Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.93/473½

Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 3, 1941.

Re: Lattimore’s Cable of August 2nd.⁸¹

1. Japan would be restrained and our interests would thereby be served if Russia, China and Britain entered upon an agreement that provided that in the event that either Russia or Britain was attacked by a power that was also attacking China, the three nations would take joint military action against the aggressor.

2. We have such a great stake in restraining Japan until the Battle of the Atlantic is won and until we can get sufficient ordnance and planes to China, that we might properly take the responsibility of suggesting the desirability of such an alliance to Britain and Russia. It offers an opportunity of holding Japan without entailing an undue diversion of materiel by the anti-Axis powers to the Far East.

3. The other alternative mentioned is that China should be invited to participate in conversations between British, Dutch and Americans regarding mutual defense in the Pacific. If such conversations are proceeding, this appears to be a reasonable request which I should think would be in our interests to grant.

4. China’s feeling that the democracies regard her as inferior and of not being worthy of being considered an ally is one I encountered. It is deep and persistent and should not, I think, be ignored. Chiang, himself, feels very strongly in this matter.

5. If you should decide to communicate the substance of these requests back to Gauss, I trust that he fully understands that he should not disclose his knowledge of them to the Generalissimo.

6. Pending action on these requests, I propose, if agreeable to you, merely to acknowledge receipt and say that the President has the matter under advisement.

Lauchlin Currie

[Annex]

Cable to Lauchlin Currie From Owen Lattimore ⁸²

Chungking, August 2, 1941.

Following extremely confidential, has not been mentioned to any Embassy. Generalissimo gravely concerned by political situation because reaction of Chinese people is that after four years strenuous resistance China, despite American assistance and American and other countries’ sympathy, has not won a single ally and the nation feels politically isolated. Growing apprehension that after the war China’s victory may not have won equal status and treatment. Japanese and puppet propaganda recently exploiting situation, insinuating China being used by anti-Axis democracies as a tool, not an ally, and will be victimized in peace terms. Such propaganda will have unfortunate reactions tending to undermine resistance of both Chinese people and army unless countered. Generalissimo feels that only the President is in a position to take initiative at present time and urges him to consider two alternatives. Either President suggest to Britain and Russia that they propose alliance with China, or America, Britain, Holland, et cetera, invite China participate in their already existing Pacific defense conferences. Hitherto, China has been omitted from conversations concerning joint defense against either Germany or Japan and is ignorant of measures taken although she has borne brunt of fighting Japan, Germany’s ally, and defending interests democratic powers for four years. Either proposal, if initiated by the President, can safeguard China’s equal footing among anti-aggression peoples and remove stigma of discrimination. If considered inadvisable to make public either proposal, they could be kept confidential. With Britain, Russia and China now all resisting Germany and Japan, if an alliance of mutual assistance is not speedily concluded, Chinese people would be increasingly alarmed and suspicious of future actions, remembering their traditional policies.

Following information also confidential, though Russians may have informed British. When Britain and Russia concluded mutual assistance pact, Japanese Ambassador protested to Molotov⁸³ that Japan considers Britain potential enemy and would regard further rapprochement as hostile. Therefore, Generalissimo considers the time ripe for President to initiate either of moves proposed above in order to nullify Japanese propaganda, remove Chinese popular apprehension, and strengthen morale.

81. Infra; Owen Lattimore was American Political Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
82. On August 4 Dr. Currie replied: “Message received and transmitted to President who is on vacation.”
83. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.