740.0011 European War 1939/26680: Telegram
The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 23—1:26 p.m.]
532. General Catroux returned from London December 16. I talked with him at some length at Bairam celebration in Damascus December 18 and at his home here yesterday. Recapitulation follows:
His visit had been well worth while. His talks with Ambassador Winant were particularly helpful. He felt himself informed and in touch with major developments. His general views were those expressed at his London press conference of December 6.
He looks forward with special satisfaction to his forthcoming visit to Washington with General de Gaulle. There he hopes to contribute to the formulation of a program for uniting and strengthening French participation in the common war effort.
Darlan,82 he felt, would have to withdraw. That achieved, a united leadership truly representative of French aims and ideals could be formed.
He feared General de Gaulle was somewhat misunderstood in Washington, perhaps especially on the score of alleged autocratic leadership. He believed their visit would dispel any such misunderstanding.
I commented that I felt sure his participation in the Washington discussions would be welcome and helpful. Our radio news led me to believe that we too hoped for united French leadership, one which would lead to the formation of a provisional French Government which would take its proper place among the United Nations.
Turning discussion to the problem of Syria and Lebanon, I suggested that such a French war government would wish to sign the United Nations Pact.83 This would involve specific adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.84
Our policy, as enunciated in my letters of credence and remarks, was a simple, direct application to that problem of the relevant principle of that Charter, namely “the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live.”
Might it not be well were he, while in Washington, to consider whether French policy could not be similarly oriented. He was the person most qualified to discuss the matter.
He replied that he would welcome such discussion. Our policy, though simple and clear, was perhaps too simple to meet a highly complicated [Page 639] situation. He had been told since his return that it had given rise to hopes among local nationalists that America would play a direct role in local affairs. This he understood we did not wish to do.
We should remember too that France had still to account for her stewardship under the mandate. Juridically the responsibilities assumed thereunder, as well as those in our 1924 treaty, subsist. Limited independence had been proclaimed, but these considerations were implied in the proclamations.
France had too, he said, its pre-eminent historical position to consider. This, as well as French institutions and investments, had been a natural consideration in the minds of those who had signed the 1936 Treaties of Alliance. The policy of Fighting France was based on the proposition that the entry into effect of such treaties would be considered at the peace settlement as an oral attendant of juridical termination of the mandate.
I commented that I believed this line of thought was well appreciated in the Department. Clearly it was one which we too had considered “normal” at the time of Iraq admission to the League. Today, however, a second line of thought also appeared to be taking form, namely, that such a treaty relationship was one not necessarily to be imposed on but rather to be sought voluntarily by a country emerging from mandate status. If so sought in the free exercise of sovereign power, it would seem to be compatible with the Atlantic Charter principle in question.
He welcomed this brief exposition of views which he might encounter in Washington.
General Catroux then confirmed the information kindly sent me in the Department’s telegram No. 274, of December 15, 2 p.m.85 He plans to announce before his return to London that the situation is now such that elections can be held.
Both Syrian and Lebanese leaders, he said, wish a return to constitutional government. This could be attained either by abrogation of the 1939 Puaux86 decrees suspending the constitutions and recall of the former chambers or by holding new elections. He favored the latter course. Some weeks would be required to conclude the preliminaries. Elections could be conveniently held next March.
I then broached the subject of Office of War Information activities which on the basis of the Department’s telegram No. 244 of November 23, 4 p.m.,85 I had discussed in his absence with officials of the Delegation General. He had already been informed of my arguments and suggestions. These were:
[Page 640]Our propaganda is designed to capitalize in favor of joint Allied war effort local good will for the United States. Distribution of printed matter will be far more effective if done directly by American agents. Its primary aims are to persuade that by the magnitude of such joint effort the defeat of our enemies is assured and that in the light of Axis record of international gangsterism our victory will be clearly to the advantage of the Syrian and Lebanese people. Further, we could not accept the principle of “proportion”, namely limitation of our effort to that of a less powerful ally, in this field of psychological warfare any more than on the field of battle.
It therefore seemed reasonable that we should be aided wherever possible, especially as we wished fully to cooperate with the local Allied authorities. Might it not be well to approach the matter empirically rather than to involve us in so complicated an agreement as that signed with General Spears? Perhaps this could best be done by assigning a special liaison officer to work with Britt. If any conflict of views arose it could be referred to the French press officer and me for consideration. I had been specifically instructed that all informational material should be distributed “under supervision of Chief of Mission”.
The General was obviously relieved to hear my final point. His assistants had gathered that Office of War Information wished to function as a wholly independent agency.
I added that I was hopeful that this matter could be settled before his visit to Washington. Elsewise it might trouble the waters of far more important relationships.
He thereupon accepted my suggestion that we proceed empirically, namely that Office of War Information begin its distribution activities so soon as details could be worked out with his press director, reservation being made that if grounds for objection should later appear they be referred to me and if necessary to the Department.
I was impressed by the General’s frankness and obvious sincerity of purpose throughout these talks; and I should appreciate the Department’s instructions by telegraph if any of my comments or suggestions are not fully in accord with its policies.
- After the invasion of French North Africa, Admiral Darlan had been designated High Commissioner for French North Africa.↩
- Vol. i, p. 25.↩
- Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Gabriel Puaux, former French High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon.↩
- Not printed.↩