the British request. Mr. Eden also pointed out the unenviable position in which Turkey would find itself vis-à-vis the Russians in the event it declined to meet British wishes. He stressed, on the other hand, the far better position in which Turkey would be placed if it went along with the British request.

Numan answered that he must know more of Russian intentions before he could allow Turkey to play the part requested by the British. Furthermore, he did not believe that Germany was stretched as far as the British contended. In order to reassure the Turks on this point, Mr. Eden said that he was having General Wilson send one of his military intelligence experts to Ankara in an endeavor to convince the Turks that the Germans were over-extended. Mr. Eden also agreed that he would take up with the Russians and the Americans the precise role that Turkey might be expected to play if it entered the war and that a paper on this point would be passed through military channels.⁶

Mr. Hayter understood that the discussions terminated at this point and that Numan was to return to Ankara. However, this morning he telephoned to me urgently that the discussions had apparently continued and that the Embassy was now beginning to receive further reports which he hoped to furnish to the Department during the course of the day.

P[aul] H. A[lling]

1. Stettinius, who was Acting Secretary on this date, sent the following note to Ailing on November 12, 1943: “I handed to Mr. Harry Hopkins yesterday at noon the original of your memorandum of the 9th on the Turkish matter, so perhaps you would like to send copies of it to those in the Department whom you feel should be familiar with the matter. ES”
2. Meeting between Churchill and Inonu at Adana, Turkey, on January 30, 1943; see Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 704 ff.
3. Treaty of January 29, 1942; Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, pp. 249–252.
4. Treaty of Alliance, signed at Baghdad June 30, 1930; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.
5. Public reports of a conditional Rumanian peace feeler had emanated from Ankara in June 1943.
6. Paper not found in associated files. For a C. C. S. paper of December 3, 1943, however, covering, among other things, Turkey’s role in the war, see post, p. 782.