893.00/14757
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to
the Secretary of State
No. 51
Chungking, July 1,
1941.
[Received July 21.]
Sir: 1. I have the honor to refer to my
despatch no. 9, June 2, 1941 transmitting a copy of a memorandum of
conversation held with the prominent Chinese communist leader Chou
En-lai, and to enclose as of probable interest to the Department a copy
of the memorandum of a further conversation held by officers of the
Embassy with Mr. Chou on June 29, 1941.
2. Mr. Chou, it will be observed, airs his views at some length in regard
to certain aspects of the current international situation, as well as in
regard to Chinese internal developments.
3. With regard to the latter subject it will be noted that according to
Mr. Chou there have recently been no noteworthy developments in
Kuomintang-communist relations. Mr. Chou asserts that Chinese communist
forces have recently cooperated in attacking the Japanese
notwithstanding the non-supply by the national government of funds and
equipment to the communists; and that this failure to supply the
communists was contrary to assurances given by General Chiang
Kai-shek.
4. On the basis of Mr. Chou’s assertions as set forth in the enclosed
memorandum of the conversation and information recently available to the
Embassy from governmental sources, it seems clear that the developments
of the past month have brought no fundamental improvement in
Kuomintang-communist relations, although beneficial signs are to be seen
in the belated cooperation given by the communist Eighteenth Group Army
to the national government forces in Shansi and in the apparent absence
of conflict between government and communist forces during the past two
or three months. It will be observed that Mr. Chou confirmed the
retention in central China of communist forces. This maintenance of
communist forces in central China, of which there is no indication of
imminent removal, continues in violation of orders issued by the
national government. It seems doubtful, now as in the past, whether the
national government will be disposed to resume supplying the Chinese
communists with funds and equipment as long as communist forces remain
in the Yangtze valley area.
5. It is generally acknowledged that the Chinese communists lost ground
among their fellow countrymen when Russia entered into a neutrality pact
with Japan. Now the German attack on Soviet Russia appears to have
introduced a new element into the situation. In the absence of clear-cut
indications of the outcome of that conflict and of the attitude of Japan
it is difficult to assess the effects of this war on the future course
of Kuomintang-communist relations. One point
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seems clear however, namely, that German and
perhaps Japanese pressure on the Soviet Union tends to diminish the
possibility of active Russian assistance or interference on behalf of
the Chinese communists in their struggle for increased influence in
China. On the other hand the Russo-German war apparently gives the
Chinese Government more freedom to deal with the Chinese communists.
Bereft of the support of the Soviet Union, it may be that the Chinese
communists will become more amenable to the desiderata of the national
government, especially since the Soviet Union is being attacked by a
power which is linked to Japan by the tripartite and anti-comintern
pacts.12
6. It would seem then, at least for the moment, that the Russo-German
conflict affords the national government a clearer opportunity to deal
with the Chinese communists than was the case when Soviet Russia
remained at peace and in a position to influence powerfully the course
of Kuomintang-communist relations. However the uncertainty of the
Sino-Japanese conflict, the evident Chinese desire to establish a
four-power bloc comprising the United States, Great Britain, China and
the Soviet Union against the Axis coalition, and Chinese dependence on
outside aid — especially from the United States and Great Britain—will,
it is believed, deter the Generalissimo and his advisers at this time
from taking drastic action to eliminate the Chinese communists. It is to
be hoped that the Chinese communists, for their part, will adopt a more
amenable attitude than that which they have assumed during the past year
or more. A spirit of accommodation on the part of both factions at this
time might go a long way for the adjustment of serious differences.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second
Secretary of Embassy in China (Drumright)
[Chungking,] June 30, 1941.
| Present: |
Chou En-lai and party of three |
|
Mr. Vincent |
|
Mr. Service |
|
Mr. Drumright |
Mr. Chou En-lai came to lunch yesterday. He was very voluble,
discussing at length various phases of the world situation.
Following the line of the Chinese press during recent days, Mr. Chou
asserted that the Russo-German war presented the United States and
Great Britain with a splendid opportunity to exercise a “strong
attitude”
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toward Japan.
With particular reference to the United States, he said that the
Russo-German war presents the United States with an excellent
opportunity to sever its economic relations with Japan, that is, to
stop buying and selling goods. He expressed the view that such a
policy might bring about a salutary change in Japan’s policy,
already vacillating, away from the Axis.
However, Mr. Chou indicated that he entertained doubt whether the
United States and Great Britain would exert pressure on Japan
notwithstanding the opportunity presented by the Russo-German
conflict. He then explained that Japan now has three courses open:
(1) attack the maritime provinces; (2) intensify military operations
in China; and (3) pursue the policy of southward expansion. He
voiced the view that Japan is most likely now to adopt the first
course, that is, attack the maritime provinces. He added, however,
that if such an attack is to occur it should be started within a
month if it is to be successful, for the onset of cold weather would
of course greatly hinder Japanese operations in Siberia. He went on
to say that present reports indicate that for the moment Japan’s
policy is one of “wait and see”. He said that he believed the
Japanese would attack Russia only in the event that Germany is
certain to win a decisive victory over Russia.
With reference to the Russo-German conflict, Mr. Chou expressed
confidence that Russia would be able to hold out against the German
attack, in which event the German position would become perilous in
the extreme. He expressed the view that the main German effort is
concentrated in White Russia in an endeavor to flank the main
Russian forces which, he said, were gathered for the defense of the
Ukraine and the important industrial center, Kharkov.
Mr. Chou said that the majority of Chinese apparently welcomed the
Russo-German conflict, although he carefully refrained from
expressing his own view in this respect. He said that this attitude
sprang from the concept that pressure on China would be relieved. He
went on to say that it is generally hoped in Chinese circles that
Japan will attack the maritime provinces because (1) it will mean
the diversion of Japanese land forces from China; (2) the
abandonment of southward expansion and thus insure further American
and British assistance to China; and (3) the affording of an
opportunity for the national government to put pressure on the
Chinese communists. I gathered from his reference to this latter
point that he does not relish the idea of Japan’s attack on the
Soviet Union. Mr. Chou confirmed the impression that the great
majority of Chinese people is sympathetic to the Soviet Union in its
conflict with Germany, although he said that there is a “small
faction”, the nature of which he did not specify, which favors a
German victory over the Soviet Union. In this relation he said that
he had learned that the Central Publicity Board had permitted
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the transmission of a
telegram by a German correspondent in Chungking to the effect that a
Japanese attack on the Soviet Union would permit of government
pressure on the Chinese communists. He said that he wondered why the
censors had passed such a message, apparently implying that the
Chinese Government is actually considering the placing of pressure
on the Chinese communists. He also referred to a Havas report from
Shanghai to the effect that the Russo-German war would result in
cessation of Soviet support to the Chinese communists, and said that
this report was wholly untrue, that the Soviet Union has not
assisted the Chinese communists.
In reply to a suggestion that the Russo-German war should seemingly
serve to improve Kuomintang-communist relations Mr. Chou refused to
commit himself definitely, saying that this would depend on future
developments such as the course of the Russo-German war, the policy
of Japan, the United States and Great Britain, and the desire of
Chinese leaders to carry on the “united front” and resistance to
Japan.
[Here follow observations by Mr. Chou En-lai regarding
Kuomin-tang-Communist military relationships and Chinese military
planning.]
Mr. Chou referred to press reports of the appointment of Mr. Owen
Lattimore as political adviser to the Generalissimo and indicated
that he was pleased to learn of Mr. Lattimore’s selection.13 It seemed obvious that Mr. Chou feels that Mr.
Lattimore may have a sympathetic attitude toward the Chinese
communists.
Unlike his inquisitiveness at our last meeting on May 30,* Mr. Chou in the course of
this conversation made no reference to alleged American mediation of
the Sino-Japanese conflict. It seems likely that the events of the
past few weeks have convinced him that the United States has no
intention of endeavoring to separate Japan from the Axis at the
expense of China.
