[Enclosure]
The Netherland Legation
to the Department of State
Memorandum
As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and general
agreement, it is necessary that for the reasons expressed by the
Secretary of State, it should be endeavored to arrive at a limited
and temporary agreement.
In view of the fact that before the occupation of Indo-China by Japan
no sanctions were applied against the latter, it seems reasonable
that if Japan gradually withdraws from Indo-China proportionately
sanctions may be lifted to a certain extent, provided, however, that
the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indo-China goes so far that the
remaining Japanese forces cannot be considered a direct threat of
the Netherlands Indies, Malakka, the Philippine Islands and the
Burma road.
But even in that event, according to the opinion of the Netherlands
Government, sanctions should not be lifted to such an extent that
this would constitute an increase of Japan’s war potential. For
instance no delivery of high octane gasoline should be allowed, but
rice and if necessary low grade oils could be furnished.
The Netherlands Government will be glad to follow the same policy
concerning oil deliveries to Japan as applied by the United States.
It goes without saying that the license system will remain in
operation.
The first point at issue of the Japanese proposals is aiming farther
than the above. The Netherlands Government wonders whether it might
not be possible to give the following reply:
- 1.
- If it is the intention of Japan to militarily withdraw
from China, then there are no objections; if Japan is not
willing to do so, then the right to continue to give
assistance to China should be reserved.
- 2.
- It should be proposed that North East Asia (Russia) be
also included in the regions enumerated in point 1 of the
Japanese proposal in which regions the powers should agree
that no armed advance should take place.
Point 2 of the Japanese proposal has been answered by the above
observations.
Ad point 3 of the Japanese proposals. The Netherlands are prepared to
treat all countries on the same favored footing provided that no
foreign power tries to obtain a preponderant position in the
Netherlands Indies to the detriment of other nations and provided
that defense requirements be taken into account.
Point 4 and 5 of the Japanese proposals have already been dealt with
in the above observations.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the above
gives at least room for discussions with which we fully entrust the
[Page 660]
Secretary of State
especially now that we have been so fully informed by him and since
we have been given the opportunity to inform him of our point of
view.
As far as the possible reduction of economic pressure on Japan is
concerned, consultations with Governor General Starkenborgh and
Economic Warfare will be necessary in view of the fact that
deliveries of tin and rubber which were originally destined for
Japan are now being shipped to the United States.
In general it will not be possible to go further than the final
proposals of the Batavia Conference as proposed before the
Netherlands-Japanese discussions had been broken off. Moreover as a
result of Russian and American purchases, the amounts of tin and
rubber offered in the final proposals are no more available.
[Washington,] November 25,
1941.
