The attached paper sets out the agreed decisions that have been
reached so far by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the present
[Page 347]
conference regarding
operations in the three main theaters. These decisions still need to
be related to the resources available and particularly to the
availability of shipping and landing craft. This is being done and a
final report will be submitted to you on Monday, 24 May 1943.2
[Attachment]
Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill
[Draft of Agreed
Decisions]
1. azores islands
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have already submitted to the
President and the Prime Minister the following
recommendations:3
-
a.
- That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be
accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early
enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during
the winter of 1943–1944.
-
b.
- That an effort should first be made to secure the use of
these islands by diplomatic means without making military
commitments to the Portuguese Government.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed:
-
a.
- That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before
the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation
and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved,
should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister
with a covering note showing suggested timings and the
effect of the plan on other military commitments now in
view.
-
b.
- That as soon as these plans have been approved
preparations should be made to implement them in case
diplomatic efforts should fail.
2. the combined bomber offensive from the
united kingdom
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish,
by a combined U.S. British air offensive, the progressive
destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial,
and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the
German people to a point where their capacity for armed
resistance is fatally weakened.4
[Page 348]
The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and
April 1, 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength
will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An
intermediate objective of particular importance is the
continuing reduction of German fighter strength.
3. defeat of axis powers in europe
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:—5
a. That forces and equipment shall be
established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an
operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on
the Continent from which further offensive operations can be
carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to
necessitate the following forces being present and available for
use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:
|
Assault:
|
5 |
Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in
landing craft) |
|
2 |
Infantry Divisions—Follow-up |
|
2 |
Airborne Divisions |
| Total |
9 |
Divisions in the Assault |
|
Build-up:
|
20 |
Divisions available for movement into lodgment
area |
| Total |
29 |
Divisions |
b. That the Allied Commander in Chief,
North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in
exploitation of
Husky
as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war
and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each
specific operation will be subject to the approval of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North
Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in
the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three
British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1
November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from
the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required
will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans
are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary
basis for
Husky
will not be considered available.
c. The above resolution shall be reviewed
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in
August, the date to be decided later, in order that the
situation may be examined in the light of the result of
Husky
and the situation in Russia.
[Page 349]
4. burma-china theater
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:—6
-
a.
- The concentration of available resources as first priority
within the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and
increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000
tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air
facilities in Assam with a view to—
- (1)
- Intensifying air operations against the Japanese
in Burma;
- (2)
- Maintaining increased American air forces in
China;
- (3)
- Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to
China.
-
b.
- Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam
into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by
Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as
many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to
China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the
Burma Road.
-
c.
- The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious
operations.
-
d.
- The interruption of Japanese sea communications into
Burma.
5. operations in the pacific—1943–44
The courses of action examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
and the conclusions reached by them are as follows:—7
-
a.
-
Far Eastern Theater.
- (1)
-
Operations in Burma To Augment
Supplies to China.
- Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the
defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the
war.
- (2)
-
Air Operations in and From
China.
- Close coordination with other elements of plan are
essential.
-
b.
-
Pacific Theater.
- (1)
-
Operations in the Solomons and
Bismarck Archipelago.
- Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining
pressure on Japan, and the defense of
Australia.
- (2)
-
Operations in New Guinea.
- The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the
opening of a line of communications to the Celebes
Sea and contribute to the defense of
Australia.
- (3)
-
Operations in Eastern Netherlands
East Indies.
- Due to limitation of forces, operations other than
air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of
those islands necessary to the capture of New
Guinea.
- (4)
-
Operations in the Mashall
Islands.
- Shortens line of communications to Southwest
Pacific and Celebes Sea.
- (5)
-
Operations in the Caroline
Islands.
- Necessary to gain control of central Pacific,
thereby facilitating establishment of line of
communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United
Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese
Archipelago.
- (6)
-
Intensification of Operations
Against Enemy Lines of Communication.
- All the foregoing operations are essential to the
attainment of positions which enable the
intensification and expansion of attacks on the
enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.
Conclusions:
-
a.
- Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in
1943–1944 should have the following objectives:
- (1)
- Conduct of air operations in and from
China.
- (2)
- Operations in Burma to augment supplies to
China.
- (3)
- Ejection of the Japanese from the
Aleutians.
- (4)
- Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline
Islands.
- (5)
- Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck
Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
- (6)
- Intensification of operations against enemy
lines of communication.
-
b.
- Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted
by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and
amphibious craft.
6. re-arming of the french in north
africa8
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the re-arming and
re-equipping of the French forces in North Africa should be
proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and
equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the
requirements of British and United States forces in the various
theaters.
7. bombing of ploeşti9
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the United States
Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to
present
[Page 351]
to the
Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they
have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian oil fields
from bases in North Africa or Syria. Further, that the Commander
in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit
appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.
