793.94/17044

President Roosevelt to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang Kai-shek)39

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the [Page 759] line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

In the present state of world affairs, I feel—and I am confident that you will agree with me—that there rests on the United States, in connection with every move which it considers and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obligation to give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and strains, to both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various possible and probable advantages in comparison with the weight of other possible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over a long [Page 760] period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I assure you that the situation and the problems which are the subject of this correspondence will continue to have my own and my country’s constant attention.

[
Franklin D. Roosevelt
]
  1. President Roosevelt on November 11 approved text of the message drafted by the Department and noted: “I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday”, November 12. The message was handed the Chinese Ambassador at 6 p.m. on November 14 by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck), and copies were transmitted on November 17 to the Chief of Staff (Marshall) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark).