891.00/2042a
The Secretary of State
to the President
[Washington,] August 16,
1943.
My Dear Mr. President: I enclose herewith,
for your consideration, a summary statement of policy which has, in
general, served as the basis of the Department’s attitude towards
Iran during the past eight or nine months. I believe that you will
agree with the fundamental principles expressed therein.
During recent months, it has become apparent that the political and
economic situation in Iran is critical and may dissolve into chaos
at any moment. I feel, therefore, that the Department’s policy
should be implemented more actively than heretofore, but before
taking further steps along this line, I should like to have
assurance that you are in accord.
It is clear that this policy can be implemented effectively only if
it is followed by all interested agencies of this Government. In
particular, it is important to have the support of the War
Department authorities in Washington and of the American military
commander in Iran.1 At the present time, the instructions of the
commander in Iran are understood to confine him strictly to the
transportation of supplies to the Soviet Union. In consequence, he
does not feel free to cooperate, even informally, with the efforts
of American civilian representatives and agencies to solve the
numerous, pressing, internal problems of Iran.
Accordingly, if you approve the course of action proposed in the
enclosed memorandum,2 I should like to suggest that it be presented
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. If they
perceive no insuperable military objection, I believe it would be
well to have instructions issued to the commander in Iran to lend
such assistance as may be practicable to the carrying out of the
policy in question. I hope, also, that following such consideration
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the War Department will feel free to
lend its assistance in other ways, perhaps, if need arises, through
the provision of certain personnel and supplies to assist the
American advisers now in Iran.
Faithfully yours,
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[Enclosure]
Memorandum on American Policy in Iran
American Policy in Iran
The historic ambitions of Great Britain and Russia in Iran have
made that country a diplomatic battleground for more than a
century. The geographical, political and economic bases of those
ambitions remain unchanged, and the present attitudes of the
British and Soviet Governments and their representatives in Iran
give strong reason to fear that their rivalry will break out
again as soon as the military situation permits. This danger is
greatly increased by the existing economic and political
weakness of the Iranian Government and the presence on Iranian
soil of British and Soviet armed forces.
If events are allowed to run their course unchecked, it seems
likely that either Russia or Great Britain, or both, will be led
to take action which will seriously abridge, if not destroy,
effective Iranian independence. That such action would be
contrary to the principles of the Atlantic Charter3 is
obvious. Its effect upon other peoples of the Near East, and
elsewhere, might well be disastrous to our hopes for an
equitable and lasting post-war settlement.
The best hope of avoiding such action lies in strengthening Iran
to a point at which she will be able to stand on her own feet,
without foreign control or “protection”, and in calling upon our
associates, when necessary, to respect their general commitments
under the Atlantic Charter and their specific commitments to
Iran under the Treaty of Alliance of 1942,4 the
provisions of which were noted by the President in a
communication to the Shah of Iran.5
The United States is the only nation in a position to render
effective aid to Iran, specifically through providing American
advisers and technicians and financial and other material
support. We are also the only nation in a position to exercise a
restraining influence upon the two great powers directly
concerned.
Since this country has a vital interest in the fulfillment of the
principles of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of
foundations for a lasting peace throughout the world, it is to
the advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that
Iran’s integrity and independence are maintained and that she
becomes prosperous and stable. Likewise, from a more directly
selfish point of view, it is to our interest
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that no great power be establshed
on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum
development in Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, the United States should adopt a policy of positive
action in Iran, with a view to facilitating not only the war
operations of the United Nations in that country but also a
sound post-war development. We should take the lead, wherever
possible, in remedying internal difficulties, working as much as
possible through American administrators freely employed by the
Iranian Government, We should further endeavor to lend timely
diplomatic support to Iran, to prevent the development of a
situation in which an open threat to Iranian integrity might be
presented. In carrying out this policy, we should enlist the
support of all branches of the American Government.
The success of the proposed course of action is favored by the
exceptionally high regard in which this country is held by the
Iranian people. There is also reason to believe that the British
Government would acquiesce, or even lend its active support. The
attitude of the Soviet Government is doubtful, but this
Government should be in a position to exert considerable
influence if occasion should arise. It goes without saying that
the safeguarding of legitimate British and Soviet economic
interests in Iran should be a basic principle of American
action.
