793.94/17001¹⁄₅
The Chinese Embassy to the Department of State 30
Message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt
“In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr. Winston Churchill:
‘Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yunnan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming and to cut China’s lines of communication with Britain and the United States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of expansion either northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and my right to impress them upon you, for much [of] the future lies in your hands.
Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan’s war of aggression on China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will ear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.
You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can our army do against another that is strong in the air? A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than 4 years on the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand’s reach. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.
For more than 4 years now China has kept some 5 million men in the field and thus immobilizes the man-power of Japan. The implications of this must be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized by yourself and all other friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then be able to cast all caution away and turn her [Page 749] whole might elsewhere. The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the European [whole] war may hang upon it.
If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprise[s] will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they mean to do, one by one. I am not asking you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, to make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.
You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she is [given a pretext] by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon this the fate of democratic cause will turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British and American willingness to cooperate in the defence of Yunnan. If the Japanese can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the plea [help] that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression.’
I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the [coming] [Page 750] campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America. If the United States would draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation [as I have suggested to Mr. Churchill I feel that success would be assured]. I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now essential to avoid the errors by which statesmen of Europe allowed Nazi Germany to divide them, and to acquire a commanding position, and to prevent Japan from attacking us in succession and separately and thus attaining the stature of a second Nazi Germany in the Far East.” (signed) Chiang Kai-shek
- Coded text dated November 1 of telegram sent on the afternoon of November 2 to the Chinese Ambassador In Washington by the Chinese Foreign Office (793.94/17002). Handed at 9:30 a.m. on November 4 by the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy (Liu) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck). Corrections in brackets based on revised copy received from President Roosevelt on November 11 and on text received from the Embassy in China on November 21 (793.94/17001²⁄₅, 17002); President Roosevelt inquired November 11 of the Secretary of State whether “I should make any change in the message I am to hand Hu Shih on Wednesday”, November 12.↩