793.94/16842: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 11—12:25 p.m.]
384. Supplementing my No. 383, September 10, 6 p.m.39 I believe that we must realize that any material relaxation of political and economic pressure on Japan permitting her to concentrate her strength on China would arouse the widest resentment in this country and cause repercussions that might seriously weaken the determination to carry on resistance. Lease-Lend or other aid to China would not overcome that resentment.
The Generalissimo is undoubtedly thoroughly sincere in his determination to fight irrespective of any regional arrangement that may be made with Japan, and he would have the support of a substantial group of influential civil and military leaders.
However, in evaluating the present situation at Chungking and in China it must be borne in mind that there are considerable numbers of Chinese who feel sincerely that a continuance of resistance might not be in the best interests of China, in that China might not now fare badly in negotiations with Japan, and that ultimately in any circumstances China and Japan must arrive at some common understanding in the Far East. It is not difficult to perceive that the resentment attending some such regional détente as proposed—is [causing?] resentment against America and the democracies—might strengthen their influence in Government councils.
The Generalissimo and his supporters might not be able to prevail against a growth of such influence within the government; and the Generalissimo might retire and clear the way for a settlement. We must all bear in mind that there is the possibility that peripheral disaffection on the part of some provincial leaders such as Yen Hsi-shan40 for instance might at any time weaken the position of the present government and the resistance.
While Japan is known to be withdrawing some of her forces from China, it is significant that the Chinese armies appear to be unable to take advantage of this situation on any front. After more than 4 years of resistance the Chinese armies are poorly equipped and scantily supplied and they are not capable of more than a continuing defensive in areas into which the Japanese cannot readily penetrate. Difficulties of terrain and of communications and supply preclude the probability of any present large scale Japanese offensive unless her armies are heavily reinforced. Meanwhile, however, Japanese air forces are [Page 538] wreaking unremitting havoc on the undefended cities and villages in Free China and the trade blockade is gradually impoverishing large areas, with resultant lowering of morale.
- Vol. iv, p. 435.↩
- Commander in chief of Chinese second war area, with headquarters in Shansi Province.↩