Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 P. W./364: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 30, 1941—10 p.m.
[Received July 30—7:10 p.m.]

1131. Your 436, July 29, 3 p.m., is greatly appreciated. The eventual way out of the present situation would appear to lie in the third provision of the Franco-Japanese protocol of July 29⁷² to the effect that the validity of the stipulations of the agreement shall cease when the situation motivating their adoption no longer exists. The President’s proposal, if accepted and carried through, would effectively remove the alleged threat to the security of Indochina set forth in the preamble of the protocol as the fundamental purpose of the agreement. If Japan should reject the proposal or should avoid giving positive authorization to the President to proceed to carry out the proposal, Japan’s good faith would be brought into question, the honesty of her announced purpose and incentives would come before the tribunal of public opinion, and her position before the world and in the light of history would become doubly unenviable.

This, of course, assumes that the President’s proposal will eventually and inevitably be made known to the public, a point which might discreetly but helpfully be conveyed to Admiral Nomura in case the reply of the Japanese Government should be unduly delayed or should prove to be of a negative or evasive character. No progress can be made toward the adjustment of international relations without mutual confidence, and were the Japanese Government to withhold confidence in the helpful efforts of the President to find a way out of the impasse and in such eventual international assurances with regard to the security of Indochina as the President might be in a position to present, such an attitude on the part of Japan would oblige the United States completely to discount any expressed desire on the part of Japan for a restoration of good relations with the United States.

I know of no other way of possibly preventing the Japanese forces from “digging in” in Indochina than to bring the foregoing thoughts through Admiral Nomura squarely to the attention of the Japanese Government.

Grew

72. Signed by Admiral Darlan and the Japanese Ambassador in France (Kato). For U. S. position in regard thereto, see telegram No. 612, July 31, noon, to the Ambassador in France, vol. v, p. 243.