Office of the Historian

883.00/1248

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Washington,] February 5, 1942.

Mr. Welles: We are impelled to suggest the despatch of the attached draft telegram to Cairo in view of the disturbing possibilities inherent in the Egyptian situation in connection with the conduct of the war.

It would seem highly undesirable for the British to remove King Farouk from the throne owing to the likelihood that he would become a martyr in the eyes of his people and a rallying-point for disaffection, sabotage and attacks directed at the British. In comparable [Page 69] circumstances in the past the Egyptians have shown a very considerable capacity for trouble-making and have even resorted to assassinations. Any such development would also provide Axis propagandists with a remarkable opportunity for playing upon the sympathies of the Arab and Moslem world.

It should be remarked that Sir Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador at Cairo, has consistently handled Farouk without tact and that he appears in the King’s eyes as a fault-finding schoolmaster.

During the last war, the British were able to remove a Khedive of Egypt without difficulty, but they do not appear to realize the immense damage to their prestige in the East which has resulted from their lack of strength in the present struggle which is particularly manifest at this time.

Nahas Pasha, who is now being called to the premiership at the dictate of the British, has long been the leading exponent of Egyptian nationalism and independence, and as such he has commanded the allegiance of the great mass of Egyptians. In consequence, the recent actions of British, which have served effective notice that Egyptian independence is not only a fiction but one which has worn completely through, place Nahas in a difficult position whereby he may lose his political following.

In these circumstances, we have thought it well to put in a word to Sir Oliver Lyttelton, the British Minister of State, who has general political supervision in the Middle East, but we have not overlooked the possibility that the present Egyptian crisis may be geared directly into Axis plans.

Wallace Murray
[Annex]

Draft Telegram to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

Washington, February 5, 1942.

Your 196, 197 and 198 of February 4. Your remarks to the King as reported in your 197 are approved. This Government considers that it has a legitimate present interest in political developments in the Egyptian area in connection with the war effort, and in view of the presence of General Maxwell’s mission in Egypt8 and of the large quantities of ordnance which have been sent to that area from the United States. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should inform the British Minister of State of this Government’s hope that a situation will not be created requiring a substantial and continuing diversion from their main task of British armed forces in the Egyptian area.

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You should also state the realization of this Government that the causes of the present crisis may be found to lie deeper than those which are now apparent in that the crisis may conceivably be connected with general Axis plans in the eastern Mediterranean area. However, according to the information now available here, an accommodation would appear desirable whereby the King will remain in power and Nahas Pasha will assume the Premiership under conditions enabling the latter to retain the support of the great body of Egyptians which he has enjoyed in the past.

For your information, we have been impressed by Ambassador Bullitt’s9 view that the King lacks competent advisers and has consistently been handled without tact by the British Ambassador.

  1. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, Chief of United States Military Mission in North Africa with headquarters at Cairo.↩
  2. William C. Bullitt, Personal Representative of the President on a mission to the Near East, November 1941–February 1942; see footnote 14, p. 10.↩