973.94/16992½
Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)22
No. 32. Part 1—An attack on Kunming by the Nipponese will result in a serious situation for groups of American volunteer airmen. For consideration are offered the remarks that follow, although I have no information as to American or British proposed military plans of action in the Orient:
My No. 28 has already advised you that Chiang Kai-shek, in our interview, made the question of air support for Chinese Armies of first important [importance]—above all meaning strengthening of the American Volunteer group.
Part 2—If the Japanese decide to attack in the direction of Kunming the last of November, and if they avoid and do not violate British Territory there are a few courses that can be followed, listed herewith:
I—Do not in any way give any direct support. This also would include the American Volunteer Force; although the groups are paid from Chinese funds and not by our funds tacitly, we are responsible [Page 743] for it and it is sponsored by this Government. If we do not let them fight, we would be breaking our agreement and faith with the Chinese.
II—If we should let the American Volunteer Force participate in conflict we would have to overcome the following:—the equipment is rather poor and their supplies are very poor.
Note our 16–20. It is understood that the Chinese can in no way give effective assistance as their air force is not up to the point of combat with the enemy.
Part 3—They have not staff or officers who are trained in staff duties; also they are short of trained commanders. They are not qualified to be committed for at least 2 months or more. Their number is too small to be committed against the Japanese by themselves. No doubt would prove very ineffective. If they should meet the Japanese in combat and the first American Group defeated or destroyed, the moral effect would be very, very bad, and no doubt the repercussions in the United States would be very serious, if it was known that they had been committed not properly equipped.
III—If the American Volunteer Group should by any chance be reinforced by squadrons of our personnel and equipment supplied from either this country or any of our Islands, would also possibly provoke war with Japan. This is not necessarily a fact and if it is done in a proper manner, the strength for combat American Volunteer Group could then be exchanged. This may increase the value. In this way, valueless Chinese bombardment units could be made of some use.
Part 4—All American organization units and the equipment should be assembled and made ready for combat. This should be done in the Islands and sent by carrier up to the vicinity of Burma.
IV—Everything has been suggested for the General to have the British do something in regards to reinforcement of the American Volunteer Group. Note my 28. I have been informed by the British Ambassador that neither he nor his government can do anything, without full backing by the American Government.
V—This would be the same as four except that the support would be forthcoming from the British interests and that Singapore would then be strengthened by various organizations of Americans. That both American units and British units would then be combined and go to the aid of China. Without my knowing the government plans and intentions, what other commitments have been made or where; also the number of units that are available from our aviation. Owing to this, a clear cut plan and recommendation cannot be made here. I cannot make a recommendation as to the best course of action to be made. We cannot formulate this plan here.
Part 5—These points are very pertinent. If we make no prompt investigation on the parts of the United States as well as the English, [Page 744] it might start trouble enough to provoke a war. This, of course, might not follow, but one cannot tell. Perhaps if diplomatic pressure is combined, it might cause Japan to desist from making any decisive attack. The effective effort and intervention would bolster the fighting land troops of China, and would be a tremendous assistant. If, by chance, the American Volunteer Group should be moved alone from the area of Burma, and then placed in Yunnan, it would without a doubt be placed automatically in a position that it would have to be committed and then perhaps attacked either in position on the ground or air. This pressure, one way or the other, must be prompt to be effective. The performance of material should all be superior much so to the Japanese, figures we estimate on Jap strength which will no doubt be operating from the different fields in Indo-China. We plan to make recommendations as to the strength we shall need for a force to neutralize these Indo-China fields. This strength will be told you at a later date. [Magruder.]
- Paraphrase of radiogram from General Magruder dated Chungking, November 1, 1941, and received at War Department November 1, 5:54 a.m.; evidently received by Mr. Hornbeck on same date.↩