Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/2276

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)⁹⁰

[Washington,] August 15, 1941.

Quality and Value of Promises Made by the Japanese Foreign Office: an Illustration

There has been furnished during the past two weeks an excellent sample (example) of the quality and the mettle of Japan’s diplomacy, a sample which is clearly indicative of the hazardous futility of placing any reliance upon a pledge given by Japan’s diplomats that Japan will desist from pursuit of an objective to which the Japanese nation is committed (and to which we know that it is committed) and from employment of weapons and a procedure which they think serves them in the said pursuit of the said objective.

On July 30, according to our Naval Attaché at Chungking, 26 heavy Japanese bombers flew over Chungking and dropped bombs.⁹¹ Of the last bombs dropped one struck close to the stern of the U. S. S. Tutuila, and one struck behind the United States Embassy about 400 yards to the east. The bombing was witnessed by the American Military Attaché, the Assistant Military Attaché, and the Naval Attaché from the Embassy hill which immediately overlooked the Tutuila and the unanimous opinion of these officers was that the bombing was a deliberate attack on the Tutuila and the Embassy which missed only by a split second.

On the morning of July 30 Mr. Welles called the Japanese Ambassador in and, stating that he was acting by direction of the President, handed him a copy of the Naval Attaché’s report to read. Mr. Welles said that by direction of the President he desired to inquire through the Ambassador of the Japanese Government whether any responsible officials of the Japanese Government had authorized the bombing, and, further, he desired to inquire of the Japanese Government what measures, concrete and detailed, the Japanese Government proposed to take in order to prevent a further incident of this character.

The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles three or four times to repeat his inquiry until the Ambassador repeated it himself correctly.

Mr. Welles stated to the Ambassador that it was unnecessary to impress upon him, in view of the situation which unfortunately existed between the two countries, the importance of the reply which might be made by his Government to this message.

In cabling an account of the interview to Mr. Grew on the same day Mr. Welles instructed Mr. Grew to take the matter up urgently and with great emphasis with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the evening of July 31 the Japanese Ambassador called to see Mr. Welles at the Ambassador’s urgent request. As soon as he entered the room the Ambassador took out of his pocket a piece of paper and read a statement. Mr. Welles asked the Ambassador if he would be good enough to let him have the statement as an aide-mémoire of the declaration he had made. The Ambassador replied that he felt unable to give Mr. Welles this statement in writing but nevertheless would be glad if Mr. Welles would take notes from the statement. The Ambassador thereupon handed Mr. Welles the statement and Mr. Welles took notes therefrom. Mr. Welles’ recorded account of the contents of the statement is as follows:

“The statement commenced to the effect that he was instructed by his Government to inform the President officially of the deep regret of the Japanese Government because of the bombing of the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking.

“The Japanese Government desired to assure this Government that the bombing was an accident ‘pure and simple’.

“In order to make sure that no further incident of this kind would take place, the Japanese Government ‘has decided to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking’.

“The Japanese Government offers to pay full indemnity for any damage occasioned American properties immediately upon the completion of the necessary investigations.

“The Japanese Government requested that its decision with regard to the suspension of bombing operations over the city area of Chungking be regarded as strictly confidential.

“The statement likewise included the assertion in the name of the Ambassador himself that it was he himself who had recommended this procedure to the Japanese Government.”

On August 8, 10 and 12, there have appeared in the press news dispatches from Chungking giving accounts of bombings by Japanese planes at and in the neighborhood of Chungking. On August 11 the American Ambassador at Chungking reported that Chungking had during the past four days been subjected to unusually heavy and prolonged air raids; and that not only districts outside of the city proper but also the city area had been repeatedly bombed although no bombs had been dropped in that part of the city area which is directly opposite the anchorage of the American gunboat and the location of the United States Embassy’s chancery. News dispatches have indicated that at least one American residence was demolished and that there was bombing around another residence (that of the British Ambassador) which is everywhere known to be within the city. [On “city” see note at end].⁹²

The New York Times special representative at Chungking, in an article appearing on August 13, states that “The raids have almost isolated Chungking from the outside world. Nearly all passenger plane services have stopped. Radio and telegraph operations are difficult…” [Practically all important passenger communication between Chungking and the outside world is by plane.]⁹² The story goes on to say that the American Ambassador and most of the staffs of the United States and the British Embassies were over the weekend isolated from their offices. Also, that “The final raid was the fourteenth in five days.” This same correspondent’s report appearing on August 14 stated that squadron after squadron continued to bomb “Chungking and its suburbs”, which had been under air alarm two-thirds of the time since Friday (August 8).

Mr. Gauss’ report of August 11 states that “the outlying districts and city area have been repeatedly bombed.”

On August 14 the Secretary of State spoke to Admiral Nomura about this apparent disregard to a given pledge. The Secretary’s memorandum of the conversation records that Admiral Nomura “very promptly replied” that the promise which he had conveyed to Mr. Welles was only that Japan would “temporarily” cease bombing the city area and not “indefinitely” and “that he thought he got that fact over to Mr. Welles but that he might have failed in his efforts to do so.” The Secretary’s memorandum concludes as follows: “at any rate he stood definitely on that contention and said that was the situation”.

If Mr. Welles’ demand on July 30 meant anything—and it surely had great meaning—it meant that this Government wanted of Japan a pledge of honest intention given in good faith and a performance that would demonstrate such intention and such faith. If the Japanese Government’s implied promise given on July 31 in response to that demand meant anything of good faith and of honest performance it surely should not have been made—and should not now be made—to rest on a narrow technical construction of the expression “city area” [a construction upon which, indeed, the Japanese Ambassador has not relied]⁹³ and be expected to have binding force only for a few days. The Japanese Government surely would know that a pledge applying only to the narrowest possible area and honored only for a few days would not be honestly responsive to the demand which Mr. Welles made. Yet the Japanese gave an implied pledge, and Mr. Welles accepted the pledge given. True, the pledge was given orally and Japan asked that it be kept secret: it was a “gentleman’s agreement”. But by that exchange a serious “incident” was “closed”. And then, within eight days, Japanese armed forces, both of the Navy and of the Army, were bombing Chungking (such bombing being a practice to which the United States Government has taken specific and emphatic and repeated exception) more intensively than ever; and thereafter, the Japanese Ambassador, in defending the action, states that Japan’s promise was “temporarily” to refrain from such action: he “thought”, he said, that he had made this clear to Mr. Welles but “he might have failed in his effort to do so.”

Next there comes to us from Tokyo on August 14 a telegram reporting receipt by Ambassador Grew of a cryptic message from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered by the Director of the American Bureau to Mr. Dooman (Counselor of Embassy):

• “One. It is unthinkable that the American Government would inform the Chungking Government of the assurance conveyed to the American Government through Admiral Nomura that Japanese forces would Suspend bombing of the area of the City of Chungking, which of course does not include its suburbs’. If, however, such information should be conveyed to Chungking by any third party, and if the fact of the conveying of such information should become known in Japan, a ‘very dangerous situation would arise.’
• “Two. Mr. Terasaki declined to enlarge on the statement, except to say that we must be aware of the Japanese doctrine of the Imperial Command and that it is a serious thing for the Japanese Government to give to any foreign government an undertaking which would restrict freedom of operation of the Japanese armed forces.⁹⁴
• “Three. Mr. Terasaki requested with great emphasis that his statement be regarded as being of the most confidential character.”

The whys and the wherefores and the meaning in general of this message, its bearer declined, Mr. Grew reports, to elucidate. Under all the circumstances, what other interpretation is there to be put upon that message than that it is intended as a warning to us, accompanied by a threat of a “very dangerous situation” against our giving either to the Chinese Government or to the public any information that the Japanese Government made us a promise and proceeded thereafter in complete disregard of the spirit, whether or not the letter, of that promise.

There comes to us today (August 15) a telegram from Mr. Grew as follows:

“All evening papers under large headlines print despatches from China announcing that since August 8 Japanese navy planes have bombed Chungking forty times, that until 10 a.m. today raids took place at intervals of three to four hours during a period of one hundred and fifty hours and that 1,000 planes were employed. The Chungking Government is described as on the ‘eve of collapse’.”

This throws light on the message account of which is given in the paragraphs next preceding: a message in which the Japanese Government demands that we keep silence and observe secrecy. It throws light on the whole transaction. The Japanese were alarmed at the time of the bombing of the Tutuila. Witness the haste with which their naval officers made apologies, at Chungking, in Tokyo, and in Washington. They rushed their making of a promise to the American Government. They obtained from us an acceptance of that promise and an assurance that we would not make the bombing of the Tutuila an issue. They then assembled extraordinarily large air forces (both of navy and of army) and they embarked upon an intensive and continuous bombing of Chungking. That bombing began on August 8. The American Government gave no indication of taking notice of it until August 14. At last the Japanese press boasts of the bombing and declares that it has practically put the Chungking Government out of business. Simultaneously, the Japanese Foreign Minister warns the United States to say nothing (except perhaps to the Japanese Government) concerning what has happened as regards a promise given and broken. The Japanese Government has again been (1) testing us out, to see whether we mean business, and (2) through the agency of its army and navy trying to accomplish and produce, while we remain silent and inactive, a fait accompli, the smashing of the Chungking Government.

[Note: The terms “city” and “city area” need to be understood. To us, in ordinary parlance, a city extends to the point where suburbs begin. In ordinary parlance, the whole built-up city of London is the city; but among the British and especially among Londoners the term “the city” applies to a very small area in the very heart of the business section of London. To the Chinese or to the Japanese, “city area” at Chungking might mean either the area within the old walls or a small central business section. This might be equivalent to what we mean when we speak of the “downtown area”. But nothing has been said by the Japanese Government to indicate that any such limited area was meant when Admiral Nomura said “city area”; and surely the American Government’s expectation was not based on any such limited concept. Had it been so, the offered pledge should have been and doubtless would have been rejected at the outset.]⁹⁵ As for the “time” factor, the record speaks completely for itself.

S[tanley] K. H[ornbeck]

90. Submitted to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State and noted by them. Mr. Hornbeck suggested reading the title, first paragraph, and last 10 paragraphs, “with special attention to what appears on and after page 6” (namely, paragraph beginning “On August 14”).
91. See Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 719 ff.
92. Brackets appear in the original.
92. Brackets appear in the original.
93. Brackets appear in the original.
94. Penciled marginal notation by Dr. Hornbeck: “This sounds very much as though the F. O. had never authorized Nomura’s statement, or, if it had, had later gotten into trouble about it with the Army and/or the Navy.”
95. Brackets appear in the original.