794.00/258
The Third Secretary of Embassy in Japan (Espy) to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)73
Last evening at a dinner party attended by Mr. Emmerson,74 Mr. Herbert Norman of the Canadian Legation, myself, and Mr. Tomo[hiko] Ushiba, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, the points given below developed in our conversation. The conversation was a long one, lasting some three hours, and I have tried to collect, under separate headings, the remarks made to us by Mr. Ushiba. Of necessity some of the points represent fragmentary comments on the subjects indicated but it is hoped that they may fit in with and perhaps fill out information that you may have from other sources.
Japanese Cabinet
Mr. Ushiba said that the present Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, was very popular with Japanese extremists. He said that “his appointment is an example of Prince Konoye’s famous policy of appointing men popular with the extremists to carry out moderate policies.” He said that Admiral Toyoda was very reluctant to accept the position; that Admirals Oikawa and Sakonji had stayed up all one night in an endeavor to persuade him to take the portfolio, but it was only the Premier’s persuasion the next morning which made him do so. Mr. Ushiba told us that Admiral Toyoda was very much upset over the French Indochina affair. Mr. Ushiba said that the Japanese decision to carry out “the joint protection of French Indochina” had been made by the previous Cabinet and was a part of the Matsuoka diplomacy. He said that from the standpoint of this particular policy it would perhaps have been better for Mr. Matsuoka to have stayed in the Cabinet and seen the matter through since he was the originator of the policy. I asked Mr. Ushiba whether he thought our reaction to the Japanese action was as strong as Japan expected it to be. He said “it was just as strong as Japan had expected.” (In putting this question to Mr. Ushiba I had in mind, although I did not so state to him, reports that I have heard during the past two days from two sources to the effect that the Japanese were relieved that we [Page 355] had not taken stronger measures, such as possibly a complete embargo against Japan or even a more positive move. Our reaction, it was said, indicated that we were very loathe to take drastic measures against Japan, if not entirely unwilling to do so, and to bring on a possible clash in the Pacific because of the fact that we had to concentrate our attention in the Atlantic area.) Mr. Ushiba also informed us that while Admiral Toyoda had been very pessimistic over the events that had occurred since his assumption of office, Prince Konoye on the other hand appeared to view the situation quite optimistically.
Mr. Ushiba verified the statement made by Admiral Nomura to Mr. Welles that he (Admiral Nomura) had accepted the post of Ambassador to the United States at the request of Admiral Toyoda.
Mr. Ushiba said that Admiral Sakonji was a moderate and a great friend of Admiral Toyoda’s.
Mr. Ushiba said that Mr. Hirasawa, formerly of the American Section of the Foreign Office and now in the Japanese Consulate General in New York, is an extremist and that Mr. Ushiba’s own brother, who has been transferred to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin from the Japanese Embassy at London, is also an extremist.
Parenthetically Mr. Ushiba said that the word “extremist” had in the sense in which he used it the connotation of “pro-Axis”.
German-Soviet-Japanese Relations
Mr. Ushiba said that some people thought that Germany had hoped Japan would attack Russia immediately upon the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostilities. From his further remarks we gathered that he implied that Japan might do so later, but that the Government had decided to wait. I understood him to say that Ambassador Oshima at Berlin had, since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, been constantly and ever more persistently urging the Government to enter the war against Russia, and that there was a feeling that Mr. Matsuoka after the war began might also have urged the Japanese Government to do so: Mr. Emmerson does not recall these remarks.
Mr. Ushiba confirmed what we have been told before that Japan had joined the Axis on the basis of peace between Germany, Russia, and Japan, and also of keeping the United States out of the war. He said that when Stahmer74a came to Japan last fall the latter had urged Japan to reach an agreement with Russia. Later on, however, Germany turned around and told Japan even before the neutrality pact had been concluded that Japan should not enter into an agreement with Russia.
Mr. Ushiba said that when Mr. Matsuoka was in Berlin he did not send one telegram on his conversations with Hitler and that the Japanese [Page 356] Government has no evidence of what transpired at the talks or what commitments Mr. Matsuoka might have made there. He said that some circles thought that Mr. Matsuoka might have committed Japan to make an immediate attack on Russia upon the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostilities. He said that this was one subject, however, which had been kept completely secret. He added the remark that Germany has a full record of the meetings at Berlin75 and Japan has nothing. I mentioned to Mr. Ushiba that we had heard various reports that Germany was anxious to have Mr. Matsuoka leave the Cabinet and asked him whether this was true and what the reasons were therefor. He said that he thought that the reasons might be that Germany was angry at Japan, at Mr. Matsuoka in particular, for having concluded the neutrality pact and for not having immediately begun hostilities against Russia. At another point during the conversation Mr. Ushiba remarked that Mr. Matsuoka apparently had not informed Hitler of Japan’s intention to conclude an agreement with Russia and that this was probably a further cause for the German feeling regarding him.
German-Soviet War
Our conversation dwelt for some time on the possible outcome of the German-Soviet war. When asked what reports the Japanese Government had received from Russia and Germany in the matter, Mr. Ushiba stated that no reports had been received from Ambassador Tatekawa for two weeks but that the Ambassador’s last report was very pessimistic as regards the Russian position. The Ambassador had stated that the Russians were despondent and that Russian troops were solemnly marching off to war with “lowered heads”. He said that Ambassador Oshima on the other hand had been sending in very optimistic reports of a successful German offensive. He told us that Ambassador Oshima had been in constant touch with Hitler, who had been telling him that all is going well for Germany. He said that Ambassador Oshima had been flooding the Government with pro-Axis reports, so much so that some Japanese had dubbed Ambassador Oshima “Ribbentrop’s secretary”. According to one of the reports received from Ambassador Oshima, Hitler had said that the Russian air force was much worse than expected but that the German army had found the Russian infantry to be putting up far greater resistance than had been anticipated. (At this point in the conversation Mr. Norman injected the comment that he had heard from some military authority, he did not say of what nationality, that German reports of the capture of Kiev and Smolensk had not been entirely unfounded; as German panzer divisions had twice occupied Kiev and three times Smolensk but that each [Page 357] time the Russians had closed in behind, held up the German infantry-advance, and forced the panzer divisions to retire.) Mr. Ushiba said that the Japanese had been told by German sources that Moscow would be captured in six weeks’ time from the outbreak of the hostilities. He added that the most optimistic reports were to the effect that Moscow would be taken within a month, while others gave two months as the longest period before its fall. When asked what the opinion of the Japanese military was regarding the war situation, he said that it would be noticed from the papers that communiqués from both sides were being published in the Japanese press. He said that heed was being given to the despatches from each country and that it was realized that the contradictory accounts gave a confused picture of the actual status of the hostilities. He added, however, that Russian resistance might soon be crushed and Moscow captured only a few days thereafter. He gave us to understand that the Japanese military did not necessarily think that the war would be over if Moscow fell and gave the impression that the Japanese were not too sure yet of an early and complete defeat of Russia although they did expect an eventual German victory.
China
In discussing the China Affair, Mr. Ushiba stated that the Japanese Government was at first rather angry and put out with Ambassador Honda for having made his public statement in the early part of May. When Mr. Wang Ching-wei came to Japan, however, their feelings changed in the matter. He said that Wang had made a great impression. It seems that Wang threatened to resign and the Government then realized that Ambassador Honda had correctly warned Japan of the situation in China.
Mr. Ushiba quoted Premier Konoye as having stated that the China Incident could not be settled by Japan alone and had to be resolved by international negotiation. Mr. Ushiba described the China Affair as tragic. He said that it must be admitted that in the beginning the North China campaign had been started as a purely military aggressive action on the part of Japan. When, however, the North China Incident evolved into the China Incident and developed into the present tragic—he kept repeating that word—affair, the Government formulated the policy of a New Order in East Asia for the purpose of extricating Japan from the war. He said that former Foreign Minister Arita had misled Mr. Grew and Sir Robert Craigie in permitting them to believe that the situation as it then existed in China represented the New Order, whereas the New Order actually was an ideal to be set up after the hostilities had ended. He said he meant by the phrase “situation as it then existed in China” the fighting in China and the killing of Chinese.
[Page 358]Mr. Norman here pointed out that one of the reasons for suspicion of the New Order entertained by third powers was that there had not been explained what the New Order meant or entailed. Mr. Ushiba admitted the truth of this observation but stated that no Foreign Minister could explain the New Order and that it was indeed a vague conception. Mr. Ushiba appealed to us to understand the fact that the Japanese people really believed in and wholeheartedly supported the New Order in East Asia policy.
Rice Crop in Japan
Mr. Ushiba said that there would likely be a very poor rice crop this year in view of the weather conditions so far. He said that the rice crop would be even smaller than that of last year with the only redeeming feature that there were prospects for a good yield in Korea. He added in passing that it was not unusual to have two bad rice years in succession.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Japan in his despatch No. 5809, August 23; received October 2.↩
- John K. Emmerson, Third Secretary of Embassy in Japan.↩
- Heinrich Georg Stahmer, German adviser in the 1940 Axis Tripartite Pact parleys.↩
- See Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, pp. 280 ff.↩