Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Hopkins Papers

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

secret

Washington, 24 May, 1943.

Prime Minister.

Camp in North Africa for Refugees From Spain

With reference to your Minute on my note at Flag A.² The present position is shown in Lord Halifax’s telegram to the Foreign Office at Flag B.³

I submit that you should now go into action with the President on this matter.

H. L. Ismay

[Attachment 1]

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill

most secret

Washington, May 21, 1943.

Prime Minister.

Camp in North Africa for Refugees From Spain (See Alcove 305 attached) (Flag ‘A’)⁴

At the International Refugees Conference recently held in Bermuda, the British Delegates suggested the setting up of a small refugee camp in North Africa to which refugees in Spain, who had escaped from France, could be moved.⁵ The proposal was that these refugees should be moved on to some more distant place of refuge when shipping was available. The reasons underlying these proposals are set out in Alcove 305.

The U.S. Delegation to the Refugee Conference felt themselves unable to agree without the approval of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This was sought through the State Department.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that the British proposals should not be accepted for the following military reasons:⁶

(a) shortage of personnel shipping;

(b) shortage of cargo shipping;

(c) additional burden placed on the shoulders of the theatre commander;

(d) possibility of Arab resentment to the influx of Jews which might cause disorder.

The Joint Staff Mission took the matter up with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and pointed out how important it was that the only effective channel of escape for refugees of all nationalities from occupied Europe should not be blocked, since if it were, admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government; the Allies would be deprived of useful personnel and public opinion throughout the world would believe that the Allies were making no serious effort to deal with the refugee problem. It was argued further that the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa, far from the Allied lines of communication and under proper supervision, would be no embarrassment to the theatre commander.

It was also pointed out that if these refugees remained in Spain, the Spanish Government would be under continual pressure by the German Government to return them and that the shipping of relatively small numbers from Spain to North Africa would not be difficult.

The Joint Staff Mission suggested that, in view of the above arguments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the State Department and Foreign Office that they saw no objection, on military grounds, to the setting up of an internment camp in North Africa, at a spot to be selected in consultation with the theatre commander.

Later the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Staff Mission that they adhered to their view that it was militarily undesirable to set up a refugee camp in North Africa for the reasons they had already stated.⁷

The Embassy then took the matter up with the State Department and the latter are understood to have suggested to the President that he should override the objections of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This they believe he will do.

The Ambassador was proposing to ask Mr. Hull tomorrow morning how the matter stood. You may wish to await the results of this interview before approaching the President.⁸

H. L. Ismay

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by President Roosevelt’s Adviser (Baruch)⁹

[Washington, undated.]

Settlement in Northern Africa: Re Refugees:¹⁰

The President’s suggestion to look up Italian plans for settlement might bring immediate practical results.¹¹

Inquiry to be made as to titles of land, soil and possibilities of compounding water for power irrigation.

If titles are found to be in the Italian Government, matters will be simplified. It will also be satisfactory, if the Italians took over the land from the inhabitants.

I am wondering if the doors of all countries cannot be opened to a few of the refugees. Each one taking a few, would soon take care of many.

The present position of the United States and Britain and the United Nations victories would make the opening up of that possibility greater now than at any other time. They might be persuaded in order to show their adherence to the four freedoms.

B M Baruch

[Attachment 3—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

secret

[London,] 19 May, 1943.

immediate

Alcove No. 305. Following for the Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Personal.

I am dismayed and depressed by the refusal of the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to our recommendation that a small camp should be established in North Africa into which to draft refugees from Spain. This suggestion has long been pressed forward by us, on the most urgent representations from H.M. Ambassador in Madrid,¹² and has, I understand, the energetic support of the State Department. It is our main hope of getting refugees out of Spain and so not only satisfying British and American Public opinion, but also keeping open the escape routes from France into Spain which are essential to our military and intelligence services.

2. This is the only remaining way of getting our pilots and other prisoners out of France. The reasons given by the Chiefs of Staff for rejecting this suggestion are not very convincing, and should I think be overridden by the higher considerations mentioned. The numbers involved are not large and agreement to open a camp even for 1,000 would ease the situation. It is difficult to believe that this would put any particular strain on shipping, while as for admistration it could be undertaken by Governor Lehman’s organisation or we, as was suggested at the Bermuda Conference, would be willing to run the camp with our own officials. As for last objection, namely resentment on the part of the Arabs this could surely be eliminated by putting the camp in a place sufficiently remote from important Arab centres.

3. The refugees, even while they are in Spain, have to be fed and maintained to a considerable extent from American and British sources, and removal to North Africa, which appears to us essential if we are not to have a serious risk of the Spaniards closing their frontier tight, is we think the most economical suggestion from the point of view of both shipping and supplies. It must inevitably become known in due course that failure to get the “Hard Core” of refugees in Spain removed to the nearest and most convenient alternative destination is due to American military objections which will hardly be accepted as plausible. In that case I foresee extremely serious Parliamentary criticism.

4. If you see no objection I should be most grateful if you could put all this personally to the President—it is our last hope of carrying through a modest suggestion to which we attach great political and military importance.¹³

1. It cannot be ascertained when this document was passed to Roosevelt or Hopkins, but the available evidence indicates that this was done at the Roosevelt–Churchill meeting on the evening of May 24 when the subject of refugees probably came up for discussion; see the editorial note, ante, p. 197.
2. “Flag A” marked Churchill’s handwritten note at the end of Ismay’s minute of May 21, 1943, to Churchill; see footnote 8 to Ismay’s minute, below.

3. “Flag B” marked a telegram of May 22, 1943, from Halifax to Eden which was attached to this minute. Halifax’s telegram reads as follows:

   “I reminded Mr. Hull today about the camp in North Africa for refugees from Spain. The present position is that the State Department have told us orally that agreement in principle will shortly be reached for the creation of a camp. But we have had no confirmation of this, and the United States Chiefs of Staff are still on record as opposing it. The question is now in the hands of the President. Mr. Hull promised to try and push it forward.”

   Hull’s memorandum of his conversation with Halifax on May 22, 1943, printed ante, p. 173, makes no mention of this particular subject.

4. Printed as attachment 3, post, p. 345.
5. The British proposal referred to here is described in telegram 127, April 21, 1943, from Hamilton, Bermuda, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i. p. 158.
6. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were set forth in Leahy’s letter of April 26, 1943, to Hull, ibid., p. 296.
7. See the letter of May 7, 1943, from Leahy to Hull, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 299.
8. Churchill wrote the following note at the end of this minute and connected it with a line to the word “President” in the final paragraph: “Yes. I will intervene if necessary. W.S.C. 22.V”
9. There is no indication as to when and by what means this memorandum was transmitted to Churchill. A copy of this memorandum is included also in the Roosevelt Papers.
10. The words “Re refugees” are written in Baruch’s hand in the source text.
11. Roosevelt’s suggestion referred to here probably was made at the luncheon with Churchill on May 17, 1943, at which Baruch was present; see the editorial note, ante, p. 96.
12. Sir Samuel Hoare.
13. The source text bears the following notation in Churchill’s handwriting: “Gen Ismay—Please report on this before I see the President. WSC–20. V”