711.94/2394: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:45 p.m.]
1690. For the Secretary and Under Secretary only. 1. The Japanese press yesterday and today prominently quotes Colonel Knox, Secretary of the Navy, as having stated in a public address that the American Government is satisfied in its own mind that the Japanese have no intention of giving up their plans for expansion and that if they pursue that course a collision with the United States is inevitable.
2. From the evidence before the American public and the world at large the conviction that the Japanese have no intention of abandoning their expansionist plans appears logical, but the fallacy of the premise lies in the fact, of which we in the Embassy have no doubt, that the men now in control of the Japanese Government are prepared to abandon these plans for expansion by armed force provided that a practical rapprochement with the United States can be effected.
3. Piecing out the information conveyed to you in my 1646, October 17, 11 a.m.,60 I learn from a wholly reliable source that before the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet the Emperor summoned a conference of prominent members of the Privy Council, the Army and Navy and asked them if they were prepared to follow a course which would ensure the avoidance of war with the United States. My informant states that the military and naval officers present at the conference remained silent, whereupon the Emperor, referring to the enlightened policy of his grandfather the Emperor Meiji, took the unprecedented step of commanding the armed forces to follow his wishes. This unequivocal position taken by the Emperor led to the necessity of appointing a Prime Minister who could be expected to exert effective control over the Army, with the resulting fall of the Konoye Cabinet and the selection of General Tojo who, while retaining his active position in the Army, is committed to endeavor to bring the conversations with the United States to a successful conclusion.
[Page 554]4. Informant states that the anti-American tone of the Japanese press and the bellicose utterances of extremist and pro-Axis elements are no true criterion of the feeling throughout various strata of the Japanese people, and especially the present leaders, that an understanding with the United States must be achieved, and that the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo, accepted office for the specific purpose of bringing the conversations to a successful conclusion and with the understanding that in the event of failure in that purpose he would resign.
5. It is believed by the Japanese leaders that the chief obstacle to a so-called settlement with the United States is the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina and the further belief is expressed that such withdrawal can and will be accomplished if Japan is not pushed into a corner by the expectation on the part of the United States that such withdrawal shall be executed all at once.
6. Informant, who is in touch with the highest circles in the country, characterizes the present situation and the new setup in Japan as opening a vista for a new orientation of policy and action which has been lacking during the past 10 years.
7. In commenting on the foregoing information and opinion, I can add little to the discussion contained in my 1529, September 29, noon, in which the suggestions put forward especially in paragraphs numbered 5 and 10 are still pertinent even although the procedure for negotiation envisaged in the proposed meeting between the responsible heads of the two governments may now have to be altered. If it is true—and I have no reason for doubting the accuracy of informant’s statement—that the Emperor is now for the first time taking an active part in shaping the future policy and action of Japan with the expressed purpose of bringing about a rapprochement with the United States, we may with some confidence look forward to a more positive effort on the part of the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to bring the preliminary conversations into more specific channels than hitherto. For the present and until the new Foreign Minister establishes contact with me, the foregoing opinion is necessarily speculative. In our first talks I shall of course take no initiative and whatever may be the nature of Mr. Togo’s approach, I shall continue to make clear the fact that you desire the preliminary conversations to be held in Washington and only in a parallel way in Tokyo.
8. From such evidence as has come to me I now have little doubt that, if the Emperor himself had not taken a positive and active stand on this issue, the developments envisaged in paragraph no. 8 of my 1529, September 29, noon, would in all probability have occurred.
- Not printed, but see memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan, October 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 689.↩