740.0011 E W 1939/7908½
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to President Roosevelt 15a
My Dear Mr. President: We arrived in Vichy at midnight 5–6 January after an exceedingly long cold journey by train and motor car from Madrid during which there was one thirty-six hour stretch without sleep and without any sensible heat except that which could be applied internally. The temperature throughout this part of France during our first ten days varied between –12 and –20 Centigrade, and the poorly clothed, undernourished people have suffered acutely.
On 8 January at noon in the Pavilion Sévigné I presented my credentials to the Chief of State in a ceremony of some formality that included a sailor guard of honor provided in special recognition of my naval rank. Our First Secretary, Mr. Matthews,15b and I had a fifteen minute conversation with the Marshal, who was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Flandin. The Marshal, who was very alert and interested, carried the entire conversation to the exclusion of M. Flandin, who did not say a word. The Marshal expressed high appreciation of your courtesy to him and of your friendship for France. He gave me a definite impression of vigor and strength of character, and of personal appreciation of the friendly attitude of America.
The next day, 9 January at 4 p.m., accompanied by Mr. Matthews, I presented to the Marshal in the presence of M. Flandin, the State Department’s stipulations in the matter of shipment by our Red Cross of milk, medicine and clothing for destitute French children, and obtained from him a complete agreement to all the conditions imposed. [Page 104] This late afternoon conference, which lasted more than an hour, was conducted almost exclusively by M. Flandin, the Marshal very different from our forenoon conference of the preceding day, giving every appearance of a tired, discouraged old man.
Foreign Minister Flandin discussed at length a very serious condition in which the Marshal’s Government finds itself because of present and prospective critical deficiencies in the food supply. He said, and the Marshal agreed, that the Germans in occupied France are conducting an active press campaign which holds the Vichy Government responsible for the existing food shortage, and which may bring about the fall of the Government and the extension of German control to the present unoccupied area. I am inclined to doubt that the Germans will take such action.
Marshal Petain stated that his only hope for the coming months is that the good offices of the United States will succeed in easing blockade restrictions on the import of essential foodstuffs to France, and in assistance by the American Red Cross.
My stay in France to date has been too short to permit of acquiring accurate information as to the actual need for foodstuffs but it is plainly apparent now that many people here in the unoccupied area are in acute distress from cold and undernourishment.
It would be patently advantageous to the cultivation of friendly relations with the French people and to the stiffening of the Marshal’s resistance to German demands if the American Red Cross should deliver in unoccupied France essential foods, clothing and medicine, where they are most needed, with the one and only condition that the Red Cross will exercise such supervision over the distribution as will insure that none of the supplies will either directly or indirectly be of any assistance to the aggressors.
Such single condition is essential and would be cheerfully accepted. Any additional conditions would adversely affect public reaction to our effort and public confidence in our good intentions.
I have made satisfactory contacts with the Marshal and with his inner Cabinet of three—Admiral Darlan, General Huntziger,15c and M. Flandin, and I am now developing contacts with the other members of the Government (Cabinet members) who just at this time seem to have little influence on matters of general policy.
They have all been exceedingly polite and agreeable to me.
I have already received the following very definite first impressions:
Marshal Pétain is remarkably capable for a man of his age but the burden of work which he has assumed is beyond his physical capacity.
He does not appear to have complete confidence in any of his Cabinet.
[Page 105]He has an intense dislike for M. Laval16 who is trying to displace him as actual head of the Government and relegate him to the position of a symbol.
He is very sensitive to German pressure, particularly when it is applied to the war prisoners, to the food supply, and to the authority of his Vichy Government.
He will make every effort to live up to the terms of the Armistice and to not go beyond those terms.
He will not under any conditions abandon continental France and move his Government to Africa.
He and his Cabinet are so impressed by the failure of France to even delay the German Army that they believe that an English victory is impossible.
I am, of course, making every effort to point out the probability of a British victory.
It is highly desirable that England should accomplish some kind of a success against German forces in the near future. The capture of Tobrouk and the Greek success in Albania have had some effect but from the French point of view the “invincible” German Army was not involved in either of these campaigns.
The French people all appear to desire a British victory. Many officials of the Government also appear to hope for but not to expect a British victory.
They are therefore in a frame of mind to make almost any compromise with Berlin.
I am afraid that under German pressure the Marshal will take M. Laval back into his Government although he believes Laval to be dishonest and unpatriotic. “A bad Frenchman”.
I have been trying to stiffen his backbone in this matter by saying that Laval’s return to power will be only the beginning of a series of concessions to be demanded by the Germans with exactly the same pressure methods to be used to force compliance with future demands.
General Huntziger impresses me as the strongest character in the Cabinet. I am told that Germany does not like him.
Admiral Darlan is very friendly with me and we “talk shop” easily.
He despises the British Naval Command, loves his own Navy, and insists that his ships will be scuttled if orders are received from any authority to turn them over to anybody. He is considered by many to be the most likely successor to the Marshal, should the latter drop out. Darlan is not pro-German but like all the others he thinks the Germans will win.
M. Flandin is a compromiser and he leans pretty far over to the German side. He gives one the impression of being honest and patriotic, but not a strong character.
[Page 106]None of the officials with whom I have made contact have any regard whatever for the pre-war form of Government.
All of them, including the Marshal, seem to incline to something like the Fascist Government of Italy without its expansionist policy.
Many of them seem to be afraid of Communist (Red) activity in France at the first opportunity.
All of this, Mr. President, is first impressions, after a very short time in contact with the Vichy Government, and therefore likely to change.
I will endeavor to keep you informed by letter from time to time of the rapidly changing situation as it appears from this point of view.
Most respectfully,
P. S. M. Flandin at lunch today indicated that he would like at some time in the near future to speak about the possibility of the President inaugurating discussions looking toward peace negotiations. He received no encouragement from me, but he may open up the subject later and I will keep you fully informed.