793.94/16992¾: Telegram
Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)14
Cable From General Magruder for Attention of General Marshall and Secretary Stimson, October 28, 1941
Part 1—Not pertinent.
Part 2—He15 made a particular point of the five questions mentioned and stated that he was very satisfied with all the methods of approach, that had been made.
One point he picked out the first thing was aviation and stated this item was the principal item at this time. He was very strong and exceedingly fluent in a request that he would like to have our Mission take over and have complete control of his aviation. Then, to take complete charge of the general development of the aviation section. He disregarded the forces of his own—that is the Chinese—and stressed particularly the American Volunteer Force under Chennault. He acted and seemed to think the American Volunteer Force was the only one that counted.
He expressed his desire many times that he would like to have a high ranking American Aviation Officer sent to the force over there and he, of course, would be given command of his (K. C. S.) air force.
This did not give me any chance to comment on these points. So I did not have a chance to discuss same.
He became very interested and intent in regards to the fact that another emergency about which he would like to talk and ask immediate assistance.
Part 3—He told me that he had information that the Japanese were all set to attack our City of Kunming and that they would come through Indo China. Their plan was to cut the Burma Road. He [Page 738] says that November, about the end, would without a doubt be the date. He said that he could resist any attack if he could concentrate his land forces but he could only do this with plenty of air support. He then repeated his request. He said he had plenty of resources to defeat the Japanese but only with plenty of air support. He wanted to know if this would be forthcoming.
The General insisted that the end would come if Kunming was lost. I agreed on that point. His estimate of the situation is that the key city to the Pacific was Kunming and no doubt if that city was destroyed, China would fall, and that without a doubt the Malaysia area under the attack would and [it] inevitably follows, nothing in the world would then stop a war in the Pacific. That war would be a certainty. He further estimated that if China held, no war in the Pacific would occur, or at least, the peace might be saved.
He says that air support must be given to China and he repeated this is very necessary to be effective. He repeated this more than once. He repeated that the British should give all aid to the American Volunteer unit. The idea must be sold and the British convinced that this is a necessity. He inferred that no other help or assistance would be forthcoming in time. He at no time mentioned reinforcements from us in any way or kind. He pleaded that the situation was very critical and he repeated this many times saying that the British would be the only support for air that could save his country. This would be the only way that peace could be preserved in the Pacific.
Part 4—Then made direct request that Washington be informed immediately of the threatening situation by me and urge that President Roosevelt intercede with British Government London—to have his defenses supported by Singapore Air Forces. The Generalissimo further asked that I personally appeal to the same effect to the C in C of British at Singapore.
An announcement of the Administration to the effect that a Japanese move southward would be detrimental to interests of U. S. was quoted by him and he argued that, if Kunming was attacked, the American Government could properly interpret such an attack in that light. Still more serious was the fact that this would be the first step of a more effective movement toward the south. He also stated that the U. S. right to trade with the Chinese would be infringed upon if Burma Road was cut.
Part 5—Generalissimo further pleaded that Mr. Roosevelt be urgently requested to put pressure of a diplomatic nature on Nipponese and to ask the English at same time to advise the Japanese that if Kunming was attacked, it would be detrimental to both American and British interests. It is his belief that if this action is taken, Japan would give up her plan.
[Page 739]Generalissimo stated that he and the English Ambassador had discussed the problem of air-support several times. His wife interrupted to say that promise of aid of large land forces had been given by Chinese in case of Japanese attack on Singapore, but that the English authorities had refused to promise air-aid in case an advance towards Kunming was started—except in the case that territory belonging to the British Empire was attacked.
Chiang Kai-shek was informed by me that his request could be transmitted by me to Mr. Stimson.
Before seeing the Generalissimo a draft of a cablegram on the probability of an attack on Kunming had been prepared by me. At present indications are strong that such an attack is contemplated. There is but slight doubt that if this attack is made and is a success the resistance of the Chinese would stop. Without effective air support it is true without doubt that the enemy’s decisive effort might be successful.
Part 7 [6?]—That Kunming is at the moment the key to the Pacific may not be an exaggerated statement at present. Chinese air force has no combat value. At present strength and as equipped now, the volunteers from America alone are ineffective and several months will elapse before they are ready for combat. Lend-lease quotas of material for aviation as now scheduled will be insufficient and arrive too late. The only hope is if Singapore forces or Units, properly organized, from Manila could arrive in time to give real aid to defending Chinese troops.
A report on the interview was made to the Ambassador and this cable has been read by him.