894.00/1064: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 18—10:10 a.m.]
1025. 1. In the absence of any authoritative statement with regard to the current Cabinet change,24 I believe that the Department may [Page 327] wish to review our series of telegrams dealing with Japanese reaction to the Soviet-German war beginning with the Embassy’s 867, June 23, 5 p.m.25 So far as we can ascertain the events which culminated in the resignation of the Cabinet followed the pattern which was outlined in those telegrams. As early as June 25 information was received that the unexpected German attack on Russia had placed the Cabinet in serious difficulties and that its resignation or reconstitution was likely (879, June 25, 10 p.m.26). It was pointed out that belief in continued peace between Germany and Russia had formed the basis of Japan’s action in concluding the alliance with Germany, that this grave miscalculation of Germany’s aspirations and policies could not be passed off without important internal adjustments and that after there had been formulated a new policy in the light of the situation created by the German attack on Russia adjustments of personnel within the Cabinet would be made along lines best conceived to implement such policy (891, June 27, 6 p.m.27).
2. In our opinion it did not seem possible that officials close to the throne would have permitted to escape unscathed those members of the government responsible for the formulation and implementation of a policy based on grave misconceptions. Baron Hiranuma whose government had been surprised by the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty in 1939,28 in presenting the resignation of his Cabinet, invoked the principle that “a Minister must assume responsibility when he causes anxiety to his sovereign”; and our belief that he would insist on the observance of that principle in the present instance was confirmed to us yesterday by a close friend of his.
3. The fact that Prince Konoye has been commanded to form a new government would indicate that he has been absolved of responsibility for the progressive deterioration of Japan’s international position. It has been broadly hinted that there have been grave differences of opinion between him and Mr. Matsuoka. We are aware for example that Mr. Matsuoka’s interpretation of Article III of the Tripartite Treaty—that Japan would probably decide to side with Germany if war should occur between the United States and Germany—is not shared by Prince Konoye (924, July 2, 7 p.m.29). It seems probable that the resignation of the Cabinet en bloc was a device which has been used several times in the past to make possible the elimination from the Cabinet of dissident ministers without recourse to the drastic method of the Emperor being asked by the Prime Minister to dismiss such ministers. Whether or not this explanation is [Page 328] correct will be demonstrated by appointments to the new Cabinet. No suggestion has yet appeared in the press that Mr. Matsuoka is to be reappointed to the Foreign Office (in fact he was referred to this morning by one paper as “the retiring Foreign Minister”).
- In telegrams No. 1014, July 16, midnight (894.00/1057) and No. 1019, July 17, 5 p.m. (894.00/1058), respectively, the Ambassador in Japan informed the Department of the en bloc resignation of the entire Cabinet on July 16 and the designation on July 17 of Prince Konoye to head the new government.↩
- Post, p. 979.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Post, p. 987.↩
- Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1989–1941, p. 76.↩
- Post, p. 991.↩