Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners¹

secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 294/1

[Washington,] 3 September 1943.

Liberated Yugoslav Prisoners

References:	a. C.C.S. 2942
	b. C.C.S. 3173

the problem

1. a. To formulate a policy with regard to the use of liberated Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other Allied Nations’ prisoners of war in active operations,

b. To determine the machinery for arming and equipping such forces if established, and

c. To determine the responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory.

2. To consider in connection with the above the message from General Eisenhower contained in Mat 16.⁴

facts bearing on the problem

3. On 1 August 1943 General Eisenhower cabled the War Department stating that the Yugoslav Delegate for Near, Middle East and North Africa had made representations concerning 70,000 to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy of which 30,000 to 40,000 are said to be fit for military service. (Appendix “A”). In order to deal with the Yugoslav request and subsequent requests, General Eisenhower asks that policy decision be made on four specific questions. (Appendix “A”). From a memorandum by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, dated 28 July 1943⁵ (enclosed in memorandum for Combined Chiefs of Staff from Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 27 August 1943⁵), it appears that only some 6,500 of the Yugoslavs in Italy are Yugoslav army prisoners of war.

4. Assuming that Yugoslav prisoners in Italy are immediately liberated, it would not be possible to equip them for large scale operations prior to the summer of 1944 except at the expense of other forces.

5. It appears that the majority of the internees have been in concentration camps for long periods, some at least since the conquest of Yugoslavia in April–May, 1941. It is therefore unlikely that any of them will be fit to undertake military duties without first undergoing a prolonged period of rehabilitation.

6. The whole question of equipping allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals was considered at Quadrant by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 317 Series. Except for French Forces, on which a decision was reached, the question is still under consideration on that level.

conclusions

7. a. It is not possible to decide on the future employment of Yugoslav and other European liberated prisoners until the study initiated in C.C.S. 317 is complete.

b. It is unlikely that it will be possible to equip or train any large numbers in the immediate future.

c. In any case, liberated prisoners are unlikely to be of much value without a prolonged period of rehabilitation.

recommendations

8. It is recommended that:

a. For the present, Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations, beyond those now operating with Allied forces, be not used in active operations except that released prisoners of war may be used as replacements or reinforcements for existing units at the discretion of the Allied Governments concerned.

b. The study of the extent to which it will be possible in the future to equip allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals be continued (vide C.C.S. 317).

c. The direct responsibility of the theater commander for emergency relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory should continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.

d. Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the government-in-exile concerned, should be despatched to the desired destination.

e. While any movement within his theater should be at General Eisenhower’s discretion and with the shipping available to him, no movement outside his area should be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned.

9. The probable existence of factions amongst internees and prisoners of war points to the undesirability of returning any of these to their homelands without the concurrence of the government concerned.

10. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and forward to General Eisenhower the cablegram contained in Appendix “B”, in reply to his cablegrams Naf 305, dated 1 August, and Mat 16, dated 24 August 1943.

Appendix “A”

secret

Algiers, 1 August 1943.

The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the War Department

WO–6293, Naf 305. Jovan Dnonovich, delegate Yugoslav Government for Near, Middle East and North Africa, has made representations concerning 70 to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy, of which 30 to 40,000 are fit for military service. He makes the following specific proposals:

• “1. To incorporate in the Italian surrender terms that the Yugoslav prisoners, internees and confinees must be left in the places where they now are.
• “‘2. That the Allied Force Headquarters receive a Yugoslav Military mission whose duty would be to care for all the Yugoslavs found in Italy. A civil section would compose a part of this mission and it would take charge of the persons unfit for military service.
• “3. To designate an Italian Island for the purpose of organizing a Yugoslav Army. In his opinion Sicily would be the most fitting.
• “4. To separate and group into camps in Tunisia and Algeria the persons who are not fit for military service and those who cannot be employed in the different services.
• “5. That the equipment, armament and maintenance of the Yugoslav forces, which exceed the financial possibilities of the Yugoslav Government, be accomplished by means of the Lend Lease agreement.
• “6. That the Yugoslav units form a part of the National Yugoslav Army with Yugoslav cadres and under the orders of Allied Force Headquarters.
• “7. That the use of the Yugoslav Forces, as soon as they have been organized and armed, will be decided by an agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain. He is of the opinion that it would be most fitting to use these forces for operations in the Balkans and especially in Yugoslavia.”

This is the first of many requests of similar nature that we shall probably receive. In order to deal with it and subsequent requests the following policy decisions are needed:

1. Are we to use Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations in active operations? If so, are these forces to be employed anywhere or only in areas affecting their home countries.

2. If the answer to 1 is in the affirmative what machinery for arming and equipping these forces is to be established.

3. It is assumed that we should assume direct responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory. Are we to assume continuing direct responsibility or are we to assist the Government concerned in caring for them.

4. In the light of our shipping problem it is presumed that we would agree to a minimum in transporting these persons from the areas in which they are found.

Provision for the release of interned Nationals of the Allied Nations was included in surrender terms for Sicily and will be incorporated in such instruments in the future.

Appendix “B”

Draft Telegram From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)⁶

In answer to Naf 305 of 1 August requesting policy directive with regard to Yugoslavs interned in Italy the following policies have been adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. For the present, Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations, beyond those now operating with Allied forces are not to be used in active operations except that released prisoners of war may be used as replacements or reinforcements for existing units at the discretion of the Allied Governments concerned.

2. The study of the extent to which it will be possible in the future to equip Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals will be continued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.⁷

3. The direct responsibility of the theater commander for emergency relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory is to continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.

4. Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the government-in-exile concerned, are to be dispatched to the desired destination.

5. While any movement within your theater will be at your discretion and with the shipping available to you, no movement outside your area is to be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned.

6. In view of the probable existence of factions amongst internees and prisoners of war, none of these is to be returned to his homeland without the concurrence of the government concerned.⁸

Policy set forth in paragraph 5 above answers your Mat 16 of 24 August.

1. Circulated under cover of a transmittal memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 294/1), September 3, 1943. For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1913, see ante, p. 1206.
2. “Liberated Yugoslav Prisoners”, August 2, 1943; not printed.
3. Ante, p. 1029.
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed.
5. Not printed.
6. As amended (see fns. 7–8, below), this message was dispatched to Eisenhower as telegram No. Fan 210, September 3, 1943.
7. This paragraph was changed to read: “The extent to which it will ultimately be possible to equip Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals is now under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”
8. This paragraph was deleted from the message as sent to Eisenhower.