740.0011 P. W./619
Dr. E. Stanley Jones to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)
Dear Mr. Hamilton: I wanted to see you while in Washington this week, but could not get around to seeking a conference. So I do the next best thing in writing you this. I am to be in Washington again on October 30, 31, and if you think it worthwhile I might talk to you about the contents of this letter.
I saw the Japanese Ambassador this week and he said in substance: The crux of our difficulties with the United States is “the China incident”. The crux of that problem is the withdrawal of troops, particularly in North China. The crux of the problem for the Japanese is psychological: after four years of war we have nothing to show for it if we withdraw troops and revert to the status quo. And yet we see that we must withdraw the troops in order to win China. He agreed with my statement that unless they had won China at the end they had lost the war, for to have a non-cooperative China at the end is to lose the future.
He felt that they were on the horns of that dilemma, and the problem of getting out was psychological.
My suggestion to you about New Guinea would, I believe, provide the way out psychologically, for Japan. It would enable Japan to be generous in the settlement with China, for we had been generous with her in providing a way out for her surplus population.
Your question at the time61 was concerning the difficulty which the United States Government would feel in regard to raising the question of giving New Guinea to Japan, since we would be asking someone else to give something which we were not giving. I saw the force of this and suggested that the United States might share in this by agreeing to give a financial contribution to help repay the losses of nationals concerned.
I also saw it would be easier if the two countries involved, namely, Netherlands and Australia, would be willing to consider such a solution and themselves raise it with you. Hence, entirely on my own, and making it plain that I represented nothing except myself, I saw the Netherlands and the Australian Ministers on Friday and Saturday last. The Netherlands Minister was unresponsive. The underlying thought in his mind, though unexpressed, was, apparently, that since they had the backing of America in the situation they could sit tight, [Page 556] hold the status quo, and do nothing to lay the foundations of peace in the Pacific. He did say this: “We would be willing to help Japan to save her face by saying that we would be willing to enter a co-prosperity movement in the Far East, cooperating in every way, provided it meant no change in sovereignty.”
I am convinced that this is not enough, that there will be a change in sovereignty before settlement, and it will be either by force or by consent. We could head off that attempt by force by providing a solution.
On the other hand I found the Australian Minister most sympathetic. Not that he did not point out difficulties—he did, but his general conclusion was that he agreed that something of this kind would have to be done before a permanent peace in the Pacific is achieved. He added that he would send my suggestions to the Australian Government.62
He added this as a further suggestion: “The fears of the Australian people of having Japan at her doors in New Guinea with the possibility that having come so close she may go further, might be allayed if the United States in any settlement would be a part of it and would guarantee, as it were, until some international body could take over the responsibility, that Japan would stop at New Guinea. If the Australian people felt a security regarding the future they might be willing for this way out.” This would involve mutual non-aggression pacts of which we would be a part. This, to my mind, might not be impossible.
The Australian Minister asked if I had raised the question of New Guinea with the State Department. I replied that I had, entirely, of course, on my own and unofficially, and that the only reaction I had was that the State Department would feel difficulties in raising a question regarding the territory of someone else. I added that I was “the fool who rushed in where angels fear to tread”, and his reply was: “Something like the catalyst function in chemistry, an agent that precipitates a reaction, but is itself no part of it”. Perhaps that best expresses the part I am trying to play. I am only interested in reconciliation.
One other matter, and this I feel may have real possibilities in it. A very high official at Washington, whose name I think it better to withhold, suggested that it might be well for our Government to send at once a Commission of three persons, of high ability, of outstanding character, of broad sympathies and understanding to go to the Far East and try to find a basis of settlement.
[Page 557]This, to my mind, might do two or three things: first, it would produce a delay, would amount almost to an armistice, and give the situation time to cool. Second, it would show Japan that we really wanted a solution. Third, it might result in finding that basis of settlement.
I pass this on to you for your consideration.
I must say in closing that my reason for sending these suggestions is that I know the State Department is seeking for light on a very difficult problem, from whatever source it may come and however humble.
Yours very sincerely,
- See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, September 17, p. 455.↩
- The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) suggested on October 30 to Mr. Hamilton that this and the next two paragraphs be brought to the attention of the Australian Minister (Casey) through the Under Secretary of State (Welles).↩