893.00/14789
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 35
[Received September 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 186 of August 9, 9 [3] p.m. (received August 12) citing certain reports of developments in Kuomintang-Communist relations and instructing the Embassy to submit by airmail an appraisal of those reports.
The Embassy has been unable to disclose in Chungking any foundation for the Yung Pao report (Associated Press despatch of July 27 from Tientsin) that the Communists had agreed to disband the New Fourth Army and that the Chinese Government had in turn agreed to extend Communist territory and to grant the Communists a monthly subsidy of more than 2 million yuan. The Embassy is satisfied, from [Page 534] information and opinion obtainable here, that no factual basis for the report exists. The Department is no doubt informed that the Yung Pao is a Japanese owned or controlled newspaper. What purpose the editor felt would be served by publishing an unfounded report of the kind is not at all clear.
With regard to the United Press despatch of August 3 from Shanghai reporting that the Central Political Council of the Chinese Communist Party had drawn up a political platform providing for non-Communist representation in the administration of the area under its jurisdiction, the Embassy has ascertained that about one month ago the Communist authorities in Yenan issued a statement in connection with forthcoming elections, proposing that all the people living in the Communist area, whether Communists or not, participate in the election of officials. The United Press despatch is thought to be a report of that development. It is not anticipated that the proposal to participate in the elections, if carried through and acted upon, will bring about any internal political changes of moment in Communist territory or have any real significance in Kuomintang-Communist relations.
In its telegram No. 306 of July 22, 4 p.m.,36 reporting the publicity given, at Kuomintang instigation, to clashes between certain government forces and 18 Group Army troops (Communist) which had occurred a month earlier and were thought to have been settled, the Embassy stated that, although distrust and dislike characterized Kuomintang-Communist relations, an open rupture was not anticipated. In its monthly summary of political developments (telegram No. 334 of August 6, 11 a.m.36) the Embassy again expressed this thought, pointing out that fundamental differences of opinion and deep-seated personal animosities prevented a real united front; and that, while deterioration of relations was not anticipated, hopes of improvement were illusory. Such is the situation that obtains today and it is believed will continue to obtain unless some unforeseen development occurs to disturb the uneasy truce.
Since its inception following the detention and release of General Chiang Kai-shek in December 1936, and its initial announcement and implementation in September 1937, after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities, the so-called “united front” has been at best an unstable and unnatural alliance, giving slight promise of viability, and drawing what vitality it had from the fear and fact of Japanese aggression. The Chinese (Kuomintang) Government, hard pressed and committed to resistance, was prepared to accept the assistance of the Communist forces. During the first year and a half of hostilities there was ample outward evidence of a real united front in the face of a common and urgent danger. Such evidence however was limited in a large measure to the military field. Within the inner councils of the Kuomintang [Page 535] there was little inclination to extend the united front to include the political and governmental field. Hence, during the past year or year and a half, with the abatement of the really active phase of hostilities, there has been recurring and increasing evidence of the fictional character of the united front.
This situation has arisen in large part it is believed from fundamental differences in conception of the meaning and intent of a united front. The leadership of the Kuomintang has laterally interpreted the term (whether sincerely or not makes no material difference) as meaning and warranting the subordination of the Communist Party to the Kuomintang and its unification with that party to the end that political uniformity might be achieved and the Communist Party would lose its identity. Indications are not lacking among Kuomintang officials of leanings toward one party conceptions of government. A training school is maintained to inculcate in the minds of promising young party members ideas not inconsistent with such conceptions. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that in the minds of many of the Kuomintang leaders democracy is interpreted and anticipated as a system under which everybody votes the Kuomintang ticket.
Opposed to this conception of unification and uniformity is the Communist Party conception of collaboration by distinct entities as the basic objective of a united front. Being by far the smaller of the two parties, the Communist Party must be constantly on guard to maintain its identity. Were the positions reversed there is little reason to doubt that the Kuomintang would have short shrift.
Thus it is not any fundamental difference with regard to the form of government that keeps the two parties apart; it is rather a fundamental difference with regard to the incidence of government, with regard to social concepts of government. The pattern is a familiar one.
With the foregoing circumstances and thoughts in mind, it becomes reasonably clear that there can be little hope of a real united front, that is, a united front grounded upon sincere political and military cooperation. Even though divergent social conceptions were insufficient to keep the parties apart, strong personal prejudice on the part of many of the Kuomintang leaders would effectively prevent real cooperation. Endeavors to bridge the gap between the older and controlling elements in the Kuomintang and the Communist leaders would, it is felt, prove as ineffectual as they were unwelcome. On the other hand, prevention of an open rupture is considered to be quite feasible so long as the common front against Japan is viewed as a necessity and outside assistance in maintaining that front is desired.
Once that necessity ceases to exist, the Kuomintang-Communist feud may be expected to flare up again, probably in the form of hostilities. The foregoing statement assumes a continuation of the present [Page 536] Kuomintang leadership. There is a possibility that the more liberal younger element in the Kuomintang may become sufficiently influential to effect a bridging of the gap—might even through the adoption of needed social and agrarian reforms cut the ground from under the Communists and effect a relative degree of political unity in the country. This is in no wise an early prospect but it is worth bearing in mind when taking a long view of the situation. For the immediate future, it suffices that disruptive and weakening civil discord may be held in abeyance.
There is enclosed a translation, made by the Chungking representative of the Communist Party, of a Manifesto issued on July 7 by the Communist Party.37 The Manifesto is an interesting statement of the Party’s position and desires, but contains nothing in the way of a new approach to the problems discussed.38 The portions included in inked brackets were deleted by the censor in Chungking before publication in the local Communist newspaper.
Respectfully yours,
- Drafted by John Carter Vincent, First Secretary of Embassy in China.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
-
The manifesto closed with the exhortations:
↩“Down with Japanese Imperialism!
Down with fascist enslavement!
Support the Soviet Union!
Long live the victory of China’s resistance war!
Long live the victory of the world’s anti-fascist united front!”