893.01/909: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 15—6:10 p.m.]
875. Embassy’s telegram 802, July 3, 4 p.m. Ostrorog asked us to drop around this morning and talked of recent Franco-Chinese relations. He referred to Chinese anxiety lest France recognize the Nanking régime and said that he has a feeling that in order to forestall such a move the Chinese have been endeavoring to exert a little counter-pressure. This has taken the form of border incidents of a relatively minor character on the [Indo-] Chinese northern frontier. A handful of deaths have resulted but these incidents have not yet assumed serious proportions.
While he is not sure that they were deliberately stirred up under orders from Chungking rather than the result of spontaneous local initiative on the part of wandering bands of [guerrillas?], he is inclined to believe that the former is the case and that they are designed to impress the French with the means of reprisal available to China should the Nanking régime be recognized. He knows that the Chinese Embassy here has been, through informants, endeavoring to give the impression to the French Ministry of Colonies (which he said is “somewhat naive” in such matters) that Chiang Kai-shek may take the initiative in breaking with France; that there are some 500 thousand Chinese troops between the Indochinese frontier and Burma, etc. A telegram from Cosme22 at Shanghai yesterday forwarding a message from Paul Boncour23 at Chungking indicated that word of the French refusal to recognize Nanking was making a “favorable impression” and that, as a result, the departure of the new Chinese Ambassador for Vichy which had been “indefinitely postponed” is now scheduled for next week. In spite of this indication of a more “sensible attitude” on [Page 528] the part of the Chinese, Ostrorog feels that it would be well if the Chinese Government could be made to see the dangers of border incidents from all points of view, adding that the Chinese “are so intelligent” that they should readily appreciate them. There has been no renewal, he said, of the Japanese request for recognition of Nanking and there has been no German pressure in that direction. On the other hand, if the Japanese get the impression that the French are not “defending” Indochina or that there is a possibility of an early Chinese invasion of that territory, they may well be moved to take some direct action against the colony themselves. Such a step would, of course, be most regrettable from the French point of view, but would also hardly serve the interests of China. The fact that the Japanese have not sent any troops in that direction, either to Kwangsi or to Hanoi, in spite of the weakness of French military forces in Indochina, would seem to indicate that they do not have the forces readily available. Such being the case, he said, it would seem foolish for the Chinese to run the risk of forcing Japan to “occupy” Indochina through the creation of border incidents, the seriousness of which, given the natural reactions of the military on the spot, is always difficult to control.
Ostrorog also read us a long telegram from Arsène-Henry sent on July 8 but delayed 4 days in transmission. The French Ambassador at Tokyo reported a long interview with Matsuoka. The latter had informed Henry that Japanese foreign policy is founded on three principal bases: The tripartite “alliance” with the Axis; the Russo-Japanese pact of non-aggression and “Japanese vital interests”. Unfortunately Matsuoka was quoted as saying “these three bases of foreign policy are sometimes somewhat contradictory and Japan is endeavoring to study the situation in the light of recent developments.” Matsuoka said that the Germans have made no demand for Japanese action against Russia “on the basis of December 7 [September 27] tripartite pact”24 and that if such a demand is received “it would have to be carefully examined.”
(Later in his telegram, however, Henry reported that one of his colleagues quoted the Counselor of the German Embassy at Tokyo as indicating that the Germans have asked the Japanese to move against Russia though possibly not on the basis of the tripartite pact—which Henry thought might be the Japanese Foreign Minister’s “subtle way” of avoiding a frank reply.) In the event, Henry came away with the definite impression that Matsuoka is doing what he can “to calm the more excitable elements” and to avoid any move against Vladivostok at the present time, particularly in the light of the “surprising strength” of Russian resistance. He laid stress on reports of one of his [Page 529] “most reliable” Japanese informants that the country is in no way—economically, financially, militarily or politically—prepared for an adventure against Russia and would like nothing better than to see the Chinese war settled as soon as possible.
It is the opinion of this informant, Henry went on, that the Japanese Government is convinced that a move against Russia at this time would [precipitate?] “an immediate conflict with the United States” and this it is understandably eager to avoid. While warning that if the chance presents itself of taking Vladivostok without risk the Japanese will probably move (and he implied that a further reason for postponing such action at this time is the weakening of Japanese military forces in the north following the signature of the Russo-Japanese pact), he does not expect any precipitate action.
Henry derived from his interview with Matsuoka with [sic] a definite feeling that the latter had been “disappointed” by the German attack on Russia, which he has been assured at the time of his Berlin visit was not contemplated—especially as the “signature of the Russo-Japanese pact had been made with German approval.” He even expressed himself to Henry as surprised that Germany had requested Bulgaria, rather than Japan, to represent German interests at Moscow. (To Ostrorog the reason is “obvious”: the Germans hope that the Japanese will enter the conflict.)
In comparing the foregoing with the Embassy’s telegram 808, July 5, 10 a.m.,25 the Department will observe that Henry’s latest telegram is somewhat in contrast to views he reported earlier.
- Henri Cosme, French Ambassador in China.↩
- Jean Paul-Boncour, French Counselor of Embassy in China.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 165.↩
- Vol. iv, p. 995.↩