Office of the Historian

740.0011 Pacific War/1100

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)

[Washington,] October 29, 1941.

I have before me a copy of a memorandum submitted by Mr. Langdon under date October 25 entitled “Observations on the Far Eastern Situation and on American Policy in Relation thereto”.

I wish to say that I am very much impressed by Mr. Langdon’s observations, his analysis of the situation and his suggestions regarding policy. I find myself thoroughly in accord with practically everything that I find in the memorandum up to the last page (16). At page 16 I find myself not sharing the view that “at present Japanese covetousness of territories south of Indochina is a temporary development due to the cutting off by democracies of supply to Japan of products to those territories”; and, not in accord with the view that a dividing of Manchuria between Japan and China in which Japan would get approximately the eastern half of Manchuria would constitute a “settlement” (if by settlement there is implied creation of a condition of real peace) of the Manchuria question [and a pacification of Japan].64a

I concur in Mr. Langdon’s views that: Japanese military and civilian intrenchment in north China and other recently occupied areas has been carried out with the intention of being permanent; that such intrenchment is now so complete that no Japanese Government could abruptly withdraw Japanese military forces and civilians from these areas; that Japan’s present program is inimical to our commercial and political interests and is a military threat to Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union; that our interests require that we follow a course designed to defeat Japan’s program in China and to immobilize (in China) Japan’s military strength; that we should, consequently, increase our help to China, continue to have no commercial intercourse with Japan, and refrain from mediating between China and Japan; that commercial and other economic concessions to Japan would not, under present circumstances, result in any change in Japanese fundamental policies; and that Japan will [Page 560] be disinclined to undertake additional military ventures where she has reason to believe she would be met with vigorous resistance but will be likely to strike at weak areas capable of being easily conquered.

  1. Brackets appear in the original.↩