740.0011 P. W./261: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:50 p.m.]
893. Without referring to the statements reported in my telegram 888, July 16, 5 p.m., we asked Ostrorog96 this morning for news of the Far East. He had just received word that Prince Konoye had been charged with forming a new government and that “general mobilization” in Japan has been declared. No telegrams have been received from the French Ambassador at Tokyo for news that general mobilization has been ordered, [which,] he said, is “encouraging from the French point of view” because no “full mobilization” would be necessary for an operation against Indochina in its present defenseless state. We asked specifically whether the Japanese had given any indication whatsoever recently of designs against Indochina or desire to acquire bases there and he replied categorically in the negative. He said in confidence that instructions had been sent to Ambassador Henry over a week ago in anticipation of a possible indication in that sense that if he obtained any hint of Japanese intent to occupy Indochina, either in whole or in part, he should protest energetically and promptly inform Vichy. No word has been received from him, he said, nor has the French Government received any word from other quarters showing Japanese designs on French Indochina.
(This statement, which is in contrast to that reported in my telegram number 888, July 16, 5 p.m., may mean either that Ostrorog has not been informed, or that Darlan has his own reasons for endeavoring to convince us that a Japanese move against Indochina is imminent.)
[Page 216]Ostrorog continued that German pressure for a Japanese attack on Russia and the Far East must be “extremely strong”, that furthermore Russia is Japan’s traditional enemy and such a move would be popular. In the third place, he said, the Japanese being well aware of “greater American interests in the Dutch East Indies and Singapore areas” nourish the hope that they can attack Russia without bringing themselves into open conflict with the United States. All the information which the French are receiving daily, Ostrorog said, shows that the Nazis are most anxious to avoid at all cost our entry into the war and still hope this can be avoided: they must know that a conflict between the United States and Japan inevitably means our similar entry into the European conflict and “loss of all hope for the compromise peace for which the Germans are so eager.” Therefore, the Germans too would probably prefer, in his opinion, to see the Japanese move northward as a lesser risk of bringing us in.
We inquired whether as a defensive measure some Japanese occupation of bases in Indochina might not be undertaken simultaneously with a move against Vladivostok. He replied that this is of course possible and is one of the causes of French anxiety.
He reminded us of Japanese fears and suspicions at the time of the Thailand mediation that the British were about to propose some mediation scheme of their own and to take a more active role in that area. (See for example telegrams Nos. 110, January 27, 5 p.m.,98 and 91, January 22, 6 p.m.) He said he thought it most important in the present delicate state of affairs in the Far East that the British be “most discreet” and give no cause or excuse to the Japanese to move into Indochina—“a move which would suit British strategy no more than French interests.”