740.0011 European War 1939/20095

The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy), Temporarily at Algiers, to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

Dear Mr. Secretary: I enclose as of possible interest and to show the trend of thought of many representative Frenchmen who are interested in French Africa, a memorandum of a conversation with M. J. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, owner of Le Jour and a prominent French business man having important interests in French West Africa.

Faithfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy), Temporarily at Algiers

I received the visit this afternoon on my return from Casablanca of Mr. J. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who arrived on Thursday from Dakar [Page 495] en route to France. M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil is the owner of the newspaper Le Jour and has important interests in the edible oil industry, particularly West African peanut oil. He tells me that his invested capital in French West Africa is in the neighborhood of 60 to 70 million francs. He has industrial interests in the occupied zone. He is the proprietor of the Lesieur edible oil plant at Dunkirk which was bombed by the Royal Air Force a few days ago, causing damage, he says, to the extent of four million francs.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil has always professed the friendliest sentiments in respect of the United States, and ever since General Weygand’s arrival in French Africa, has evinced a desire to support his administration. He claims to be, and I believe he is, anti-German, for sentimental reasons and because he is convinced that German domination of France will in the end cause him to lose his own business, as it will lose to most Frenchmen the direction of their own affairs. He has said repeatedly that we should understand that some French business men still believe their interests would be best served by a German victory, and that a British victory would only mean the bolshevization of France.

The purpose of M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil’s visit was to tell me that he considered General Weygand’s dismissal in the nature of a major catastrophe which might well lead to France’s loss of her African empire. Therefore, he said he proposed to work for the establishment of a French African provisional government which would be independent of Vichy. He declared that he is in contact with leading French officials and military authorities in French West and North Africa whose names he will disclose to me at a later date. I know that he has important connections. He said, however, that his plan is dependent on American support. He believes that nothing can be accomplished unless the United States would be prepared to consider the following program:

1
—Recognize such a provisional government immediately it is established;
2
—Provide transport ships to carry French effectives and military equipment now at Dakar to French North Africa;
3
—Arrange for the immediate shipment of arms and ammunition to North Africa against payment to be made by the provisional government with gold now stored in French Africa;
4
—Be prepared to send an expeditionary force of at least three divisions to French North Africa;
5
—Guarantee the complete restoration of all the French Empire to France after the termination of hostilities;
6
—Accept French command of military forces in French Africa;
7
—When French Africa proclaims its independence the United States should send at least four warships to Bizerta as a demonstration [Page 496] of its sympathy with the purpose of the French African provisional government to resist axis aggression.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil insisted that under such plan it must be demonstrated that the French are acting independently of the United States and that we must be careful to avoid any appearance of collusion.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil also recommended that in any dealings with French Africa, the United States must use the greatest discretion as the Germans today are maintaining a most active surveillance of everything which concerns this area. He said that after all there were only two ways of defeating the Germans: (1) by force or (2) by duplicity. He said that thus far the French position is that not having any means to resist by force, of necessity they must resort to ruse. In his own case, for example, as his business requires him to go from the occupied French zone to Africa, since his interests lie in both places, he is even going to the extent of having a police record carefully prepared which will be shown to the Germans indicating that he is a collaborationist and pro-nazi.

I told Lemaigre-Dubreuil, whom I have known for a long time, that his ideas are most interesting; that at the moment I could give him no indication of the policy of my government with respect to French Africa, because as I understand it, that policy is at present under discussion at Washington. I could only tell him that as he already knows, our general policy is to assist all those who offer resistance to axis aggression.

M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who is now en route to Paris, and who, of course, runs a grave risk should his actual plans become known to the German authorities, promised that he would keep me informed of future developments. He expects to return to French West Africa on December 22.

R[obert] D. M[urphy]