890D.00/922: Telegram
The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:22 p.m.]
503. Reference my 501, December 3, 5 p.m. Résumés follow of my conversations with Premier Barazi, Foreign Minister Faiz Khouri, [Page 674] his brother Faris who was President of last Parliament, Kalid Azam who headed last Government under Vichy French, General Spears and General Collet:
1. Premier. He has consistently insisted, he said, and only last week reiterated to Minister Casey, that Syrian independence is not real;
That the President’s French-granted autocratic legislative and executive powers are exercised under the firm control of General Collet with General Catroux’s support and General de Gaulle’s approval;
That consequently such important matters as national defense, police sûreté, censorship, supply services and intérêts communs (revenues from customs, oil refinery, monopolies, et cetera) are in fact controlled by the French with scantiest regard for and no accounting to the Ministry;
That, in short, autocratic Vichy-French mandatory control has been replaced by one even more autocratic and less acceptable exercised by Free France;
That his Ministry is more than willing to cooperate with Allied control in all matters where limitation of sovereign authority is necessitated by conditions of war; including questions of supply;
But that for such cooperation to be most effective two fundamental political steps must be taken, namely reestablishment of the constitutional regime and assumption by Great Britain of more direct responsibility under a clearly enunciated policy.
To me he wished to repeat this exposition with the following important addition: He welcomes our clear statement of basic policy, suggests its adoption by the United Nations and urges that control of all necessarily reserved questions be exercised by an Allied Military Commission on which the United States to be represented.
Finally, he asked me to inform my Government that he took serious exception to a telegram sent by his President to General de Gaulle and of which he had learned only when reading it in the newspapers December 1.
This telegram, prompted by the sinking of the French Fleet at Toulon, expressed the President’s confidence that this catastrophe would soon unite the people of France “around your person and foster reconstitution of her existence under your leadership”.
The Premier argued that no such commitment should have been made without Ministerial consultation, that it was tantamount to approval of Free French control in Syria, which neither he nor the Syrian people would ever willingly accept.
2. Foreign Minister. He had, he said, left the National Bloc early in 1941 because many of its members were tending towards a pro-Nazi policy, prompted thereto primarily by bitter opposition to [Page 675] French rule as well as admiration of German strength and belief in the inevitability of Axis victory.
Now Syrian sentiment including that of these same leaders was predominantly pro-Ally, due largely to direct British intervention in Syria and to American entry into the war; but anti-French feeling had rather strengthened than abated.
He had accepted office at British instance but was keenly disappointed that after more than 1 year London had formulated no program for preparing Syria for full postwar independence. He had, however, reason to hope that Minister Casey’s visit, following on Allied victories, augured well for early reconsideration in London of Syrian problems.
Finally, he believed it most important that an Allied policy regarding Syria be elaborated, and he urged that clear understanding on fundamentals be reached between the British and American Governments and especially with General de Gaulle during his forthcoming visit in Washington.
3. Faris Khouri. A leader of the important national bloc and an ardent nationalist with American cultural background, he welcomes our policy, is intransigently anti-French and urges reestablishment of the constitutional regime.
He argues that the Vichy-French decree suspending the constitution should be revoked and the former Parliament reconvened but would not oppose new elections if assured that they could be held with reasonable fairness.
He said that all Syrian leaders readily recognize the necessity of wartime limitation of government powers but feels strongly that this should be supplemented by a program of progressive preparation for full postwar independence.
4. Azam. A nationalist of old Damascus family and French cultural background, he painted Syria’s history from the coining of Emir Faisal and the King–Crane Commission as a sequence of dashed hopes and disillusionments. He blamed its ills primarily on French maladministration and disregard of the principle of mandatory trusteeship.
He was apprehensive lest Britain again yield to French importunity and America again withdraw into isolationism. To reassure Syrian leadership on this score he said would be far more effective propaganda than any designed to prove our growing military might.
5. Spears. He had not, he said, during Casey’s brief visit been able to complete discussions of the many aspects of the Syrian problem: Constitution and elections, economic policy and inflation, intérêts comrmms and financial controls, security and the Garde Mobile and the possibility, suggested by the British military authorities of enlisting locally some thousands of auxiliary service troops.
[Page 676]He would continue the discussions in Cairo this week end and perhaps soon to London. One serious handicap to working out the problems locally had been a sometimes distressing lack of clear policy directives from London.
Here he had found all too often that prestige and self interest, rather than a will to win the war, had determined Free French policy. And in London, when de Gaulle had grown too big for his boots, Free French susceptibilities as to Syria had been humored presumably because of more important aspects of Franco-British relations.
The net result was an obvious weakening of the British position in Syria and Lebanon. Now, however, with defeat in North Africa turned into victory and the whole question of Anglo-American-French relations one of urgency, the time seemed propitious for general settlement.
6. Collet. To Syrian [nationalists] he symbolizes French repression and imperialism. British sources report him “out to win the war”. He sees in de Gaulle “a man of destiny”.
He is not opposed to elections but argues strongly that, as the country is from almost no point of view ready for self-government, close foreign control must be maintained. The alternative would be to risk, unwarrantably in war time, political and economic chaos.
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An early Cabinet crisis may be expected.