Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ¹

secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 242/6

[Washington,] 25 May 1943.

Trident: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242)² the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

i. overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

ii. overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

1. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

iii. basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

iv. specific operations for 1943–44 in execution of overall strategic concept

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The U–boat War

a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U–boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.

b. Other Anti-U–boat Measures

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

2. Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.–British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault:	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
	2	Air-borne Divisions.
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault.
Build-up:	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
Total	29	Divisions.

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan.³ In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.⁴

c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean area subsequent to Husky . These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after Husky a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploeşti

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;

(b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and

(c) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

(3) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of Anakim .

b. Operations in the Pacific

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.

(2) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

(3) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.

(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.

(5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

v. availability of resources to meet the requirements of basic undertakings and specific operations in execution of overall strategic concept 1943–44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

Ground Forces

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U. S. Naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U. K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U. S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

Shipping

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

vi. conclusions on miscellaneous subjects

1. Equipment for Turkey

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the Anfa Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

2. Re-Arming of the French in North Africa

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

vii. other conferences

1. Decisions of the Casablanca Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

Annex

Advantages To Be Gained by the Use of the Azores

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U–boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U. S.-U. K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U–boat concentrations against the U. S. Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the Azores as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.⁵

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira for operating V.L.R. aircraft;

b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:

(1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean;

(2) West Indies and the U.K.;

(3) South America and the U. K.;

(4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;

(5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U–boats were concentrated in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route. (See diagram.⁶)

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U–boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U–boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from U. S. A. to Europe, Africa, and the Far East.⁷

1. This report was circulated as an enclosure to the following memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff: “The Enclosure is the final report on the results of the Trident Conference as approved by the President and the Prime Minister on 25 May 1943.” This text includes the changes to C.C.S. 242/3. ante, p. 359, made by Roosevelt and Churchill and incorporated in C.C.S. 242/4, not printed, as well as those further modifications to C.C.S. 242/4 contained in C.C.S. 242/5, supra, and the amendments! agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 25, 1943, the record of which is printed ante, p. 199. Roosevelt and Churchill gave their final approval to this report during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 203.
2. Ante, p. 346.
3. For a discussion of the directive of April 23, 1943, to Morgan, see Harrison, pp. 46–49.
4. See the supplementary directive to Morgan, enclosure B to C.C.S. 250/1, May 25, 1943, ante, p. 286.
5. In the annex to C.C.S. 242/2 (see ante, p. 353) the last three sentences of this paragraph read as follows: “In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for our convoys to follow a route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we have to forego a considerable measure of air protection. If we had both a northerly and a southerly route which had equal air protection, it would be a great advantage and consequently facilities in the Portuguese Atlantic Islands would be of outstanding value in shortening the war by convincing the enemy he has lost the Battle of the Atlantic.”
6. Not printed.
7. In the annex to C.C.S. 242/2 (see ante, p. 353) subparagraph i reads as follows: “The Islands would prove useful staging points on the air supply routes from the U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theaters of operations.”