792.94/134: Telegram
The Minister in Thailand (Grant) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 28—9:08 a.m.]
369. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs today informed me that his Government yesterday at a special meeting of the Cabinet examined the political situation arising out of the new Japanese movement in Indochina and decided to follow for the time being a policy of “watchful waiting” without making any formal declaration of neutrality. He manifested keen interest in the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States20 and wanted to know the amount involved. He informed me a decision on the matter of oil, tin and rubber would be delayed for the present until the political atmosphere is clarified. He added however that his Government would likely propose to the Japanese that rubber be thrown on the open market in addition to tin. He said he himself favored this solution of the problem which he indicated is giving the Thai considerable concern as the result of the Japanese pressure. He said the Japanese were “furious” with the Thai as the result of the negotiations for oil, tin, rubber and that they offered to furnish the Thai all the oil they need in addition to armaments and they insist on 35,000 tons of rubber of the 48,000 tons.
The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs then said to me that he thought the United States Government should show its friendship for Thailand in a more positive manner by announcing publicly that the United States proposed to assist Thailand in every way possible and that my Government should not insist upon anything in return, such as rubber and tin, because of the Japanese pressure on Thailand. I replied that my Government was showing its friendship by proposing to assist Thailand in the economic sphere but that after all real friendship implied obligations on both sides, that my Government wanted all the rubber and tin it could acquire and it seems to me that the least that the Thai could do would be to give the United States an “even break” on these products, whereas the Japanese had already been promised the bulk of the annual supply in return for armaments. I added that in view of the recent political developments in this area, which had placed Thailand in a precarious condition, it seemed to me that Thailand would be better off without these Japanese armaments, since it was reasonable to conclude that Japan would strengthen her grip through the furnishing of these supplies. It was a certainty that Japan would not offer to furnish armaments which might be turned against her and who else, I asked, was offering a threat to Thailand’s political and territorial integrity. Certainly not the United States [Page 236] and Great Britain. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is the official spokesman on foreign affairs for Luang Pibul, made no comment but he gave clear indication that he understood and perhaps appreciated the argument advanced.
The Japanese Minister last night gave a large dinner party in honor of the Japanese Delimitation Commission, the guests including a number of high Thai officials.
Repeated to Tokyo.
- See press release of July 25 and Executive Order No. 8832, July 26, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 266 and 267.↩