893.24/1143½
Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs49
The MID50 report attached hereto and submitted by one of the Assistant Military Attachés in China51 is a brief summary of the movement of munitions and commodities between the Soviet Union and China. It is believed that you will find it worth your time to read through the entire report.
It is estimated that since 1937 the Russians were able to supply the Chinese approximately 700 military aircraft and approximately 40,000 tons of other weapons and ammunition. The largest volume of traffic moved over the Alma Ata-Lanchow route during the closing weeks of 1940. Excluding Russian trucks in the Alma Ata-Hami section there were operating on the highway approximately 1,000 trucks of the Northwest Transportation Company. Also in operation were more than 350 trucks of other categories. As on the Burma Road, fuel was one of the greatest problems.
Inward bound traffic was almost entirely war materials and petroleum products. Trucks bound for Russia carried wool, tea, furs and tung oil. The maximum capacity of the Turkestan Road with equipment [Page 541] existing at the end of 1940 was estimated to be approximately 18,000 tons each way annually.
Apparently the road and the trade which moved across it were inefficiently handled. The explanations for this situation were the same as those applying to inefficiency on the Burma Road: corruption, political intrigues and jealousies and plain incompetence.
The Soviet-German hostilities have meant that Russian supplies to China have been virtually terminated excepting for small quantities of munitions already contracted for but yet undelivered. As the Soviet Union is not expected to be able to spare motor fuel for transport to China, the trucks on the Turkestan highway are expected to discontinue service. The total reserves of gasoline in the entire northwest are estimated to be only 300,000 gallons.