711.94/2177
Draft of Proposed
Communication to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)96
August 15, 1941
On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese
Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington97 that he
was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The
Netherlands and of China that they concur in a joint declaration that
they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they
would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indochina should be
available to all Powers on equal terms. The President stated further
that he would be willing to suggest to the Powers mentioned that they
undertake this joint declaration, in which the United States would be
willing to join, upon the understanding
[Page 371]
that the Government of Japan would be disposed to
make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its
military and naval forces from Indochina.
Subsequently, the President of the United States informed the Government
of Japan that the proposal which he had made should be regarded as being
made extensive to Thailand as well.98
The President has now been informed that the British Government is fully
disposed to support the proposal made by the President.
On August 6 the Japanese Government informed the Government of the United
States through the Secretary of State of a proposal which it proffered
as a reply to the suggestion made by the President on July 24.99
The proposal of the Japanese Government states in its first paragraph
that the Japanese Government undertakes, provided the Government of the
United States undertakes various steps set forth in the said proposal,
that the Government of Japan, “will not further station its troops in
the southwestern Pacific areas except French Indochina and that the
Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn
forthwith on the settlement of the China incident”.
During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan,
through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations. These
conversations had envisaged the ultimate reaching of agreements based
upon certain principles and policies. The principles and policies which
formed the basis for the conversations under reference were altogether
at variance with the adoption by either Government of any measures
involving military expansion on the part of either Power through the use
of force or through the threat of force. Notwithstanding these facts,
the Government of Japan has already occupied Indochina with its
military, air and naval forces.
Nevertheless, in view of the statement made to the Secretary of State on
August 6 by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, that the Japanese
Government is desirous of providing “a fresh basis for Japanese-American
understanding upon which informal conversations have been carried on
during the past months”, and, although the Government of the United
States finds it necessary to state clearly that various of the
suggestions contained in the proposal of the Japanese Government of
August 6 are totally unacceptable, it will be prepared to undertake
informal conversations in the sense of this proposal upon the receipt of
categorical assurances by the Government of Japan that it will undertake
no further moves in the nature
[Page 372]
of military expansion or in the nature of an extension of Japanese
influence through the use of force or through the threat of force in the
Pacific so long as such conversations are in progress.
The Government of the United States cannot again undertake conversations
of this character with the Government of Japan if the Japanese
Government during continuation of such conversations undertakes a step
such as that which it recently took with regard to Indochina.
Such assurances from the Government of Japan are regarded by the
Government of the United States as an indispensable prerequisite to any
discussion of the proposal made by the Japanese Government on August
6.
The Government of the United States shares the desire expressed by the
Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for
Japanese-American understanding. Its patience in seeking an acceptable
basis for such understanding has been demonstrated time and time again
during recent years and notably so during recent months. It believes
that only complete candor on its part at this moment will tend to
further the objective sought.
The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to
state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government
undertakes any further steps in pursuance of the policy of military
domination through force or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it
has apparently embarked, the United States Government will be forced to
take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever character it deems
necessary in its own security notwithstanding the possibility that such
further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two
countries.
[Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine in later years wrote two
memoranda to the Secretary of State with respect to decisions
reached at the Atlantic Conference in regard to relations with Japan
and the implementation of those decisions. First, he wrote as
follows (740.0011–Pacific War/2664½):1
[Washington,] July 3,
1942.
Mr. Secretary: With reference to the account by Forrest Davis and
Ernest Lindley in the Ladies’ Home Journal of
the Atlantic Conference where it is stated that the President told
Mr. Churchill that he could “baby the Japanese along”, the facts as
known to us on the basis of information communicated by Mr. Welles
would appear to be as follows:
Mr. Churchill and the British Government desired ardently to avert
war in the Pacific. The President and the American Government had
the same desire. The British believed that the issuance
[Page 373]
of a stern warning to
Japan (whether the British advocated publicity I do not know) would
be very likely to cause Japan not to proceed with further aggression
in the Pacific. The President did not share the British confidence
that the giving of a stern warning would produce the desired effect.
The President considered that a public warning would be likely to
precipitate further Japanese aggression rather than to discourage
it. Taking into account these various considerations, with the
common denominator that both desired to avert, if possible, war in
the Pacific and, if that could not be done, to have as much time as
could be obtained to strengthen their defensive positions, the
President and Mr. Churchill agreed that each Government should
separately inform the Japanese Government that further movements of
aggression on Japan’s part would cause the American Government and
the British Government, respectively, to take such measures as might
be deemed necessary to safeguard the interests of each country;
also, that the American Government would, in response to the request
already made of it by the Japanese Government, be prepared to resume
the informal conversations with the Japanese Government directed
toward exploring all possibilities of finding a peaceful adjustment
of the entire Pacific situation.
Mr. Welles brought with him from the Atlantic Conference a draft of
the proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador, a copy of
which is attached.2 This draft was considered by the Secretary and other
officers of the Department in a meeting in the Secretary’s office.
On the basis of the discussion at the meeting in the Secretary’s
office it was decided to recommend to the President that he hand to
the Japanese Ambassador two documents, one containing a statement
designed to make it unmistakably clear to the Japanese, although in
a manner which could not well be exploited by the extremists in
Japan in their agitation for a program of unlimited aggression, that
we could not be expected to remain passive in the presence of a
continued expansion of Japanese aggression. The wording of the draft
brought back by Mr. Welles was somewhat modified to accord with the
foregoing purpose. In the other document there was discussed in a
more expanded form than contained in the draft brought back by Mr.
Welles the conditions under which this Government would be willing
to resume conversations with the Japanese. A copy of the memorandum
of conversation which the President and the Secretary had with the
Japanese Ambassador on August 17 is attached.3
There is embodied in this memorandum the text of the two
communications delivered to the Japanese Ambassador by the
President.4
At the meeting in the Secretary’s office in which the draft brought
by Mr. Welles from the Atlantic Conference was considered, there was
discussed the question of what action this Government would be in
position to take in the event that the Japanese failed to heed what
we might say to them. This point was deemed especially cogent by the
Secretary in view of statements to him by our naval authorities
revealing an attitude on their part that we needed more time to
prepare and that our armed forces would in the event of armed action
by Japan make dispositions for defensive warfare.
[Page 374]
There is attached also a copy of the account of the informal
conversations with the Japanese.5 Beginning
on page 27, last line, (as
indicated by a blue slip) and going through to the top of page 30 of that
account,6 there are
described the developments relating to the delivery to the Japanese
Ambassador of the communications under reference.
The Davis-Lindley account in the Ladies’ Home
Journal, especially the statement that the President told
Mr. Churchill that he (the President) could “baby the Japanese
along” is not in accordance with our understanding of the facts, and
calls into question the good faith of this Government in carrying on
conversations with the Japanese. An accurate version of the matter
may be briefly stated, as follows:
In entering into the conversations with the Japanese this Government
realized that the prospects of success were very slight. This
Government, however, was actuated by a sincere desire to bring about
a peaceful, fair and progressive settlement of the situation
throughout the Pacific area. This desire was entirely consistent
with the traditional belief of the American people. It was also
consistent with the need of having as much time as possible to build
up the defensive preparations of the United States which were vital
not only to this country but to many other countries resisting
aggression. It was not until the middle of November when Mr. Kurusu
arrived and when it became apparent that he brought no new proposals
and that Japan would not budge from the fundamental tenets of its
military leaders, which included insistence (a) upon fulfillment of Japan’s obligations under the
Tripartite Pact—a direct threat to this country—(b) upon continuing to maintain Japanese armed forces in
large areas of China for an indefinite period, and (c) upon retaining a special economic position
in China as well as elsewhere in the western Pacific area, that it
became evident that it was illusory to expect that arrival at a
general agreement would be possible. This became even more clear
when we received the Japanese proposal of November 20.7 It
was not until about this period that the President, according to our
recollection, spoke of “babying the Japanese along.”
Second, as Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
Mr. Ballantine wrote the Secretary of State as follows
(711.932/6–1244):
[Washington,] June 12,
1944.
Mr. Secretary: With reference to the circumstances leading to the
delivery by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17
[1941] of a warning that if the Japanese Government took any further
steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of
force of neighboring countries this Government would be compelled to
take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate
rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United
States, it will be recalled that on August 15 Mr. Welles returned to
Washington from the Atlantic Conference and handed you a draft
[Page 375]
of a document which he
said had been agreed upon by the President and Mr. Churchill as a
statement which should be made to the Japanese. A copy of this draft
is attached.
The draft was discussed on the same day by you with your Far Eastern
advisers and they concurred with you in your immediate reaction that
the draft needed toning down. On the following day a redraft was
prepared but even this was thought to be too strong unless balanced
by some more friendly gesture. Accordingly it was decided to suggest
to the President upon his return on August 17 that he receive the
Japanese Ambassador and deliver to him two communications, one of
which would contain a warning and the other, in the nature of an
olive branch, would inform him that this Government would be
prepared to continue its conversations with the Japanese Government
and by such means to offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative
to the course upon which Japan was engaged.
There is no record in the Department of any written advance
communication being made to the President to this effect. My
recollection is that you saw the President on Sunday, August 17, and
that before seeing the President I brought up to you at your
apartment the two communications which we had drafted for the
President. The President approved of this procedure and on the same
day he received the Ambassador in company with you. The memorandum
of the conversation at the White House on this occasion is recorded
on pages 554 and 555 of Volume II, Foreign Relations of the United
States—Japan—1931–1941
. The two statements delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on
that occasion appear on pages
556 and 557
respectively.
It will be noted that there is a considerable difference in tone
between the draft which Mr. Welles presented to you on August 15 and
the papers which were actually handed to the Japanese Ambassador.
This is especially marked in the last paragraph of Mr. Welles’ draft
and the corresponding paragraph in the communication delivered.
These two paragraphs are set forth in parallel columns for your
convenience of reference.
|
Mr. Welles’ Draft
|
Communication Delivered
|
| The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it
necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the
Japanese Government undertakes any further steps in
pursuance of the policy of military domination through force
or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has
apparently embarked, the United States Government will be
forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever
character it deems necessary in its own security
notwithstanding the possibility that such further steps on
its part may result in conflict between the two
countries. |
Such being the case, this Government now finds it
necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the
Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of
a policy or program of military domination by force or
threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of
the United States will be compelled to take immediately any
and all steps which it may deem necessary toward
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the
United States and American nationals and toward insuring the
safety and security of the United States. |
[Page 376]
As a consequence of the manner in which this matter was handled, in
pursuance of your advice to the President, there resulted a
resumption of the conversations, which would not be likely to have
been the case if the matter had been handled merely by a
communication to the Japanese along the lines of Mr. Welles’
draft.
On June 12, 1944, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, then
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, wrote as follows
(711.932/6–1244):
June 12, 1944
“When, on Friday, August 15, 1941, Mr. Welles brought in a draft of a
proposed statement to the Japanese, he said that it had been agreed
at the meeting in the Atlantic that the American and the British
Governments would both say to the Japanese substantially what
appeared in the last paragraph of that draft.
“What thereupon took place, together with what was done on August 15,
16 and 17 with regard to this matter is briefly outlined in Mr.
Ballantine’s memorandum. On each of the three days there was
discussion and drafting and redrafting. The original draft was toned
down and was made sufficiently comprehensive to show that the
American Government was not condoning or giving assent to
continuation of Japan’s aggression against China or the launching of
Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union; and a second
communication was prepared to go along with that communication when
delivered.
“On Sunday morning final touches were put on both drafts; Mr.
Ballantine went with both to the Secretary’s residence shortly
before lunch; Mr. Ballantine telephoned me at about one o’clock with
regard to some points of phraseology; the two drafts were then
approved and adopted by the Secretary; and after luncheon the
Secretary went with them to the White House, where there followed a
conversation to which the President, the Secretary of State, the
Japanese Ambassador Admiral Nomura were parties (of which the
Secretary made a memorandum under date August 17).”]
