Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

751G.94/366

The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 14

London, July 25, 1941.
[Received August 1.]

Sir: I have the honor to report that in conversation this morning with Netherlands Minster for Foreign Affairs van Kleffens, he reminded me of his Government’s anticipation of a Japanese move vis-à-vis Indo-China as expressed to me by Netherlands Prime Minister Gerbrandy (see my despatch No. 12, July 16 [15] 1941¹⁵). Minister van Kleffens went on to say that I could therefore readily understand that the recent Japanese move came as no surprise to his Government. In event, moreover, of a major Russian reverse, his Government believed that a Japanese move in the north might be expected. In fact, Japan was now in the mood to seize any place, if they thought they could get away with it, without getting hurt. However, if, and only if, the Japanese had reason to believe they would burn their fingers by advancing in any given direction, they would not move.¹⁶

The current turn of events had recalled to his mind conversations he had had with the President, with [Acting] Secretary Welles, and with Dr. Hornbeck, concerning the question of “political oil” and other “political supplies”.¹⁷ In this connection he felt confident that these conversations would be taken into consideration in the event our Government was now contemplating any plan vis-à-vis Japan. In other words, he hoped that any plan our Government might adopt would not envisage an embargo on materials essential to Japan, the cutting off of which might lead Japan to turn an aggressive eye toward the East Indies or to Borneo, etc.

On the other hand, of course, if the United States proposed to come down hard on Japan, by cutting off this category of materials, he felt sure that our Government was aware that this would immediately give rise to Japanese pressure on the East Indies and other neighboring sources of supply—pressure so severe as to call for an immediate discussion regarding a definite plan of action.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

15. Not printed.
16. In a memorandum dated August 16, the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) was asked by his Assistant (Hiss) to “note especially last sentence, paragraph 1”.
17. For President Roosevelt’s attitude on this subject and for Executive Order No. 8832 “freezing Japanese assets in the United States,” see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 264–265, 266–267.