859A.20/208/12
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of
State
[Washington,] July 1, 1941.
The British Ambassador called me on the telephone this morning to say
that he had information for me with regard to the Iceland question. I
consequently arranged to see the Ambassador at eleven o’clock.
The Ambassador came in with two messages for me which are attached
herewith. He read to me likewise additional telegrams he had received
from his Government which made it entirely clear that the Icelandic
Government and the British Government approved entirely of the texts of
the messages proposed by the President to be exchanged between the Prime
Minister of Iceland and himself and likewise with regard to all of the
other steps, including the timing of publicity to be given to these
messages as specified in the last conversation I had with the Ambassador
on this subject. The sole reservation
[Page 791]
made was that the Icelandic Government, for the
reasons expressed in the memorandum handed to me by the Ambassador,
hoped that the President would agree to use the phrase “to replace”
instead of the phrase suggested by the President “to supplement and
perhaps eventually to replace” in the penultimate sentence of the first
paragraph of the message to be sent by the Prime Minister of Iceland to
the President. I said that this suggestion had been made by the
President himself and that I doubted very much that the President would
feel able to modify his decision in that regard, but that I would submit
the matter to the President and let the Ambassador have the President’s
decision in the matter.
It was further clearly stated by the Ambassador that the Prime Minister
of Iceland agreed that the agreement now reached between him and the
President as to the texts of the two messages to be exchanged should be
regarded as sufficient and that no texts need actually be
telegraphed.
I subsequently spoke with the President on the telephone and he
authorized me to state to the Ambassador that he was willing to omit the
word “perhaps” from the suggested message but that he would have to
insist upon the retention of the phrase “to supplement and eventually to
replace” in lieu of the mere phrase “to replace”.
I then called Lord Halifax on the telephone and communicated to him the
President’s decision. Lord Halifax said that I was to understand that
this was entirely satisfactory to the Prime Minister of Iceland and that
the two texts of the messages were now to be regarded as finally
approved.
[Annex 1]
The penultimate sentence of the first paragraph of the text of the
message which the Iceland Prime Minister originally suggested that
he should send to the President ran as follows:
“He also called my attention to the declaration of the
President of the United States to the effect that he must
take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the
Western Hemisphere—one of President’s measures is to assist
in the defence of Iceland—and that the President is
therefore prepared to send here immediately United States
troops to replace the British force here.”
This paragraph was redrafted by the President to run as follows:—
“He also called my attention to the declaration of the
President of the United States to the effect that he must
take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the
Western Hemisphere—one of the President’s measures is to
assist in the defense of Iceland—and that the President is
therefore prepared to send here immediately United States
troops to supplement and perhaps eventually to replace the
British force here.”
[Page 792]
The Iceland Prime Minister has now replied through the British
Minister in Reykjavik that the Iceland Government would greatly
prefer the original wording which they themselves suggested.
This is important from the point of view of their own internal
political position. They had counted on being able to defend their
action in the Icelandic Parliament by saying that Iceland would now
be accepting the protection of a non-belligerent power instead of
that of a belligerent. The wording desired by the President
suggests, however, that in theory, at all events, Iceland may be
under a joint occupation for an indefinite period. The Iceland
Government do not understand the necessity for the President’s
amendment since they feel that it is already provided that it should
be left to the judgment of the United States and British Governments
to decide when the British forces should leave.
One of the “reservations” or “conditions” asked by the Iceland
Government from His Majesty’s Government, and accepted by the
latter, ran as follows:—
“Great Britain promises to withdraw all her armed forces as
soon as the transport of the United States forces is so far
advanced that their military strength is sufficient for the
defence of the country. The defence of the country while the
change is to be effected never to be less than they are
now.”
The Iceland Government hope that if the President feels unable to
withdraw his proposed amendment and return to the text originally
suggested by the Iceland Prime Minister, he will be prepared to have
the word “perhaps” in his draft omitted.
The Iceland Government agree to the President’s proposal that once
the texts of the two messages have been finally agreed upon46 this agreement shall be
regarded as being equivalent to the two notes having been exchanged
and it will not be necessary for them actually to be telegraphed.
The Iceland Government also agree that as soon as the draft messages
have been finally settled the United States forces should
start.47
July 1, 1941.
[Annex 2]
The Foreign Office are anxious to be informed as long as possible in
advance of the date and hour of publication in Washington of the
exchange of messages between the President and the Iceland Prime
Minister. They are also anxious to know whether the President
proposes to publish any other material at the same time. In that
event they would like if possible to be informed of the text of this
additional material in advance.
